Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Autozone was fined for violating the Pricing Act. The State subsequently sued AutoZone under the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), alleging that by violating the Pricing Act, AutoZone had also violated Ariz. Rev. Stat. 44-1522(A) (Statute), which prohibits deceptive practices in connection with the sale or advertisement of merchandise. The superior court entered summary judgment for AutoZone. The court of appeals vacated the superior court and remanded. Among other things at issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Statute's Act Clause, which prohibits deceptive acts or practices in connection with the sale or advertisement of merchandise, or the Omission Clause, which prohibits omission of material facts with intent that others rely on such omissions, governed the State's non-pricing claims. The Court vacated the court of appeals, holding (1) the court of appeals correctly held that neither side was entitled to summary judgment, as the question of whether AutoZone had the intent required by the CFA was an issue of fact, regardless of whether the Act or the Omission Clause applied to the non-pricing allegations; (2) the CFA did not authorize disgorgement to the State; and (3) the court of appeals erred by awarding the State interlocutory attorney's fees. View "State ex rel. Horne v. Autozone, Inc." on Justia Law

Arizona's Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Act (UMA) requires all insurers writing motor vehicle liability policies to also offer underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage that covers all persons insured under the policy. Any exceptions to UIM coverage not permitted by the UMA are void. Insurer in this case sought a declaratory judgment that it had validly denied Insured's UIM claim. Insured was injured while a passenger on a motorcycle driven by her husband, the named insured on a separate motorcycle policy issued also by Insurer. The Supreme Court held (1) the UMA required Insurer to provide UIM coverage for Insured under the auto policy, where Insured's total damages exceeded the amount of her tort recovery from her husband under the husband's motorcycle policy; and (2) the UMA did not permit Insurer to refuse to provide Insured with UIM coverage under her auto policy because she was partially indemnified as a claimant under the liability coverage of the separate motorcycle policy issued by Insured to her husband, whose negligence contributed to her injuries. View "Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sharp" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs leased state trust land and owned all structures and improvements on the land. Under the terms of the lease, the improvements that existed on the land would become the state's property upon lease termination. After the leases were entered into, the legislature created a property tax classification ("Class Nine") in which property was taxed at a lower rate than that applicable to commercial property. For certain years, Maricopa County classified the improvements under the classification applicable to general commercial property and taxed Plaintiffs accordingly. The State Board of Equalization denied Plaintiffs' request for Class Nine classification. Plaintiffs then filed a declaratory judgment action in the tax court. The tax court granted summary judgment for the County based on Plaintiffs' failure to meet the requirements of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 42-12009(A)(1)(a), which provides that improvements on land leased from the state qualify for a reduced ad valorem tax rate if they become the property of the state on termination of the leasehold interest in the property. The Supreme Court remanded, holding that section 42-12009(A)(1)(a) applies when, at the time of taxation, improvements exist on the land that, under the terms of the lease, would become the state's property upon lease termination. View "CNL Hotels & Resorts, Inc. v. Maricopa County" on Justia Law

These consolidated cases involved two properties purchased by John Hogan. Each parcel became subject to a deed of trust when Hogan took out loans from Long Beach Mortgage Company. Hogan was delinquent on both loans, which triggered foreclosure proceedings. A notice of trustee's sale recorded for the first parcel identified Washington Mutual Bank as the beneficiary and Deutsche Bank as the beneficiary for the second parcel. Hogan filed lawsuits seeking to enjoin the trustees' sales unless the beneficiaries proved they were entitled to collect on the respective notes. The superior court dismissed the cases. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Arizona's non-judicial foreclosure statute (Statute) does not require presentation of the original note before commencing foreclosure proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's orders dismissing Hogan's complaints and vacated the court of appeals, holding that the Statute does not require the beneficiary to prove its authority or show the note before the trustee may commence a non-judicial foreclosure. View "Hogan v. Washington Mut. Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Ariz. Rev. Stat 8-238 requires juveniles charged with certain offenses and summoned to appear at an advisory hearing to submit to the investigating law enforcement agency a sample of buccal cells or other bodily substances for DNA testing and extraction. The penalty for failure to comply is revocation of release pending adjudication. In this case seven juveniles were separately charged with violations of offenses specified in section 8-238(A). Each was summoned to an advisory hearing, released, and ordered to submit a buccal sample to law enforcement within five days. In each case, the superior court rejected Fourth Amendment objections to the sampling order. The Juveniles jointly filed a special action in the court of appeals, which held that requiring the submission of DNA samples from juveniles for whom a probable cause determination has been made does not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals, holding that the statutory scheme violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. View "Mario W. v. Superior Court (Kaipio)" on Justia Law

