Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident. The at-fault driver’s insurance was insufficient to cover Plaintiff’s damages, and therefore, Plaintiff sought underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage from her insurer (Insurer). When Plaintiff purchased her car insurance, Insurer had offered her UIM coverage on a form approved by the Arizona Department of Insurance, but Plaintiff declined the coverage. Insurer denied Plaintiff’s claim on the grounds that Plaintiff had waived UIM coverage. Plaintiff filed suit seeking a declaration that the UIM waiver was void because the written notice offering the UIM coverage did not include a premium quote. The trial court granted summary judgment for Insurer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statutorily required written offer need not include a premium quote. View "Newman v. Cornerstone Nat’l Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder, sexual assault, kidnapping, and misconduct involving weapons. The trial court imposed the death sentence for the murder conviction. Defendant appealed, raising twenty-six issues. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences, holding (1) the trial court did not prejudicially err in its pretrial rulings, guilt phase rulings, or penalty phase rulings; (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions; (3) the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct throughout the trial; and (4) a sentence of death was the appropriate sentence in this case. View "State v. Burns" on Justia Law

Linda Bell was injured at her job and underwent surgery for her injury seventeen months later. Bell requested temporary partial disability (TPD) compensation to reimburse her for the sick leave and vacation time she had used following her injury and before her surgery. The Industrial Commission of Arizona (ICA) denied the request on the ground that Bell did not had not taken time off work during the time period for which benefits were requested and that she did not miss any period of time over one week. The court of appeals affirmed on the ground that Bell failed to prove she had satisfied the waiting period created by Ariz. Rev. Stat. 23-1062(B). The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and set aside the ICA award, holding (1) the waiting period for compensation set forth in section 23-1062(B) applies to claims for all types of disability including both TPD benefits and temporary total disability (TTD) benefits; and (2) section 23-1062(B) does not require proof of an initial period of TTD but does require proof of seven consecutive calendar days of some type of work-related disability before an injured employee becomes entitled to compensation for any type of disability. View "Bell v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz." on Justia Law

The Rudgears, the owners of Wildwood Creek Ranch, LLC, borrowed money, through Wildwood, from the predecessor to BMO Harris Bank to finance construction of a home on a vacant lot. The loan was secured by a deed of trust. The home was never built, and the property remained undeveloped. Wildwood later defaulted on its loan, and BMO foreclosed on the property. A third party successfully bid for the property. BMO subsequently sued Wildwood and the Rudgears for the deficiency. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that the Rudgears intended to use the property for a single-family residence and therefore qualified for anti-deficiency protection. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Arizona’s residential anti-deficiency statute does not bar a deficiency judgment against an owner of vacant property. Remanded for entry of partial summary judgment in favor of BMO. View "BMO Harris Bank, N.A. v. Wildwood Creek Ranch, LLC" on Justia Law

Loop 101, LLC (“Loop”) borrowed money from MidFirst Bank to construct an office building. The promissory note was secured by a deed of trust, and four individuals guaranteed payment. The note, deed of trust, and gurantees expressly waived the fair market value provision of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 33-814(A). MidFirst assigned its rights under the loan and deed of trust to CSA 13-101 Loop, LLC (“CSA”). After Loop defaulted on the loan, CSA bought the property at a trustee’s sale for a credit bid of $6.15 million. CSA then sued Loop and the guarantors for a deficiency judgment. Loop and the guarantors counterclaimed and filed a third-party claim against MidFirst for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. MidFirst and CSA moved to dismiss, arguing that Loop and the guarantors had waived their right to a fair market value determination. The superior court ruled that parties may not prospectively waive this provision, determined the fair market value of the property to be $12.5 million, and concluded that no deficiency existed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that parties may not prospectively waive the fair market value provision of section 33-814(A). View "CSA 13-101 Loop, LLC v. Loop 101, LLC" on Justia Law

After HB 2010 was introduced by the legislature to expand Arizona’s indigent healthcare program, the question arose whether the legislature must pass the act by a supermajority vote. The legislative decided, by majority vote in each chamber, that it did not. The legislature then passed HB 2010 by a simple majority vote, and the governor signed it into law. Thirty-six legislators who voted against the bill sued to enjoin enforcement of the bill, alleging that by failing to satisfy the supermajority requirement, the legislature violated the constitution. The superior court dismissed the legislators’ claims for lack of standing because they did not suffer an “injury” when the supermajority requirement was found inapplicable. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the plaintiff legislators had enough votes to have blocked the bill if passage required a supermajority vote, the group alleged an injury sufficient to confer standing. View "Biggs v. Hon. Katherine Cooper" on Justia Law

In 2007, Defendant was convicted for possession of methamphetamine for sale. Defendant filed a notice of post-conviction relief (PCR), but the trial court dismissed the proceeding after Defendant’s new attorney failed to timely file a petition. Defendant then filed a second PCR notice through a different attorney. The trial court again dismissed the matter after Defendant’s new attorney failed to timely file a petition. Defendant initiated a third PCR proceeding, and a third attorney timely filed Defendant’s first PCR petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). The trial court denied the petition. The court of appeals also denied relief, concluding that Defendant waived his claim pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts, holding that because former counsel failed to file any petition in Defendant’s previous PCR proceedings and those failures were not Defendant’s fault, Defendant did not waive his IAC claim. View "State v. Diaz" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree felony murder, attempted first-degree murder, first-degree burglary, and three counts of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death for the murder conviction. The Supreme Court held (1) the trial court erred by permitting a sociologist who specializes on domestic violence to opine about separation violence, lethality factors, and any characteristics common to domestic abusers, as the testimony impermissibly created a “profile” of domestic abusers; and (2) the error was not harmless as to the convictions and sentences for first-degree murder and first-degree burglary, but the error was harmless as to the convictions and sentences on three counts of aggravated assault and one count of attempted first-degree murder. Remanded for a new trial on Defendant’s convictions and sentences for first-degree murder and first-degree burglary. View "State v. Ketchner" on Justia Law

Orca Communications Unlimited, LLC filed this action against Ann Noder, its former president, and the competing company Noder started after she left Orca, asserting common law tort clams based on alleged misappropriation of confidential information. The superior court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Orca’s common law claims were preempted by Arizona’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act (AUTSA), which creates an exclusive cause of action - and displaces conflicting causes of action - for claims based on the misappropriation of trade secrets. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) AUTSA does not displace common-law claims based on alleged misappropriation of confidential information that is not a trade secret; and (2) therefore, AUTSA did not displace Orca’s unfair competition claim. View "Orca Commc’ns Unlimited, LLC v. Noder" on Justia Law

In August, 2014, Elizabeth Joice filed a nomination paper with the Maricopa County Education Service Agency (“Agency”) announcing her intent to run for a vacant term of the Peoria Unified School District Governing Board. Joice also filed nominating petitions that did not comply with Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-314(D). Raymond Malnar filed this action challenging Joice’s candidacy based on her non-compliant nomination petitions. The superior court upheld Malnar’s challenge and ordered that Joice’s name not be included on the 2014 general election ballot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the record reflected proper service on Joice, the superior court correctly found that it had jurisdiction over the matter; and (2) the superior court imposed an appropriate remedy for the violation. View "Malnar v. Joice" on Justia Law