Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Douglas Eddington was charged as an accomplice in the murder of the son of a Tucson police officer. During voir dire, one potential juror stated he was employed as a deputy sheriff with the law enforcement agency that had investigated the crime. The trial court denied Eddington's motion to strike the deputy for cause, and the jury ultimately found Eddington guilty of second degree murder. The court of appeals held that the trial court erred in refusing to strike the deputy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a peace officer currently employed by the law enforcement agency that investigated the case is an "interested person," who is disqualified from sitting as a juror by Ariz. Rev. Stat. 21-211(2). View "State v. Eddington" on Justia Law

Michael Hummons agreed to speak with a police officer on the sidewalk. During the encounter the officer discovered an outstanding warrant for Hummons' arrest. The officer arrested Hummons, and in a search incident to that arrest discovered drugs and drug paraphernalia in Hummons' backpack. At trial Hummons moved to suppress the evidence, arguing it was obtained as the result of an illegal detention. The trial court denied the motion, finding the officer's encounter with Hummons consensual. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the appellate court, holding that the court overemphasized the importance the warrant as an intervening circumstance in dissipating the taint of any prior illegality and that the court should have applied the third Brown v. Illinois factor, i.e., the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. The Court held the totality of the circumstances militated against suppressing the evidence and upheld the judgment of the trial court.View "State v. Hummons" on Justia Law

Jacob Braden, an adult with developmental disabilities, died as a result of injuries suffered while residing at an Arizona Integrated Residential and Educational Services (AIRES) facility. AIRES is a licensed private corporation that contracts with the Arizona Department of Economic Security's Division of Developmental Disabilities. Jacob's estate sued the State, alleging a statutory claim under the Adult Protective Services Act (APSA) for abuse and neglect. The trial court granted summary judgment for the State, finding it was not a proper defendant under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 46-455, which permits an action under APSA against a "person" or an "enterprise." The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the State was not exempt from liability under section 46-455. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed the superior court after applying the rules of statutory construction to section 46-455, concluding that the State was not liable under APSA because the legislature did not intend to include the State in its expressly enumerated list of potential APSA defendants. View "Estate of Braden v. State" on Justia Law

After Petitioner was indicted on child abuse, the State extended a plea offer in May 2009 without imposing a deadline for its acceptance. A new prosecutor was assigned to the case in August 2009 and notified Petitioner that the offer was no longer available. Petitioner moved under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.8, which authorizes sanctions if a prosecutor imposes a plea deadline and fails to disclose certain information to the defense at least thirty days before the offer lapses, to preclude any evidence disclosed after July 29, 2009. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals granted relief to Petitioner, holding that rule 15.8 applied because the State effectively imposed a deadline on the offer by withdrawing it. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals, holding (1) rule 15.8 does not apply when a prosecutor withdraws an open-ended plea offer; and (2) in such a situation, Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.7 governs the imposition of sanctions for any failure to make required disclosures. Remanded. View "Rivera-Longoria v. Superior Court (Slayton)" on Justia Law

Plaintiff refinanced her home by executing a promissory note in favor of Saxon Mortgage and a deed of trust (DOT) naming Saxon as beneficiary and a title company as trustee. Saxon assigned the note to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as trustee for Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2005-3 by endorsing the note in blank. The assignment was not recorded. Plaintiff defaulted under the note. Deutsche Bank then executed a substitution of trustee, removing the title company as trustee and appointing Tiffany and Bosco as the substituting trustee. Tiffany and Bosco recorded a notice of trustee's sale, naming "Deutsche Bank/2005-3" as the current beneficiary in care of Saxon Mortgage Services. An agent of Saxon then executed an assignment of the DOT, assigning all its beneficial interest to Deutsche Bank. The Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction of questions certified by the United State Bankruptcy Court, answering that the recording of an assignment of deed of trust is not required prior to the filing of a notice of trustee's sale under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 33-808 when the assignee holds a promissory note payable to bearer. View "Vasquez v. Saxon Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

