Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that Ariz. Rev. Stat. 23-1043.01(B), which limits workers' compensation claims for mental illnesses to those that arise from an "unexpected, unusual or extraordinary stress" situation, does not violate Ariz. Const. art. XVIII, 8 or equal protection guarantees under Ariz. Const. art. II, 13.Plaintiff, an officer with the Tucson Police Department, filed an industrial injury claim arising from an incident in June 2018, claiming that it exacerbated his preexisting post-traumatic stress disorder. An administrative law judge found Plaintiff's claims for mental injuries non-compensable because the June 2018 incident was not an "unexpected, unusual or extraordinary stress" situation under section 23-1043.01(B). The court of appeals affirmed the denial of benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 23-1043.01(B) does not unconstitutionally limit recovery for stress-related workplace injuries. View "Matthews v. Industrial Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court, after a jury trial, in this tort action for first-party insurance bad faith, holding that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on waiver and mitigation of damages.Plaintiff sued Defendant for insurance bad faith. Defendant denied liability and asked the trial court to instruct the jury on waiver, in the form of a contract waiver instruction, and mitigation of damages. The trial court granted Defendant's request for both jury instructions, and the jury returned a verdict for Defendant. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the waiver jury instruction was misleading and prejudicial to Plaintiff, requiring a remand for a new trial. View "Cavallo v. Phoenix Health Plans, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that public policy prohibits an agreement between a builder-vendor and a homebuyer to disclaim and waive the warranty of workmanship and habitability implied in every contract entered into between the buyer-vendor and homebuyer and to replace it with an express warranty.Plaintiff entered into a preprinted purchase agreement with M & RC II, LLC to buy a home that M & RC II's affiliate, Scott Homes Development Company, would build. Plaintiff later sued M & RC II and Scott Homes (together, Defendants) for breach of the implied warranty of workmanship and habitability. Defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff had waived the implied warranty per the purchase agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the public policy underlying the implied warranty of workmanship and habitability clearly outweighed enforcement of the waiver of that warranty in the purchase agreement. View "Zambrano v. M & RC II LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions on two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, two counts of aggravated assault causing temporary but substantial disfigurement, and one count of attempted second degree murder, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.At issue on appeal was whether the trial court committed fundamental error by instructing the jury that a conviction for attempted second degree murder may be based not only on intent to kill but on recklessness or the defendant's knowledge that serious injury would result. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) the trial court's instruction on second degree murder was erroneous, and a new instruction is necessary, which the Court adopts in this opinion; and (2) based on the evidence, the nature of the charged offense, and other factors, Defendant fell short of meeting his burden of persuading the Court that he suffered prejudice. View "State v. Fierro" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that while the broad evidence rule is not applicable in Arizona such that that an insurer and/or fact-finder may consider labor depreciation as a pertinent factor in determining the term "actual cash value" in a homeowner's insurance policy, this Court does not categorically preclude application of the broad evidence rule with respect to other homeowners' insurance policies where appropriate.Plaintiffs purchased a homeowners insurance policy from Defendant that did not define the terms "actual cash value" or "depreciation." When Plaintiffs' home received water damage Defendant accepted coverage for the loss. Plaintiffs then filed a complaint alleging that Defendant underpaid them and other similarly situated insureds by depreciating both materials and labor when calculating property damage claims under their respective homeowners' insurance policies. The federal district court certified two questions to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered (1) under the terms of the policy at issue, an insurer may not depreciate the cost of labor when determining actual cash value, and the broad evidence rule does not apply; and (2) there is no bar to application of the broad evidence rule where the terms of the policy do not dictate otherwise in the context of other homeowners' insurance policies in Arizona. View "Walker v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Arizona Corporation Commission, acting by a majority of its commissioners, may not prevent an individual commissioner from exercising investigatory powers pursuant to Ariz. Const. art. XV, 4, and a commission aggrieved by such action may seek judicial recourse by way of declaratory judgment pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-1831 to -1846.The court of appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court dismissing the underlying case brought by Plaintiff, a member of the Commission, seeking declaratory relief and arguing that individual commissioners have authority to demand compliance with subpoenas without the approval from other commissioners. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals and reversed the superior court's denial of summary judgment on the issues before the Court, holding (1) the Arizona Constitution does not allow a majority of commissioners to prevent any single commissioner from exercising the investigatory powers expressly granted to each in article 15, section 4; and (2) the Arizona Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act grants a commissioner standing to seek a declaration of his and his colleagues' rights. View "Burns v. Arizona Public Service Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court rejecting objections based on the issue of whether signatures collected by some initiative petition circulators must be disqualified because those circulators failed to strictly comply with two registration requirements, holding that this Court declines to disqualify any signatures as a result of the circulators' failure to strictly comply with Ariz. Rev. Stat. 19-102.01(A).At issue was a challenge to the Voters' Right to Know Act, a proposed statewide initiative for the November 8, 2022 general election ballot. Challengers filed this lawsuit challenging the legal sufficiency of certain circulator registrations. The trial court denied most of Challengers' objections. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) circulators failed to strictly comply with one statutory requirement which ordinarily would require the Secretary of State to disqualify the signatures gathered by those circulators; and (2) because the registration process prevented compliance with the statute, enforcing the statutory disqualification requirement would "unnecessarily hinder or restrict" the constitutional right to engage in the initiative process. View "Leibsohn v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

In this marriage dissolution case, the Supreme Court held that the appropriate method of establishing the marital community's interest in separate property should begin with trial judges using the "Drahos/Barnett formula" and then adjust the calculation to account for the community's overall contribution of labor and funds to the separate property along with the market appreciation of the property.At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the formula laid out in Drahos v. Rent, 149 Ariz. 248 (App. 1985) and refined in Branett v. Jedymak, 219 Ariz. 550 (App. 2009) (the Drahos/Barnett formula) was the appropriate method of establishing the marital community's equitable lien on a spouse's separate property, in order to provide for a fair division of the separate property’s increase in value proportionate to the amount the community contributed to the property. The Supreme Court held that the Drahos/Barnett formula is an appropriate starting point for courts to calculate a marital community's equitable lien on a spouse's separate property, thus affirming the trial court's judgment in this case. View "Saba v. Khoury" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that when a debtor defaults on a debt secured by a deed of trust and the trustee chooses to sell the property, the trustee's act of recording and serving a notice of trustee's sale does not accelerate the debt as a matter of law.Plaintiff defaulted on a loan for which he executed a promissory note secured by a deed of trust against his residential property. Thereafter, two notices of trustee's sales were recorded, but neither notice invoked an optional acceleration clause included in the promissory note and deed of trust. When the property was not sold, Nationstar Mortgage LLC began servicing the loan. Plaintiff sought declaratory relief, arguing that Nationstar was not permitted to foreclose on the property the six-year statute of limitations contained in Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-548(A)(1) had expired. The trial court granted summary judgment for Plaintiff, concluding that the notices of trustee's sales accelerated the debt. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the entry of summary judgment in favor of Nationstar, holding that the recording a notice of trustee's sale, by itself, is not an affirmative act that accelerates the debt. View "Bridges v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the trial court that the Senate disclose all communications concerning an audit to American Oversight, holding that communications concerning legislative activities need not relate to proposed or pending legislation nor require an affirmative showing of indirect impairment of legislative deliberations to qualify for legislative privilege.At issue in this case was the scope and application of legislative privilege pursuant to the "Gravel/Fields framework" under the Arizona Constitution and common law. In 2020, Senate members contracted to conduct an audit of ballots cast in Maricopa County. American Oversight, a nonprofit organization, filed a complaint under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 39-121 to compel disclosure of the documents. The trial court rejected the Senate's immunity claim and ordered it to disclose the documents. When the Senate submitted a privilege log listing several withheld and redacted communications along with the requested documents American Oversight moved to compel the Senate to produce the withheld records. The trial court rejected the Senate's legislative privilege claim and granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Gravel/Fields framework requires that the Senate only disclose communications concerning administrative, political, or other non-legislative matters. View "Fann v. Honorable Kemp" on Justia Law