Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case concerning the meaning and application of a standard title insurance policy exclusion (Exclusion 3(a)) designed to cover any defects, encumbrances, or adverse claims created or suffered by the insured in the context of construction lending, holding that this Court's opinion in First American Title Insurance Co. v. Action Acquisitions, LLC, 218 Ariz. 394 (2008), sets forth the proper interpretation and application Exclusion 3(a).In its underlying rulings, the trial court invoked Action Acquisitions to interpret Exclusion 3(a) in the construction lending context. The court of appeals reversed, instead applying the bright-line rule articulated in BB Syndication Services, Inc. v. First American Title Insurance Co., 780 F.3d 825 (7th Cir. 2015). The Supreme Court reversed in part and vacated the judgment in part, holding (1) this Court adopts Action Acquisitions' causation test for Exclusion 3(a)'s applicability; and (2) the court of appeals erred in applying the BB Syndication approach. View "Fidelity National Title Insurance Co. v. Osborn III Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the post-conviction relief (PCR) court determining that Appellant raised a colorable claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel and ordering him to disclose certain materials, holding that the PCR court did not err in ordering the disclosure of the records.Appellant was found guilty of two counts of first degree murder and sentenced to death. In these PCR proceedings, the PCR court determined that Appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim in III(A)-III(E) of the PCR petition was colorable. The court then ordered Appellant to disclose materials associated with trial counsel's interviews of three of Appellant's family members who did not testify during the penalty phase of trial. Appellant filed a petition for special action, claiming that he should not have to disclose the records at issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was good cause for the disclosure of materials associated with the interviews under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.6(b)(2). View "Naranjo v. Honorable Sukenic" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Arizona Department of Revenue (ADOR) is not required to assess the money collected from a taxpayer-business's customers to cover transaction privilege taxes against the responsible person pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 42-1104(A) before filing a collection lawsuit.ADOR brought suit against Peter Tunkey and his wife (together, Tunkey) to recover unpaid transaction privilege taxes (TPTs) pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 42-5028, which imposes liability on a "person" for failing to remit to ADOR any "additional charge" made to cover the tax. The tax court granted Summary judgment for ADOR and entered judgment against Tunkey for $26,000 in unpaid TPTs. Tunkey appealed, arguing that the tax court erred in ruling that ADOR was not required to timely assess the $26,000 amount against him personally before filing suit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 42-1104(A) did not require ADOR to notify Tunkey of "additional taxes due" because the unpaid TPT charges did not constitute an "additional tax due" triggering section 42-1104(A)'s notice requirement. View "State v. Tunkey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the justification defense provided in Arizona's self-defense statute, Arizona. Rev. Stat. 13-404(A), does not extend to both the defendant and the victim but only applies to a defendant's conduct. Section 13-404(A) states that "a person is justified in threatening or using physical force against another when and to the extent a reasonable person would believe that physical force is immediately necessary to protect [one]self against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful physical force." However, Rev. Ariz. Jury Instr. (Crim.) Justification for Self-Defense 4.04, at 63-65 (4th ed. 2016), states that the justification defense applies not to a "person" but to a "defendant." The court of appeals vacated Defendant's convictions and remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the justification presumptions were not intended to apply to the victim's conduct. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) the term "person" in section 13-404(A) applies to a defendant in a criminal prosecution; and (2) therefore, the trial court erred when it modified the standard Revised Arizona Jury Instruction to incorporate a victim's use of force. View "State v. Ewer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Town of Marana violated Ariz. Rev. Stat. 9-463.05 by assigning the entire cost of upgraded and expanded wastewater treatment facilities to future homeowners through development impact fees.\Applying the Home Builders Ass'n of Central Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 187 Ariz. 479 (1997), the court ruled that the development impact fees bore a presumption of validity and that section 9-463.05 was satisfied because the development fees resulted in a beneficial use to the development. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and reversed the trial court, holding (1) in applying section 9-463.05 as amended, the court of appeals erroneously applied from City of Scottsdale a presumption of validity to the Town's assessment of development fees; and (2) the Town violated section 9-463.05 by making future development bear 100 percent of the cost of acquiring the wastewater treatment facility and bearing nearly all of the cost of upgrading, modernizing, and improving the facility. View "Southern Ariz. Home Builders Ass'n v. Town of Marana" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the final statements in the "Predatory Debt Collection Protection Act" initiative description, when read in its entirety, did not communicate objectively false or misleading information.Plaintiff filed a complaint claiming that the initiative description at issue was legally insufficient because the final statement "Does not change existing law regarding secured debt" was misleading or objectively false. The trial court denied the objection and ordered that the Act qualified to appear on the general election ballot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the description, when read in its entirety, alerted a reasonable person to the principal provisions' general objectives and was not objectively false or misleading. View "Protect Our Ariz. v. Fontes" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the political question doctrine prohibits courts from adjudicating complaints that legislative committees held meetings in violation of Arizona's Open Meeting Law (OML). See Ariz. Rev. Stat. 38-431(6), -431.01(A).Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the Arizona Legislature alleging that twenty-six Republican legislators were threatening to violate the OML by attending a summit hosted by the American Legislative Exchange Council that was closed to the general public. The superior court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, concluding that whether the Legislature complied with the OML was a nonjusticiable political question. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the question of whether the Legislature violated the OML was nonjusticiable. View "Puente v. Arizona State Legislature" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order granting preliminary injunctive relief in this case, holding that courts lack authority to enter a nunc pro tunc order absent clerical error or mistake in the record rendering such an order void and subject to collateral attack.In 1994, Nevada Freeman was convicted of first-degree murder. In 2020, after disagreement about whether Freeman was parole eligible, Freeman and the State entered into a stipulation regarding Freeman's sentence. The stipulation stated that, at the time of Freeman's sentencing, the parties intended that after twenty-five years' imprisonment Freeman would be eligible for parole. The parties thus requested that Freeman's sentencing order be corrected to include the word "parole" as a form of release. The judge entered a nunc pro tunc order making the requested amendment. Freeman then filed claim for injunctive relief arguing that his sentence, as amended, clearly conferred parole eligibility. The trial judge granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court exceeded its authority under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 24.4 because it did not remedy a clerical error, omission, or oversight in the record. View "Shinn v. Ariz. Bd. Of Executive Clemency" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Ariz. Rev. Stat. 23-1043.01(B), which limits workers' compensation claims for mental illnesses to those that arise from an "unexpected, unusual or extraordinary stress" situation, does not violate Ariz. Const. art. XVIII, 8 or equal protection guarantees under Ariz. Const. art. II, 13.Plaintiff, an officer with the Tucson Police Department, filed an industrial injury claim arising from an incident in June 2018, claiming that it exacerbated his preexisting post-traumatic stress disorder. An administrative law judge found Plaintiff's claims for mental injuries non-compensable because the June 2018 incident was not an "unexpected, unusual or extraordinary stress" situation under section 23-1043.01(B). The court of appeals affirmed the denial of benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 23-1043.01(B) does not unconstitutionally limit recovery for stress-related workplace injuries. View "Matthews v. Industrial Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court, after a jury trial, in this tort action for first-party insurance bad faith, holding that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on waiver and mitigation of damages.Plaintiff sued Defendant for insurance bad faith. Defendant denied liability and asked the trial court to instruct the jury on waiver, in the form of a contract waiver instruction, and mitigation of damages. The trial court granted Defendant's request for both jury instructions, and the jury returned a verdict for Defendant. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the waiver jury instruction was misleading and prejudicial to Plaintiff, requiring a remand for a new trial. View "Cavallo v. Phoenix Health Plans, Inc." on Justia Law