Citizens for a Better Arizona (CBA) filed a recall petition with Secretary of State Ken Bennett seeking to recall State Senator Russell Pearce. After determining that the petition contained more signatures than required, Secretary Bennett filed the petition with the Governor's office. Governor Janice Brewer then ordered a special election for the recall of State Senator Russell Pearce. Six days later, Franklin Ross, a District 18 elector, filed suit to enjoin the recall election, alleging that the recall petition failed to meet constitutional and statutory requirements. The superior court refused to enjoin the election. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that CBA's petition for the recall of Senator Pearce substantially complied with the constitutional and statutory requirements, including the requirements that the circulators of the petition subscribe to an oath that the signatures are genuine and that the petition contain a general statement of the grounds for recall. View "Ross v. Bennett" on Justia Law

In May 2006, Mesa police responded to an aggravated assault call. Officers went to the apartment complex where Appellant Laquinn Fisher lived. Officers knocked and announced their presence. Appellant and two others came to the door. None had weapons, and all there were cooperative. Appellant matched a description given by the alleged assault victim. Despite having this information, officers thought further investigation was necessary because a gun used in the assault was still "unaccounted for. Without asking whether anyone else was inside, police entered the apartment to see if anyone else was there. Inside, officers smelled marijuana and observed open duffle bags containing drugs. After the sweep, officers obtained written consent from Appellant's roommate to search the apartment, and then seized the drugs. Appellant was charged with various crimes, including possession of marijuana. Appellant moved to suppress evidence of the marijuana that was seized. The trial court denied the motion, and a jury subsequently found Appellant guilty on the possession charge. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court centered on whether the police lawfully conducted a protective sweep of a suspect's home when the suspect and the only other occupants were detained outside. The Court held that the protective sweep in Appellant's case violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court vacated Appellant's possession conviction, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.View "Arizona v. Fisher" on Justia Law

Appellees Randall and Penny West were charged with child abuse after an infant in their foster care died from severe head trauma. During their joint trial, each moved for an acquittal at the close of the State’s case and after the close of evidence. The trial court denied those motions. The jury found both guilty on child abuse charges. After the trial, Appellees renewed their motions for acquittal which this time was granted by the trial court. The court held that there was no evidence to prove who injured the child. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision granting Appellees’ motions. The appellate court used the Supreme Court’s holding in the “Hyder” case. Upon review of this case, the Supreme Court overturned its holding in “State ex rel. Hyder v. Superior Court” (“Hyder”), which placed conditions on trial courts’ granting of post-verdict motions for acquittal. The Court held that the “Hyder” case was now inconsistent with state law. In this case, the trial judge thoroughly explained his reasons for granting defendants’ post-verdict motions. Because the appellate court reviewed the trial court’s ruling under “Hyder” conditions, it did not determine whether the trial court’s record reflected substantial evidence to warrant the convictions. The Supreme Court vacated the appellate court’s decision, remanded the case for the lower court to address the sufficiency of the evidence and the merits of the trial court’s decision.View "Arizona v. West " on Justia Law

Appellant Wayne Prince, Jr. was convicted of first degree murder for the death of his step-daughter and for the attempted murder of his wife. The jury found Appellant guilty, and the trial judge sentenced Appellant to death. The sentence was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court. Under the law in effect when Appellant killed his step-daughter, the trial judge decided whether to impose the death penalty, but a jury needed to determine whether there were mitigating circumstances from the case that might warrant life imprisonment. A penalty-phase was impaneled, and it found no mitigating factors to spare Appellant from the death sentence. The second jury sentenced Appellant to death. Appellant appealed, citing among other issues that the second jury’s sentence gave the State a second chance to seek a death sentence thus violating the ex post facto clauses of the U.S. and Arizona Constitutions. Upon re-review, the Supreme Court was not persuaded by Appellant’s ex post facto argument, and affirmed the trial court’s death sentence.View "Arizona v. Prince" on Justia Law

Appellant Clarence Dixon was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. At trial, he represented himself. A jury found him guilty on all counts. When Appellant elected before trial to represent himself, the judge warned him that he would have sole responsibility for his defense, including examining and cross-examining witnesses. Appellant requested that an advisory counsel handle the examination of witnesses. The trial court rejected this proposal. On appeal, Appellant claimed multiple errors by the trial court entitled him to a new trial, including the trial court’s denial of his proposed “hybrid representation.” The Supreme Court noted that “there is no constitutional right to hybrid representation.” The Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion. Finding no other errors from trial, the Court affirmed the lower court’s decision and Appellant’s death sentence.View "Arizona v. Dixon" on Justia Law