This case concerned a challenge to the nomination of Lois Jean McDermott, a Democratic candidate for the Arizona House of Representatives. McDermott appealed from a superior court judgment striking her from the primary election ballot because she identified her name as "Cheuvront-McDermott, Jean" in her nomination paper. McDermott's legal surname was McDermott. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) McDermott substantially complied with the requirements in Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-311(G), which directs that the candidate's surname shall be printed first; and (2) McDermott's name shall be printed on the primary ballot as "McDermott, Jean Cheuvront." View "Dedolph v. McDermott" on Justia Law

This automatic appeal arose from Defendant's 2009 death sentences for the 1996 murders of Thomas Hardman and Carol Lynn Noel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, that (1) the trial court did not err by allowing the State to offer evidence during the penalty phase of the felony murders when he did not present any mitigating evidence; (2) the trial court did not violate Defendant's rights under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the federal and state Constitution by refusing to grant a pretrial evidentiary hearing on Defendant's motion to dismiss on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct; (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to introduce photographs of the crime scenes showing the victims' bodies; and (4) Defendant's death sentences were appropriate. View "State v. Nordstrom" on Justia Law

In the underlying federal court action, an auto insurer (Insurer) sought a declaratory judgment that it had validly denied Insured's underinsured motorist (UIM) claim. Insured was injured while a passenger on a motorcycle driven by her husband, who had a motorcycle insurance policy with Insurer. Insured counterclaimed for breach of contract and bad faith. The U.S. district court certified several questions to the state Supreme Court. The Court held (1) Ariz. Rev. Stat. 20-259.01(G) required Insurer to provide UIM coverage for Insured under the auto policy, where Insured's total damages exceeded the amount of her tort recovery from her husband under the husband's motorcycle policy; and (2) Ariz. Rev. Stat. 20-259.01(H) did not permit Insurer to refuse to provide Insured with UIM coverage under her auto policy because she was partially indemnified as a claimant under the liability coverage of the separate motorcycle policy issued by Insurer to Insured's husband, whose negligence contributed to Insured's injuries. View "Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sharp" on Justia Law

Gary Gipson was indicted for first degree murder, illegal discharge of a firearm, and aggravated assault. At trial, the judge sua sponte instructed the jury on second degree murder over Gipson's objection and on manslaughter over the objections of both Gipson and the State. The jury found Gipson guilty of manslaughter and illegal discharge of a firearm. On appeal, Gipson conceded that the evidence supported the manslaughter instruction, but he argued that the trial court erred by giving it over the objections of both parties. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, although a judge should hesitate to give the instruction over objections from the defense and the prosecution, it was not reversible error in this case to do so. View "State v. Gipson" on Justia Law

These consolidated cases involved two properties purchased by John Hogan. Each parcel became subject to a deed of trust when Hogan took out loans from Long Beach Mortgage Company. Hogan was delinquent on both loans, which triggered foreclosure proceedings. The trustee recorded a notice of sale for the first parcel, naming Washington Mutual Bank (WaMu) as the beneficiary. A notice of trustee's sale recorded for the second parcel identified Deutsche Bank as the beneficiary. Hogan filed lawsuits seeking to enjoin the trustees' sales unless the beneficiaries proved they were entitled to collect on the respective notes. The superior court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Arizona's non-judicial foreclosure statute did not require presentation of the original note before commencing foreclosure proceedings. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed the superior court's orders, holding that Hogan was not entitled to relief because the deed of trust statutes impose no obligation on the beneficiary to "show the note" before the trustee conducts a non-judicial foreclosure. View "Hogan v. Washington Mut. Bank. N.A." on Justia Law