Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was tried for three counts of child molestation. At trial, Defendant requested a Willits instruction regarding the destruction of of Tuscon Police Department and Child Protective Services recordings of an earlier interview with the alleged victim, arguing that the recordings would have been useful in impeaching the alleged victim's current testimony. The trial court denied the request on the grounds that the recordings had not been maliciously destroyed and that Defendant had not shown that they contained exculpatory evidence. A jury convicted Defendant on two counts. On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court erred in refusing to give a Willits instruction but reversed only the conviction and sentence on one count of which Defendant was convicted. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals, reversed the convictions and sentences, and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court erred in refusing to give a Willits instruction, and the error was not harmless. View "State v. Glissendorf" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a juvenile court can delegate discretion to the Arizona Department of Economic Security (ADES) to return a dependent child to his or her parents without first determining that return is in the child’s best interests. The juvenile court concluded that ADES has the discretion to determine when it serves a dependent child’s best interests to be returned to the child’s parent or guardian. The Supreme Court vacated the juvenile court’s order, holding (1) a juvenile court must specifically determine that return of a dependent child to his or her parents is in the child’s best interests before ordering the return; and (2) the juvenile court in this case erred by granting discretion to ADES to place dependent children with their parents without a prior judicial determination that reunification was in the children’s best interests. View "Alexander M. v. Hon. Lisa Abrams" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a personal injury suit against Defendant, BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. BCI rejected Plaintiff’s offer of judgment to settle, and the case proceeded to trial. The jury rendered a verdict for Plaintiff and awarded her damages. The trial court entered a total award of $2,135,867, which included prejudgment interest under Ariz. R. Civ. P. 68(g) as a sanction against BCI for rejecting Plaintiff’s offer of judgment. At issue in this case was whether the prejudgment interest was interest on an “obligation” under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 44-1201(A) or interest on a judgment” under section 44-1201(B). The trial court concluded that the prejudgment interest awarded as a sanction pursuant to Rule 68(g) was interest on an “obligation,” thus entitling Plaintiff to the ten percent rate set forth in section 44-1201(A). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the applicable rate for prejudgment interest under Rule 68(g) in this case was 4.25 percent based on section 44-1201(B). View "Metzler v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, Inc." on Justia Law

Two estates filed separate wrongful death actions against two acute care hospitals alleging violations of Arizona’s Adult Protective Services Act (APSA). The trial court granted summary judgment for the hospitals, concluding that APSA does not apply to acute care hospitals. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the APSA subjects acute care hospitals to potential liability. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals and remanded, holding that the APSA does apply to acute care hospitals because they provide care to vulnerable adults and are not expressly exempted by the statutory language of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 46-455(B). View "Wyatt v. Vanguard Health Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant was placed on probation. Appellant’s appointed counsel filed a notice of appeal. The Office of the Public Defender assigned the case to an attorney. Appellant informed the trial court, as well as her attorney, that she wished to represent herself on appeal, but her requests were ignored. Appellant’s counsel then filed a motion with the court of appeals seeking leave for Appellant to represent herself. The court of appeals denied the motion, concluding that although there was no constitutional right to self-representation on appeal, self-representation was permitted if the request was timely, and Appellant’s request was untimely. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ decision, holding (1) the Arizona Constitution provides a defendant with a right to self-representation on appeal, and (2) the request for self-representation on appeal must be made no later than thirty days after the filing of the notice of appeal. Remanded. View "Coleman v. Hon. Johnsen" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on multiple counts of child molestation and sexual conduct with a minor under age fifteen, and the case proceeded to trial. An expert witness for the State testified during trial, explaining in general how children perceive sexual abuse and describing behaviors involving disclosure of abuse. The jury found Defendant guilty on all but two counts. Defendant appealed the admission of the testimony, arguing that the testimony was barred by Ariz. R. Evid. 702 because it was “cold” in that it educated the jury about general principles but was not tied to the particular facts of the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the expert testimony, as Rule 702(d) does not bar the admission of “cold” expert testimony that educates the trier of fact about general principles without considering the particular facts of the case. View "State v. Salazar-Mercado" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was an abandoned easement on property that DOS Land Holdings, LLC purchased. The closing documents omitted the easement from the property’s legal description. DOS filed claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing against Empire West Title Agency, alleging that DOS “reasonably believed” that the easement was represented in documents used at the closing. Empire filed a motion to compel DOS to disclose any attorney-client communications indicating whether DOS knew before closing that the easement had been abandoned. The superior court denied the motion, concluding that the documents were protected by the attorney-client privilege. Empire filed a petition for special action in the court of appeals, arguing that DOS had impliedly waived the attorney-client privilege by alleging that it “reasonably believed” that Empire had met its contractual obligations. The court of appeals ordered the disclosure of attorney-client communications found relevant to the “reasonableness of DOS’s expectation of coverage.” The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ decision, holding that the court erred in ruling that DOS impliedly waived the privilege by pleading its “reasonable belief” in the litigation. View "Empire West Title Agency, LLC v. Hon. Talamante" on Justia Law

