Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, armed robbery, first degree burglary, kidnapping, and theft of a means of transportation. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death for the murder conviction and to prison sentences totaling forty-two years for the other convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declaring a mistrial and later denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the State's allegation that Defendant should be sentenced to death; (2) the statutes governing the death penalty are not unconstitutionally vague; (3) there is not an unconstitutional presumption of death in Arizona's death penalty statutes; and (4) the jury did not abuse its discretion in imposing the death sentence in this case. View "State v. Reeves" on Justia Law

In 2000, Arizona voters approved a referendum that statutorily directed the Legislature to annually increase the base level of the revenue control limit for K-12 public school funding. The measure was codified as Ariz. Rev. Stat. 15-901.01. For several years, the Legislature adjusted the base level and transportation support level annually for inflation, but the 2010-11 budget (HB 2008) included an adjusted to the transportation support level only. Subsequent budgets likewise did not include base level adjustments. Several school districts and other parties sued the State Treasurer and State, alleging that HB 2008 amended or repealed a voter-approved law in violation of the Voter Protection Act (VPA). The superior court dismissed the complaint for failing to state a claim, ruling that section 15-901.01 was not mandatory and that voters "cannot require the legislature to enact a law that provides for the appropriation" prescribed in the statute. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no constitutional impediment existed to the electorate's directive, and legislative adjustments to section 15-901.01's funding scheme are limited by the VPA. View "Cave Creek Unified Sch. Dist. v. Ducey" on Justia Law

Four members of the Commission on Appellate Court Appointments filed this special action asking the court to declare H.B. 2600 unconstitutional and to enjoin the Commission from applying the statute. The Arizona Constitution established the Commission and required it to submit "not less than three" nominees to the governor for her appointment to fill an appellate judicial vacancy. H.B. 2600 directed the Commission to submit "the names of at least five persons" to the governor, unless an applicant was rejected by a two-thirds vote of the Commission, in which case it could submit fewer than five names. The court held that H.B. 2600 was unconstitutional because it directly conflicted with Arizona's Constitution. Accordingly, the court enjoined the Commission from applying the statute and awarded reasonable attorney's fees to petitioners upon compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21. View "Dobson v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, third degree robbery, and aggravated robbery. Defendant was sentenced to death for the murder. A few years later, the trial court vacated the sentence, finding that Defendant's defense counsel was inefficient. Because the jury could not agree on a sentence at the resentencing trial, the judge declared a mistrial. After a second penalty phase trial, the jury determined Defendant should be sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's death sentence, holding, inter alia, that (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's second petition for post-conviction relief and his motion to suppress; (2) the statutory provision for retrial after a hung penalty-phase jury does not result in cruel and unusual punishment; (3) the trial court did not err in its decisions regarding the jury or the jury instructions; (4) the application of the 2009 version of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-752(G) in Defendant's case did not violate the ex post facto clause; (5) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct; and (6) based on the aggravating and mitigating circumstances present in this case, the mitigation was not sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency. View "State v. Medina" on Justia Law

Relatives of Bradford Lund (collectively, Miller) sought the appointment of a guardian and conservator to manage Bradford's assets. Bradford, his father, and his stepfather (collectively, the Lunds) opposed the appointment. Miller's counsel subsequently served a law firm that previously represented Bradford (JS&S) with a subpoena requesting all non-privileged information relating to Bradford. JS&S mistakenly delivered the entire client file to counsel without reviewing it for privileged information. Eventually, the trial court decided to review the documents in camera before ruling on whether each document was privileged. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's order, holding (1) before reviewing a particular document, a trial court must first determine that an in camera review is necessary to resolve the privilege claim; and (2) the trial court in this case erred by ruling that it would review all the documents to determine whether they were privileged without considering the parties' arguments regarding privilege and waiver to determine whether in camera review was warranted for particular documents before reviewing them. Remanded. View "Lund v. Myers" on Justia Law

Dudley Pounders, a New Mexico resident, was exposed to asbestos while working at a New Mexico power plant (Plant) more than thirty years ago. Dudley later moved to Arizona and, in 2008, was diagnosed with mesothelioma, a cancer associated with asbestos exposure. Dudley and his wife, Vicki, filed suit in Arizona against Defendants, including the successor-in-interest to the architect and design manager for three units at the Plant and the designer and manufacturer of industrial boilers used at the Plant. After Dudley died later that year, Vicki amended the complaint to assert claims for wrongful death. The trial court applied New Mexico substantive law to Vicki's claims, including New Mexico's statute of repose, which the court found applied to Vicki's wrongful death claim and barred the action. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that New Mexico substantive law applied to Vicki's wrongful death claim. View "Pounders v. Ensearch E&C, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of child abuse, two counts of concealing a dead body, and two counts of first degree murder. The jury also found three aggravating factors, including the young age of the victims, ages three and four. Defendant was sentenced to death for the two murders. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences, holding, inter alia, that (1) the trial court did not err by dismissing some jurors improperly and failing to dismiss others; (2) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant's request for a change of venue based on presumed and actual prejudice; (3) the trial court did not err by refusing to suppress Defendant's post-arrest statements; (4) the prosecution did not commit prejudicial misconduct; (5) the evidence was sufficient to convict Defendant of the child abuse charges; (6) the trial court did not fundamentally err in its aggravation phase jury instructions; and (7) the jury did not abuse its discretion by finding the mitigating factors presented by Defendant insufficient to warrant leniency. View "State v. Payne" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the murders of three individuals and of attempted murder. Defendant was sentenced to death for each murder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, that (1) the trial court sufficiently inquired into the bases for Defendant's requests for a change of counsel and correctly denied the requests; (2) the trial court did not err in refusing to permit Defendant to impeach the surviving victim with her prior inconsistent statements absent an offer of proof of the prior statements; (3) the trial court did not err in admitting evidence impeaching a witness as substantive evidence of Defendant's guilt; (4) the State presented sufficient evidence of premeditation; and (5) the jury did not abuse its discretion by determining that the mitigation presented by Defendant was not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. View "State v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant with driving while impaired in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 28-1381(A)(1) (the (A)(1) charge) and having an alcohol concentration of .08 or more within two hours of being in physical control of a vehicle in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 28-1381(A)(2). Before trial, the State moved to prevent Defendant from introducing evidence of the variability of the "partition ratio" used to convert breath alcohol concentration (AC) to blood AC readings to cast doubt on his impairment. The municipal court concluded that partition ratio evidence is relevant whenever breath test results are introduced in connection with an (A)(1) charge and denied relief. The superior court and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) evidence relating to the variability of partition ratios in the general population is relevant to a particular defendant's state of impairment; and (2) therefore, partition ratio evidence may be admissible in a prosecution for an (A)(1) charge if the state elects to introduce breath test results to prove the defendant violated section 28-1381(A)(2). View "State v. Cooperman" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and eight other felonies. For his crimes, Defendant was sentenced to death and prison terms. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its pretrial rulings; (2) the trial court did not err in instructing the jury during the aggravation phase; (3) the prosecutor did not misstate the law in his closing argument; (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to inform the jury of Defendant's willingness to waive parole eligibility; (5) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding victim impact evidence; (5) the jury's finding that three aggravating circumstances applied was supported by the evidence with respect to each murder; and (6) the jury did not abuse its discretion in imposing the death penalty for each murder. View "State v. Benson" on Justia Law