Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The defendant in this criminal case moved to suppress the pretrial identification of a police officer that responded to an emergency call. The trial judge denied the motion to suppress without making any findings regarding the procedure’s suggestiveness or the identification’s reliability. On appeal, the State conceded that the one-person show-up identification procedure was inherently suggestive and that the trial court erred in concluding that the officer’s identification was not subject to a due process identification analysis. Relying on the pretrial hearing transcript, the court of appeals concluded that the officer’s identification of Defendant was reliable and therefore admissible. At issue in this case was whether an appellate court may make a reliability determination in the first instance when the trial court has failed to do so. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an appellate court may make a reliability determination if the trial court record permits an informed analysis; and (2) the court of appeals in this case had a sufficient record from which to analyze the reliability of the officer’s identification of Defendant, and therefore, the court of appeals did not err in conducting a reliability analysis of Defendant’s identification in the first instance on appeal. View "State v. Rojo-Valenzuela" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-820.02(A)(7), under which public entities and employees enjoy qualified immunity from liability for an injury to a motor vehicle driver that is attributable to the driver’s violation of statutes prohibiting reckless driving and driving while under the influence. Faith Mascolino died after she was arrested for driving under the influence and placed in the rear seat of a Department of Public Safety (DPS) cruiser, which was struck by another motorist. Plaintiff, the conservator for Mascolino’s minor children, filed this wrongful death action against DPS. The trial court instructed the jury on section 12-820.02(A)(7)’s qualified immunity. The jury found the motorist seventy-five percent at fault, Mascolino twenty-five percent at fault, and assigned no fault to DPS. The court of appeals upheld the giving of the section 12-820.02(A)(7) instruction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 12-820.02(A)(7)’s qualified immunity applies only when the driver was injured while driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle; and (2) the statute was inapplicable in this case, as Mascolino was not a driver of the motor vehicle at the relevant time. View "Fleming v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety" on Justia Law

The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of Father to his two children. Father appealed. While the appeal was pending, the juvenile court ordered the children’s adoption. Thereafter, the court of appeals reversed the termination of Father’s parental rights. Father then filed a motion asking the juvenile court to set aside the adoption pursuant to Arizona Rule of Procedure for Juvenile Court 85(A). The juvenile court denied the motion. The court of appeals vacated the adoption order as void, concluding that Arizona Rule of Procedure for Juvenile Court 103(F) divests the juvenile court of authority to enter an adoption order pending a biological parent’s appeal of a termination-of-rights order. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion, holding that the court of appeals misinterpreted Rule 103(F) and that the juvenile court had authority to enter the adoption order. Remanded to the court of appeals to decide whether the juvenile court properly denied Father’s motion to set aside the adoption pursuant to Rule 85(A). View "Roberto F. v. Dep’t of Child Safety" on Justia Law

