Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue presented here was whether the superior court must hold an evidentiary hearing when the results of a postconviction DNA testing conducted under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-4240 are favorable to the petitioner. A jury found Petitioner guilty of second-degree murder. Petitioner's conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. Petitioner later successfully petitioned the superior court for DNA testing. The test results were favorable to Defendant. Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief and requested an evidentiary hearing. The superior court denied postconviction relief. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's order, holding that under section 13-4240(K), a court faced with favorable DNA test results, but no material issues of fact, must hold a non-evidentiary hearing to permit the parties to argue why the petitioner should or should not be entitled to relief as a matter of law. Remanded. View "State v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

Defendant was detained by police during a stolen vehicle investigation. Defendant moved to suppress statements he made confessing to the crime, arguing that his initial detention was not supported by reasonable suspicion and, alternatively, that the initial detention had become a de facto arrest unsupported by probable cause before he was interrogated. The State countered that although there was no probable cause to arrest until Defendant made incriminating statements, the detention never became a de facto arrest. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court granted review to consider relevant factors in determining when a lawful detention becomes a de facto arrest. The Court vacated the court of appeals and held that the lack of evidence that officers acted diligently in investigating the matter and that the continuing use of handcuffs when there was no ongoing safety threat or flight risk transformed the valid Terry stop into a de facto arrest before Defendant was questioned by an auto theft detective. Remanded. View "State v. Boteo-Flores" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for first degree murder, illegal discharge of a firearm, and aggravated assault. At trial, the judge sua sponte instructed the jury on second degree murder over Defendant's objection and on manslaughter over the objections of Defendant and the State. The jury acquitted Defendant of first degree murder and was unable to reach a verdict on second degree murder but found Defendant guilty of manslaughter. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on aggravated assault but found Defendant guilty on the firearms charge. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred by giving the manslaughter instruction over the objections of both parties. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) if a lesser included offense instruction is given and supported by the evidence, a resultant conviction for the lesser included offense does not violate the defendant's constitutional rights or contravene any Arizona statute or rule; and (2) because the manslaughter instruction in this case was supported by the evidence, Defendant's conviction must stand. View "State v. Gipson" on Justia Law

Defendant Dale Hausner was convicted and sentenced to death for six murders. Defendant was also convicted and sentenced for seventy-four non-capital offenses. The convictions stemmed from a series of random shootings in the Phoenix area between June 2005 and August 2006 in which Defendant murdered six pedestrians or bicyclists, several dogs, and, allegedly, a horse. The Supreme Court (1) reversed Defendant's conviction and sentence for one count of animal cruelty, holding that the evidence was not sufficient for a jury to reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant shot a horse; and (2) otherwise affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences. View "State v. Hausner" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court addressed whether an employer can be held vicariously liable for an after-work accident caused by an employee who was on an extended away-from-home assignment. The accident occurred when the employee was driving back to his hotel after dinner. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that an employee on out-of-town travel status is not acting within the course and scope of his employment while traveling to or from a restaurant for a regular meal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the employee was not subject to his employer's control, he was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident, and therefore, the employer was not liable for the employee's actions. View "Engler v. Gulf Interstate Eng'g, Inc." on Justia Law

Autozone was fined for violating the Pricing Act. The State subsequently sued AutoZone under the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), alleging that by violating the Pricing Act, AutoZone had also violated Ariz. Rev. Stat. 44-1522(A) (Statute), which prohibits deceptive practices in connection with the sale or advertisement of merchandise. The superior court entered summary judgment for AutoZone. The court of appeals vacated the superior court and remanded. Among other things at issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Statute's Act Clause, which prohibits deceptive acts or practices in connection with the sale or advertisement of merchandise, or the Omission Clause, which prohibits omission of material facts with intent that others rely on such omissions, governed the State's non-pricing claims. The Court vacated the court of appeals, holding (1) the court of appeals correctly held that neither side was entitled to summary judgment, as the question of whether AutoZone had the intent required by the CFA was an issue of fact, regardless of whether the Act or the Omission Clause applied to the non-pricing allegations; (2) the CFA did not authorize disgorgement to the State; and (3) the court of appeals erred by awarding the State interlocutory attorney's fees. View "State ex rel. Horne v. Autozone, Inc." on Justia Law

