Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that Jorge Othon, who purchased property from Victalina Carreon but never recorded the deed with the county recorder, may not collaterally challenge a default judgment entered in a separate tax lien foreclosure action.The property Othon purchased was encumbered by delinquent property taxes. Advanced Property Tax Liens, Inc. (APTL) purchased a tax lien on the property and then filed a tax lien foreclosure action against Carreon. The trial court entered default judgment against Carreon. APTL then filed this quiet title action seeking to establish its title to the property. Othon filed an answer and counterclaim requesting that the trial court determine that the default judgment in the foreclosure action was void due to invalid service on Carreon, and declare that title to the property vested in Othon. The trial court granted summary judgment for Othon. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Othon could not, in this quiet title action, collaterally attack the default judgment entered in the foreclosure action. View "Advanced Property Tax Liens, Inc. v. Othon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that legislative amendments to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-751(F)(5) enacted in 2019 did not provide a basis for post-conviction relief under Ariz. R. Cim. P. 32.1(a), (c), (g), or (h) for a sentence of death imposed in 1996 because the amendments were prospective only and the death sentence was constitutional.In 1996, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder - felony and premeditated. The trial court sentenced him to death. In 2020, Defendant filed this successive post-conviction relief (PCR) petition alleging that his death sentence was now unconstitutional as a consequence of 2019 legislative amendments. The superior court granted relief and vacated Defendant's death sentence. The Supreme Court reversed and affirmed Defendant's sentence, holding that the sentence was lawfully imposed and did not violate Defendant's constitutional rights under either the United States or Arizona Constitutions. View "State v. Greene" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that certain statements made on air by a radio talk show host about a political figure could not serve as a basis for a defamation action given each statement's content, the overall context, and the protections afforded to core political speech by the First Amendment.Respondent Daniel McCarthy, a "Republican political hopeful," sued James Harris, a radio host on a local station owned by iHeartMedia, Inc. (collectively, Petitioners), alleging that statements made by Harris on his radio show were defamatory. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the statements were rhetorical hyperbole incapable of being proved false and thus protected by the First Amendment. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that none of the statements at issue were actionable because none of them could be reasonably interpreted as asserting or implying false statements of fact that defamed McCarthy. View "Harris v. Honorable Warner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded these cases to the court of appeals dismissing these appeals for lack of jurisdiction, holding that these were direct appeals over which the court of appeals had jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-4033(A).Petitioners were both sentenced to natural life for murders they committed when they were under the age of eighteen. After the Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) Petitioners filed postconviction relief (PCR) petitions to vacate their sentences. The trial court resentenced Petitioners. Thereafter, the court vacated the resentencings, concluding that Miller did not apply. Petitioners appealed pursuant to section 13-4033(A)(3). The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for failure to comply with the petition for review procedures set forth in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.16(a)(1). The Supreme Court remanded the cases, holding that the court of appeals had jurisdiction over the appeals. View "State v. Purcell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that on-going, at-will, consumer-business relationships consist of the day-to-day offer and acceptance of unilateral contracts, and thus, businesses may effectively modify the non-negotiated, standardized terms governing those relationships if the business can demonstrate certain elements.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether an effective modification of a consumer contract can occur when the offeror sends notice of the proposed modification to the offeree through a communication channel to which the offeree previously consented even if the offeree fails to respond. In considering the requirements for modifying the terms of at-will, on-going, business-consumer relationships, the Supreme Court held that its jurisprudence did not provide definitive guidance and that Restatement of Consumer Contracts 3 is hereby adopted to fill that void. View "Cornell v. Desert Financial Credit Union" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the superior court could adjudicate the challenge brought by Legacy Foundation Action Fund to the subject matter jurisdiction of the Clean Elections Commission in a collateral proceeding and that issue preclusion did not apply under the circumstances.The issues raised in this appeal stemmed from a 2014 election-related dispute between Legacy and the Commission. Legacy failed timely to appeal the final administrative decision of the Commission assessing a penalty for Legacy's violation of the Citizens Clean Elections Act. Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that the superior court lacked appellate jurisdiction to decide the issue of whether the Commission acted within its subject matter jurisdiction. At issue before the Supreme Court here was whether the superior court could adjudicate the issue of the Commission's jurisdiction in a collateral proceeding. The Supreme Court answered (1) because a judgment entered by a tribunal lacking subject matter jurisdiction was void the superior court could adjudicate Legacy's challenge to the Commission's subject matter jurisdiction in a collateral proceeding; and (2) because the Commission did not serve as a neutral decision maker in deciding its own jurisdiction, Legacy was deprived of a full and fair adjudication of the issue, and therefore, issue preclusion did not apply. View "Legacy Foundation Action Fund v. Citizens Clean Elections Comm'n" on Justia Law

In this case concerning the meaning and application of a standard title insurance policy exclusion (Exclusion 3(a)) designed to cover any defects, encumbrances, or adverse claims created or suffered by the insured in the context of construction lending, holding that this Court's opinion in First American Title Insurance Co. v. Action Acquisitions, LLC, 218 Ariz. 394 (2008), sets forth the proper interpretation and application Exclusion 3(a).In its underlying rulings, the trial court invoked Action Acquisitions to interpret Exclusion 3(a) in the construction lending context. The court of appeals reversed, instead applying the bright-line rule articulated in BB Syndication Services, Inc. v. First American Title Insurance Co., 780 F.3d 825 (7th Cir. 2015). The Supreme Court reversed in part and vacated the judgment in part, holding (1) this Court adopts Action Acquisitions' causation test for Exclusion 3(a)'s applicability; and (2) the court of appeals erred in applying the BB Syndication approach. View "Fidelity National Title Insurance Co. v. Osborn III Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the post-conviction relief (PCR) court determining that Appellant raised a colorable claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel and ordering him to disclose certain materials, holding that the PCR court did not err in ordering the disclosure of the records.Appellant was found guilty of two counts of first degree murder and sentenced to death. In these PCR proceedings, the PCR court determined that Appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim in III(A)-III(E) of the PCR petition was colorable. The court then ordered Appellant to disclose materials associated with trial counsel's interviews of three of Appellant's family members who did not testify during the penalty phase of trial. Appellant filed a petition for special action, claiming that he should not have to disclose the records at issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was good cause for the disclosure of materials associated with the interviews under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.6(b)(2). View "Naranjo v. Honorable Sukenic" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Arizona Department of Revenue (ADOR) is not required to assess the money collected from a taxpayer-business's customers to cover transaction privilege taxes against the responsible person pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 42-1104(A) before filing a collection lawsuit.ADOR brought suit against Peter Tunkey and his wife (together, Tunkey) to recover unpaid transaction privilege taxes (TPTs) pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 42-5028, which imposes liability on a "person" for failing to remit to ADOR any "additional charge" made to cover the tax. The tax court granted Summary judgment for ADOR and entered judgment against Tunkey for $26,000 in unpaid TPTs. Tunkey appealed, arguing that the tax court erred in ruling that ADOR was not required to timely assess the $26,000 amount against him personally before filing suit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 42-1104(A) did not require ADOR to notify Tunkey of "additional taxes due" because the unpaid TPT charges did not constitute an "additional tax due" triggering section 42-1104(A)'s notice requirement. View "State v. Tunkey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the justification defense provided in Arizona's self-defense statute, Arizona. Rev. Stat. 13-404(A), does not extend to both the defendant and the victim but only applies to a defendant's conduct. Section 13-404(A) states that "a person is justified in threatening or using physical force against another when and to the extent a reasonable person would believe that physical force is immediately necessary to protect [one]self against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful physical force." However, Rev. Ariz. Jury Instr. (Crim.) Justification for Self-Defense 4.04, at 63-65 (4th ed. 2016), states that the justification defense applies not to a "person" but to a "defendant." The court of appeals vacated Defendant's convictions and remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the justification presumptions were not intended to apply to the victim's conduct. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) the term "person" in section 13-404(A) applies to a defendant in a criminal prosecution; and (2) therefore, the trial court erred when it modified the standard Revised Arizona Jury Instruction to incorporate a victim's use of force. View "State v. Ewer" on Justia Law