Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The real parties in interest here were eleven defendants charged with aggravated driving under the influence. The Scottsdale Crime Laboratory (SCL) tested each defendant’s blood for blood alcohol concentration (BAC). The defendants moved to exclude evidence of their BAC results under Ariz. R. Evid. 702, arguing that the instrument used by SCL to test their BAC had unresolved flaws that undermined its reliability. The trial court excluded evidence of the results as to all defendants, concluding that the State met its burden under Rule 702 for establishing the admissibility of the BAC results but that the State failed to show that the testing methodology had been reliably applied as required under the Rule 702(d). The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s order excluding evidence of the BAC results, holding (1) a trial court should exclude evidence resulting from errors in application of a methodology only if the errors render the expert’s conclusions unreliable; otherwise, a jury should consider whether the expert properly applied the methodology in determining the weight or credibility of the expert testimony; and (2) the trial court in this case applied the wrong legal standard under Rule 702(d) and thereby abused its discretion in excluding the evidence. View "State v. Hon. Bernstein" on Justia Law

At the time of Petitioner’s arrest, she had a registry identification card allowing her to use medical marijuana in compliance with the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act (AMMA). Petitioner pleaded guilty to three charges, including driving under the influence (DUI). Petitioner signed a plea agreement containing a provision that, as a condition of probation, she would not use marijuana in any form, whether or not she had a medical marijuana card issued by the State. Before sentencing, Petitioner filed a motion to strike the marijuana condition as prohibited by AMMA. The trial court granted the motion and struck the condition. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the condition was justified in a DUI case. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court’s order, holding (1) the trial court properly rejected the marijuana condition to the extent it prohibited Petitioner from using marijuana in compliance with AMMA during her probation; but (2) the trial court erred by refusing to permit the State to withdraw from the plea agreement after the court rejected the marijuana condition. View "State ex rel. Polk v. Hon. Cele Hancock" on Justia Law

While Petitioner was serving a prison term, the people passed the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act (AMMA). Petitioner obtained a registry identification card identifying him as a registered qualifying patient under the AMMA so that he might obtain medical marijuana for his chronic pain from a fractured hip. During his probation, Petitioner's probation officer added as a condition of probation that Petitioner “not possess or use marijuana for any reason.” Petitioner asked the superior court to amend his probation conditions to delete the “no marijuana” term. The superior court denied relief. The court of appeals, however, granted relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the immunity AMMA provides to qualified patients does not exclude probationers; (2) any probation term that threatens to revoke probation for medical marijuana use that complies with the terms of AMMA is unenforceable and illegal; (3) AMMA provides immunity for charges of violating Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-3408(G), which might otherwise subject a person to revocation of probation for marijuana use; and (4) by removing the probation condition at issue in this case, the trial court would not be authorizing a violation of federal law but would be recognizing that the court’s authority to impose probation conditions is limited by statute. View "Reed-Kaliher v. Hon. Wallace R. Hoggatt" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident. The at-fault driver’s insurance was insufficient to cover Plaintiff’s damages, and therefore, Plaintiff sought underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage from her insurer (Insurer). When Plaintiff purchased her car insurance, Insurer had offered her UIM coverage on a form approved by the Arizona Department of Insurance, but Plaintiff declined the coverage. Insurer denied Plaintiff’s claim on the grounds that Plaintiff had waived UIM coverage. Plaintiff filed suit seeking a declaration that the UIM waiver was void because the written notice offering the UIM coverage did not include a premium quote. The trial court granted summary judgment for Insurer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statutorily required written offer need not include a premium quote. View "Newman v. Cornerstone Nat’l Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder, sexual assault, kidnapping, and misconduct involving weapons. The trial court imposed the death sentence for the murder conviction. Defendant appealed, raising twenty-six issues. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences, holding (1) the trial court did not prejudicially err in its pretrial rulings, guilt phase rulings, or penalty phase rulings; (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions; (3) the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct throughout the trial; and (4) a sentence of death was the appropriate sentence in this case. View "State v. Burns" on Justia Law

