Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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Defendant constructed a home that it sold to its initial purchaser. The initial purchaser, in turn, sold the home to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs later learned the home's hillside retaining wall and home site had been constructed in a dangerously defective manner. Plaintiffs requested that Defendant cover the cost of repair, but Defendant claimed it was no longer responsible for any construction defects. Plaintiffs then filed an action against Defendant to force Defendant to cover the cost of repair. The trial court dismissed all of the claims, concluding, among other things, that Plaintiffs' negligence claims were barred by Arizona's economic loss doctrine. The court of appeals remanded for resolution of Plaintiffs' various negligence claims, concluding that, because Plaintiffs had no contract with Defendant, the economic loss doctrine did not bar their tort claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the economic loss doctrine did not bar Plaintiffs' negligence claims to recover damages resulting from the construction defects. Remanded. View "Sullivan v. Pulte Home Corp." on Justia Law

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The State of Arizona filed an interlocutory appeal from an order issued in the general stream adjudications of the Gila River System and Source and the Little Colorado System and Source. At issue was whether federal water rights were impliedly reserved on lands granted by the United States government to the State of Arizona to support education and other public institutions (State Trust Lands). The Supreme Court accepted review and affirmed the superior court's ruling that there was no withdrawal, no reservation for a federal purpose, and no congressional intent to reserve water rights for the State Trust Lands. View "In re Water Rights to Gila / Little Colorado" on Justia Law

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This case involved the intersection of municipal zoning regulations and the right of tattoo artists to ply their trade. After the City of Mesa denied Plaintiffs a permit to operate a tattoo parlor, Plaintiffs filed this action alleging violations of their rights to free speech, due process, and equal protection. The superior court dismissed the complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Recognizing that tattooing involves constitutionally protected speech, the Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and reversed the judgment of the superior court, holding that the superior court erred by dismissing the complaint as a matter of law. Remanded. View "Coleman v. City of Mesa" on Justia Law

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A jury found Defendant guilty of felony murder and other crimes. Defendant was sentenced to death for the murder and to prison terms on the other convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences, holding (1) the trial court did not err in permitting the State's medical expert to testify; (2) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant's request for an Enmund/Tison jury instruction at the aggravation phase of trial; (3) Defendant's waiver of his right to present mitigation was voluntary, knowing, and informed; and (4) the jury did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the mitigating circumstances were not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. View "State v. Joseph" on Justia Law

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A jury found Defendant guilty of one count of first degree burglary, four counts of aggravated assault, four counts of kidnapping, one count of theft, and one count of first degree murder. After a mistrial in the penalty phase, a second jury determined Defendant should be sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences, holding, inter alia, that (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motions to strike prospective jurors; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a brown bag with ammunition; (3) the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct warranting reversal; and (4) the death sentence was appropriate. View "State v. Martinez" on Justia Law

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On January 27, 2012, the Yuma County Superior Court disqualified Alejandrina Cabrera under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 38-201(C) from appearing on the ballot as a candidate for the San Luis City Council. Concluding that section 38-201(C)'s language requirement must be read "in the context of the political office at issue," the court found that Cabrera was not sufficiently proficient in English to perform as a city council member for San Luis. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, in relevant part, that (1) the trial court correctly interpreted section 38-201(C); and (2) the trial court's interpretation of the statute did not unconstitutionally violate Cabrera's right to participate in government. View "Escamilla v. Cuello" on Justia Law

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A jury found Defendant guilty of first degree burglary, kidnapping, and two counts of first degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to death on both murder counts and to prison terms on the other counts. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences, holding, among other things, (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's challenges to the State's peremptory strikes of two minority jurors; (2) the evidence was sufficient to sustain Defendant's convictions; (3) the trial court did prejudicially err by admitting evidence of other acts that occurred on the weekend of the murders; (4) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant's motion for mistrial after three jurors inadvertently saw Defendant during the guilt phase exiting an elevator accompanied by law enforcement officers and wearing jail garb; and (5) the sentences were appropriate. View "State v. Hardy" on Justia Law

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In 2009, Defendant was sentenced to death for first degree murder of a fellow inmate. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence, holding, among other things, (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant his successive motions to continue the trial, as Defendant failed to establish prejudice from the denials; (2) the State presented sufficient evidence of premeditation; (3) the trial court did not err in permitting the State to present evidence of other bad acts Defendant had committed while incarcerated; (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting rebuttal evidence that Defendant had attacked and seriously injured another inmate; and (5) the jury did not abuse its discretion in determining that death was the appropriate sentence. View "State v. VanWinkle" on Justia Law

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A jury found Defendant guilty of the first degree murder of his girlfriend. Defendant was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence, holding, among other things, that the trial court did not err by (1) precluding Defendant from asking prospective jurors what factors they would find aggravating or mitigating; (2) requiring Defendant to mention mitigation in a hypothetical question he asked; (3) striking for cause a juror who worked for the public defender's office and had expressed strong opposition to the death penalty; (4) denying Defendant's request for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct; and (5) denying Defendant's requested jury instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter. View "State v. Patterson" on Justia Law

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Joseph Lodge was a judge of a county superior court who sought to run for election to a new term in that office. To qualify for the primary election ballot, Lodge needed to obtain 525 valid signatures on his nominating petitions. Lodge timely filed ninety-nine nominating petitions containing a total of 1,110 signatures. Jill Kennedy, a qualified elector, challenged Lodge's petitions, arguing that they did not substantially comply with Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-314, -331, and -333 because they did not specify the office that Lodge was seeking. The superior court entered judgment for Kennedy and ordered that Lodge's name not be placed on the 2012 primary or general election ballots. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the petitions failed to substantially comply with statutory requirements. View "Kennedy v. Lodge" on Justia Law

Posted in: Election Law