Petitioners sued Respondents. Respondents, represented by counsel, made a settlement offer. The offer subsequently expired. Respondents’ counsel later extended a new settlement offer with terms that mirrored the prior offer. Petitioners’ attorney timely accepted the offer, and the trial court accepted the settlement (February 8 settlement). After Respondents’ attorney learned that he lacked authority to extend the settlement offer, he made a new settlement offer, which materially varied from the February 8 settlement. Petitioners moved to enforce the February 8 settlement. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that Respondents’ attorney had actual and apparent authority to extend the settlement offer and, alternatively, that Respondents were equitably estopped from disputing that authority. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that because Respondents’ assent to the agreement was not in writing, the requirements of Ariz. R. Civ. P. 80(d) were not met, and the agreement was unenforceable as a matter of law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the parties in this case did not dispute the existence and terms of the February 8 settlement, Rule 80(d) did not apply; (2) even if Rule 80(d) applied, the agreement satisfied the rule; and (3) the agreement was enforceable because the attorney acted within the apparent authority given by his clients. View "Robertson v. Alling" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court clarified the issue as to what form a provocation-manslaughter instruction should take in a second-degree murder trial. Defendant was charged with two counts of attempted second-degree murder. During trial, over Defendant’s objection, the trial court instructed the jury on attempted provocation manslaughter, ruling that attempted provocation manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of attempted second-degree murder. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on manslaughter. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Arizona’s statutes allow a provocation-manslaughter instruction in a second-degree murder case if the evidence warrants such an instruction even if the offense is not separately charged. View "Arizona v. Lua" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of felony murder and two counts of kidnapping. Defendant was sentenced to death for each murder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the corpus delicti rule, the State met its burden for both kidnapping charges, and therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting incriminating statements Defendant made to a television reporter; (2) the trial court did not commit fundamental error by failing to give an accomplice instruction; (3) the court’s exclusion of certain expert testimony did not violate Defendant’s right to present a defense or to a fair trial; (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to give a Willits instruction; (5) the use of Defendant’s kidnappings convictions, which were the predicate felonies for Defendant’s felony-murder convictions, to aggravate his sentence was not unconstitutional; (6) the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct during closing arguments; (7) any error in the trial court’s admission of victim impact statements was harmless; and (8) the remainder of Defendant’s arguments regarding his convictions and sentences were without merit. View "State v. Carlson" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers initiated a traffic stop that ultimately led to Defendant’s arrest for possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia and aggravated driving under the influence. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to pull him over. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment does not require officers to testify about how their observations reduce or eliminate the possibility that the innocent motoring public will be subject to seizures and does not require trial courts to make specific findings on that issue. View "State v. Evans" on Justia Law

After it was discovered that Defendant kept up mercury in his house, a firefighter and police officer entered Defendant’s home without a warrant in order to investigate. Once inside, the officer smelled marijuana and eventually discovered marijuana plants in the laundry room. Defendant was charged with production of marijuana and three counts of possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress, concluding that exigent circumstances permitted the warrantless search. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the search was not justified by exceptions to the warrant requirement. The Supreme Court affirmed a portion of the court of appeals’ opinion, ordered that the opinion be republished, and reversed the trial court’s order denying the motion to suppress, holding (1) the community caretaking exception does not apply to homes; and (2) if exigent circumstances or an emergency are present, police may make a warrantless entry into the home under those exceptions. Remanded. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

In 2007, the driver of a vehicle heading eastbound on Interstate 10 lost control of her vehicle, which crossed through a dirt median into the westbound lanes, and crashed into Plaintiff’s vehicle, killing Plaintiff’s husband and daughter and seriously injuring Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued the State for failing to install a median barrier in the area of the accident. The State moved for summary judgment based on Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-820.03, which provides public entities a “state of the art” affirmative defense against claims for injuries arising out of a plan or design for construction of a roadway. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that section 12-820.03 did not apply because Plaintiff did not allege that I-10 was unsafe when it was designed in 1967 but that the circumstances in 2007 rendered this portion of the interstate unreasonably unsafe. The court subsequently denied the State’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, which again asserted section 12-820.03’s affirmative defense. The jury found in favor of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the affirmative defense in section 12-820.03 remains available even if material changes to travel have rendered the roadway substandard; but (2) the State failed to establish every element of the defense in this case. View "Glazer v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her friend were involved in an automobile accident which killed Plaintiff’s friend and hospitalized Plaintiff. Arizona Department of Public Safety (DPS) officers erroneously identified the surviving patient and informed Plaintiff’s family that Plaintiff had died. Six days after the notification, Plaintiff was positively identified as the hospital patient. Plaintiff and her family (Plaintiffs) sued the State, alleging, as relevant to this appeal, negligence. The superior court granted partial summary judgment to the State, concluding that the officers did not owe a duty to Plaintiffs. The court of appeals reversed and reinstated Plaintiffs’ negligence claim. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and affirmed the superior court’s entry of summary judgment for the State, holding that, as a matter of policy, the DPS officers did not assume a legal duty to Plaintiffs by undertaking to provide the next-of-kin notification. View "Guerra v. State" on Justia Law