Linda Bell was injured at her job and underwent surgery for her injury seventeen months later. Bell requested temporary partial disability (TPD) compensation to reimburse her for the sick leave and vacation time she had used following her injury and before her surgery. The Industrial Commission of Arizona (ICA) denied the request on the ground that Bell did not had not taken time off work during the time period for which benefits were requested and that she did not miss any period of time over one week. The court of appeals affirmed on the ground that Bell failed to prove she had satisfied the waiting period created by Ariz. Rev. Stat. 23-1062(B). The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and set aside the ICA award, holding (1) the waiting period for compensation set forth in section 23-1062(B) applies to claims for all types of disability including both TPD benefits and temporary total disability (TTD) benefits; and (2) section 23-1062(B) does not require proof of an initial period of TTD but does require proof of seven consecutive calendar days of some type of work-related disability before an injured employee becomes entitled to compensation for any type of disability. View "Bell v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz." on Justia Law

The Rudgears, the owners of Wildwood Creek Ranch, LLC, borrowed money, through Wildwood, from the predecessor to BMO Harris Bank to finance construction of a home on a vacant lot. The loan was secured by a deed of trust. The home was never built, and the property remained undeveloped. Wildwood later defaulted on its loan, and BMO foreclosed on the property. A third party successfully bid for the property. BMO subsequently sued Wildwood and the Rudgears for the deficiency. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that the Rudgears intended to use the property for a single-family residence and therefore qualified for anti-deficiency protection. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Arizona’s residential anti-deficiency statute does not bar a deficiency judgment against an owner of vacant property. Remanded for entry of partial summary judgment in favor of BMO. View "BMO Harris Bank, N.A. v. Wildwood Creek Ranch, LLC" on Justia Law

Loop 101, LLC (“Loop”) borrowed money from MidFirst Bank to construct an office building. The promissory note was secured by a deed of trust, and four individuals guaranteed payment. The note, deed of trust, and gurantees expressly waived the fair market value provision of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 33-814(A). MidFirst assigned its rights under the loan and deed of trust to CSA 13-101 Loop, LLC (“CSA”). After Loop defaulted on the loan, CSA bought the property at a trustee’s sale for a credit bid of $6.15 million. CSA then sued Loop and the guarantors for a deficiency judgment. Loop and the guarantors counterclaimed and filed a third-party claim against MidFirst for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. MidFirst and CSA moved to dismiss, arguing that Loop and the guarantors had waived their right to a fair market value determination. The superior court ruled that parties may not prospectively waive this provision, determined the fair market value of the property to be $12.5 million, and concluded that no deficiency existed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that parties may not prospectively waive the fair market value provision of section 33-814(A). View "CSA 13-101 Loop, LLC v. Loop 101, LLC" on Justia Law

After HB 2010 was introduced by the legislature to expand Arizona’s indigent healthcare program, the question arose whether the legislature must pass the act by a supermajority vote. The legislative decided, by majority vote in each chamber, that it did not. The legislature then passed HB 2010 by a simple majority vote, and the governor signed it into law. Thirty-six legislators who voted against the bill sued to enjoin enforcement of the bill, alleging that by failing to satisfy the supermajority requirement, the legislature violated the constitution. The superior court dismissed the legislators’ claims for lack of standing because they did not suffer an “injury” when the supermajority requirement was found inapplicable. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the plaintiff legislators had enough votes to have blocked the bill if passage required a supermajority vote, the group alleged an injury sufficient to confer standing. View "Biggs v. Hon. Katherine Cooper" on Justia Law

In 2007, Defendant was convicted for possession of methamphetamine for sale. Defendant filed a notice of post-conviction relief (PCR), but the trial court dismissed the proceeding after Defendant’s new attorney failed to timely file a petition. Defendant then filed a second PCR notice through a different attorney. The trial court again dismissed the matter after Defendant’s new attorney failed to timely file a petition. Defendant initiated a third PCR proceeding, and a third attorney timely filed Defendant’s first PCR petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). The trial court denied the petition. The court of appeals also denied relief, concluding that Defendant waived his claim pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts, holding that because former counsel failed to file any petition in Defendant’s previous PCR proceedings and those failures were not Defendant’s fault, Defendant did not waive his IAC claim. View "State v. Diaz" on Justia Law