After field sobriety tests revealed that Defendant had Carboxy-Tetrahydrocannobinol (“Carboxy-THC”) in his blood while driving, the State charged Defendant with violating Ariz. Rev. Stat. 28-1381(A)(3), which prohibits driving a vehicle while there is any drug defined in Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-3401 or its metabolite in the person’s body. The justice court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge, reasoning that, although Carboxy-THC is a marijuana metabolite, the legislature did not intend to include all possible byproducts, particularly those that are inactive and cannot impair the driver. The court of appeals disagreed, holding that section 28-1381(A)(3)’s language prohibiting driving with a proscribed drug or its metabolite included the metabolite Carboxy-THC. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the “metabolite” reference in section 28-1381(A)(3) is limited to any of a proscribed substance’s metabolites that are capable of causing impairment; and (2) therefore, drivers cannot be convicted of violating section 28-1381(A)(3) based merely on the presence of a non-impairing metabolite, such as Carboxy-THC. View "State ex rel. Montgomery v. Shilgevorkyan" on Justia Law

In 2006, Wife and Husband divorced. In 2011, the superior court conducted a hearing on the parties’ post-decree petitions. Prior to the hearing, Wife filed a petition seeking reimbursement for certain 2010-11 expenses under the terms of the decree of dissolution. The court, however, did not consider the expenses at the hearing. On November 1, 2011, the court entered an order resolving all of the issues listed in the pretrial statement and denied Wife’s request for attorneys’ fees. Shortly thereafter, the court vacated this fee ruling. On September 12, 2012, the court awarded Wife a judgment on the 2010-11 expenses and again denied her request for attorneys’ fees. On October 11, 2012, Wife appealed from both the November 1, 2011 and September 12, 2012 orders. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal from the November 1, 2011 order as untimely. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ order and remanded, holding a family court order that neither resolves a pending request for attorneys’ fees nor includes language making the order appealable is not final for purposes of appeal. View "Bollermann v. Nowlis" on Justia Law

In 2006, the City of Phoenix started installing light rail tracks along Jefferson Street, which abutted Appellant’s property. As part of the installation, the City erected a permanent concrete barrier between the tracks and Appellant’s property, thus blocking two driveways providing vehicular access from Jefferson Street to Appellant’s property. The property, however, still had access via Madison Street. The City subsequently filed an eminent domain action to determine the compensation it owed to Appellant for a temporary construction easement Appellant granted the City. Appellant counterclaimed, seeking damages for his permanent loss of access to Jefferson Street. The superior court granted summary judgment to the City on that claim, concluding that a property owner is not entitled to compensation for loss of access if he retains “free and convenient access” to the property. The court of appeals vacated the superior court’s ruling, concluding that the government may not eliminate a property owner’s established access to an abutting roadway without providing just compensation to the property owner. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under these circumstances, an owner may claim compensable damage to private property within the meaning of Ariz. Const. art. II, 17, even if other streets provide access to the property. View "City of Phoenix v. Garretson" on Justia Law