Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2010, the Arizona legislature amended Ariz. Rev. Stat. 15-1441(I) to require the election of two at-large members to the governing board of community colleges located in very populous counties. Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking a declaration that section 15-1441(I) violates Arizona’s constitutional prohibition against special laws. The superior court concluded that the legislation did not violate the special law prohibition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the test set forth in Republic Inv. Fund I v. Town of Surprise, section 15-1441(I) does not violate the special laws provision of article 4, part 2, section 19 of the Arizona Constitution. View "Gallardo v. State" on Justia Law

Daughter accused Stepfather of sexual abuse. Because Daughter was a minor at the time of the accusation, Mother asserted victims’ rights on her behalf. Before trial, Daughter turned eighteen. Stepfather then filed a motion to compel Mother to submit to a defense interview, which the superior court granted. Mother and Daughter sought special action relief in the court of appeals. The court held that the right of a parent who exercises victims’ rights on behalf of a minor to refuse a defense interview expires when the victim reaches the age of eighteen. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals and the order of the superior court, holding that a parent who exercises victims’ rights on behalf of a minor child is statutorily entitled to refuse a defense interview through the final disposition of the charges, even if the child earlier turns eighteen. View "J.D. v. Hon. Hugh Hegyi" on Justia Law

An insurer refused to defend its insured against a third party’s tort claims. The third party, standing in the insureds’ shoes, brought a declaratory judgment action against the insurer for indemnification and failure to defend. Prior to the instant suit, an Arizona state court entered default judgment against the insureds that was entered pursuant to a Damron agreement that stipulated facts determinative of both liability and coverage. In the instant case, a federal district court granted summary judgment for the insurer. Applying Arizona law, the district court concluded that the default judgment did not preclude the insurer from litigating the question of whether coverage existed under the policy and that, as a matter of law, the insured did not own the vehicle involved in the accident at the time of the accident. The Supreme Court accepted certification and held (1) insurers are generally not precluded from litigating pure coverage issues in a default judgment action; (2) an insurer in a coverage action may not, in the guise of a coverage defense, litigate what are essentially and solely liability issues resolved by the default judgment; and (3) the insurer here was not precluded from litigating, for coverage purposes, who owned the vehicle at issue at the time of the accident. View "Quihuis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted review in this case to resolve the conflict between Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-116, which requires that concurrent sentences be imposed on a defendant whose convictions stem from a single act, and Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-705(M), which requires that sentences imposed on a defendant convicted of certain dangerous crimes against children run consecutively even when the underlying convictions arise from a single act. Defendant was convicted of reckless child abuse (Count 1), child abuse (Count 2), and first degree murder (Count 3). The trial court convicted her to terms of imprisonment on all counts, with Count 2 to be served consecutively to the other sentences. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions but modified the sentence to make Count 2 concurrent, rather than consecutive, to the other sentences. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) under the rule that when statutes conflict and cannot be harmonized, the more recent statute applies, section 13-705(M) should govern in this case because it is more recent; and (2) therefore, the trial court properly ordered Defendant’s sentence on Count 2 to be served consecutively to her other sentences. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

Developer obtained a loan from Bank to construct a commercial and condominium project. Bank secured its loan with two deeds of trust, the first of which attached before construction began on the project. Developer failed to pay the general contractor (Contractor) several million dollars for the project, and after Developer had sold many of the units, Contractor recorded a mechanics’ lien against the project. Contractor then sought to foreclose on its lien against Developer, the unit owners, and their lenders. The Owners and Lenders contested the foreclosure, arguing that they were equitably subrogated to Bank’s first deed of trust and thus had priority over Contractor’s mechanics’ lien. The trial court concluded that Contractor’s lien had priority. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Ariz. Rev. Stat. 33-992(A), which gives mechanics’ liens priority over liens recorded after construction begins on real property, does not preclude assignment by equitable subrogation of lien that attached before construction began on the project; and (2) when a single mortgage burdens multiple parcels, a third party may be entitled to equitable subrogation when that party has paid a pro rata amount of the obligation and obtained a full release of the parcel at issue from the mortgage. Remanded. View "Weitz Co., LLC v. Heth" on Justia Law

While executing a warrant authorizing the search of a home, police found Defendant, who was not named in the warrant, in the home. Police proceeded to search Defendant’s purse. Defendant was subsequently charged with possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence found in her purse, arguing that the search of her purse was unlawful because she was not named in the warrant. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that police were permitted to search the purse. The Supreme Court affirmed after adopting the possession test, under which officers may search personal items that are not in their owners’ possession when police find them in executing a premises search warrant, holding that because Defendant did not physically possess her purse when the officers found it, they were authorized to search it for the items listed in the warrant. View "State v. Gilstrap" on Justia Law

Defendant assaulted a victim with a knife or other sharp object, injuring the victim’s hand, leg, and abdomen. A jury found Defendant guilty of three counts of aggravated assault, one for each wound. Defendant was convicted under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-1204(A)(3), which states that an assault is aggravated if it is committed “by any means of force that causes temporary but substantial disfigurement…of any body part.” The court of appeals affirmed the hand-injury conviction but reversed the abdominal-injury conviction. Both parties sought review, each arguing that the court of appeals misinterpreted the phrase “temporary but substantial disfigurement.” The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err in concluding that the location of an injury does not determine whether it is disfiguring; (2) the court of appeals erred in suggesting that the “duration” of a temporary injury is relevant in determining whether a person has been disfigured and in suggesting that a substantial injury must be comparable to a fracture or the loss of an organ or body part; and (3) sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that the victim’s abdominal injury constituted a “temporary but substantial disfigurement.” View "State v. Pena" on Justia Law

After a police officers had a consensual encounter with Defendant, they asked Defendant if he had any firearms. Defendant replied that he had a gun. The officers then frisked Defendant, removed the gun, and arrested Defendant as a prohibited possessor of a firearm. Defendant moved to suppress the gun as the fruit of an unconstitutional search. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that once the officers became aware that Defendant had a gun, they were allowed to remove the gun and conduct a pat down for safety purposes. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s conviction and sentence, holding that, during an initially consensual encounter with an individual, an officer must have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot before frisking the individual. View "State v. Serna" on Justia Law

Doug Clark, the incumbent Constable for the Downtown Justice of the Peace Precinct of Maricopa County, challenged the sufficiency of Jimmy Munoz Jr.’s nominating petitions. The trial court removed Munoz’s name from the ballot for the office of Constable, concluding (1) several of Munoz’s petition sheets were invalid because they contained a photograph of the Maricopa County Constable’s badge that could confuse or mislead voters, and (2) when the signatures on these sheets were excluded, Munoz had fewer than the required number of valid signatures. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Munoz’s petition sheets containing the photograph did not substantially comply with Ariz. Rev. Code 16-315(A), and therefore, the trial court correctly removed Munoz’s name from the primary ballot. View "Clark v. Munoz" on Justia Law

Dan Shooter filed a petition seeking to remove Toby Farmer’s name from the primary ballot for the office of State Senator for Legislative District 13 on the grounds that seven of the signatures on two of Farmer’s petition sheets were signed by persons other than the voters whose names had been signed. Shooter asked the trial court to infer that Farmer knew of the forgeries. The trial court declined to do so and determined that petition forgery had not been proved. Accordingly, the court did not remove Farmer’s name from the ballot. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment and denied Farmer’s request for attorney’s fees, holding that the trial court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous and that Shooter did not act in bad faith. View "Shooter v. Farmer" on Justia Law