Arizona's Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Act (UMA) requires all insurers writing motor vehicle liability policies to also offer underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage that covers all persons insured under the policy. Any exceptions to UIM coverage not permitted by the UMA are void. Insurer in this case sought a declaratory judgment that it had validly denied Insured's UIM claim. Insured was injured while a passenger on a motorcycle driven by her husband, the named insured on a separate motorcycle policy issued also by Insurer. The Supreme Court held (1) the UMA required Insurer to provide UIM coverage for Insured under the auto policy, where Insured's total damages exceeded the amount of her tort recovery from her husband under the husband's motorcycle policy; and (2) the UMA did not permit Insurer to refuse to provide Insured with UIM coverage under her auto policy because she was partially indemnified as a claimant under the liability coverage of the separate motorcycle policy issued by Insured to her husband, whose negligence contributed to her injuries. View "Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sharp" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs leased state trust land and owned all structures and improvements on the land. Under the terms of the lease, the improvements that existed on the land would become the state's property upon lease termination. After the leases were entered into, the legislature created a property tax classification ("Class Nine") in which property was taxed at a lower rate than that applicable to commercial property. For certain years, Maricopa County classified the improvements under the classification applicable to general commercial property and taxed Plaintiffs accordingly. The State Board of Equalization denied Plaintiffs' request for Class Nine classification. Plaintiffs then filed a declaratory judgment action in the tax court. The tax court granted summary judgment for the County based on Plaintiffs' failure to meet the requirements of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 42-12009(A)(1)(a), which provides that improvements on land leased from the state qualify for a reduced ad valorem tax rate if they become the property of the state on termination of the leasehold interest in the property. The Supreme Court remanded, holding that section 42-12009(A)(1)(a) applies when, at the time of taxation, improvements exist on the land that, under the terms of the lease, would become the state's property upon lease termination. View "CNL Hotels & Resorts, Inc. v. Maricopa County" on Justia Law

These consolidated cases involved two properties purchased by John Hogan. Each parcel became subject to a deed of trust when Hogan took out loans from Long Beach Mortgage Company. Hogan was delinquent on both loans, which triggered foreclosure proceedings. A notice of trustee's sale recorded for the first parcel identified Washington Mutual Bank as the beneficiary and Deutsche Bank as the beneficiary for the second parcel. Hogan filed lawsuits seeking to enjoin the trustees' sales unless the beneficiaries proved they were entitled to collect on the respective notes. The superior court dismissed the cases. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Arizona's non-judicial foreclosure statute (Statute) does not require presentation of the original note before commencing foreclosure proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's orders dismissing Hogan's complaints and vacated the court of appeals, holding that the Statute does not require the beneficiary to prove its authority or show the note before the trustee may commence a non-judicial foreclosure. View "Hogan v. Washington Mut. Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Ariz. Rev. Stat 8-238 requires juveniles charged with certain offenses and summoned to appear at an advisory hearing to submit to the investigating law enforcement agency a sample of buccal cells or other bodily substances for DNA testing and extraction. The penalty for failure to comply is revocation of release pending adjudication. In this case seven juveniles were separately charged with violations of offenses specified in section 8-238(A). Each was summoned to an advisory hearing, released, and ordered to submit a buccal sample to law enforcement within five days. In each case, the superior court rejected Fourth Amendment objections to the sampling order. The Juveniles jointly filed a special action in the court of appeals, which held that requiring the submission of DNA samples from juveniles for whom a probable cause determination has been made does not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals, holding that the statutory scheme violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. View "Mario W. v. Superior Court (Kaipio)" on Justia Law