Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioners sued Respondents. Respondents, represented by counsel, made a settlement offer. The offer subsequently expired. Respondents’ counsel later extended a new settlement offer with terms that mirrored the prior offer. Petitioners’ attorney timely accepted the offer, and the trial court accepted the settlement (February 8 settlement). After Respondents’ attorney learned that he lacked authority to extend the settlement offer, he made a new settlement offer, which materially varied from the February 8 settlement. Petitioners moved to enforce the February 8 settlement. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that Respondents’ attorney had actual and apparent authority to extend the settlement offer and, alternatively, that Respondents were equitably estopped from disputing that authority. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that because Respondents’ assent to the agreement was not in writing, the requirements of Ariz. R. Civ. P. 80(d) were not met, and the agreement was unenforceable as a matter of law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the parties in this case did not dispute the existence and terms of the February 8 settlement, Rule 80(d) did not apply; (2) even if Rule 80(d) applied, the agreement satisfied the rule; and (3) the agreement was enforceable because the attorney acted within the apparent authority given by his clients. View "Robertson v. Alling" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court clarified the issue as to what form a provocation-manslaughter instruction should take in a second-degree murder trial. Defendant was charged with two counts of attempted second-degree murder. During trial, over Defendant’s objection, the trial court instructed the jury on attempted provocation manslaughter, ruling that attempted provocation manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of attempted second-degree murder. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on manslaughter. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Arizona’s statutes allow a provocation-manslaughter instruction in a second-degree murder case if the evidence warrants such an instruction even if the offense is not separately charged. View "Arizona v. Lua" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of felony murder and two counts of kidnapping. Defendant was sentenced to death for each murder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the corpus delicti rule, the State met its burden for both kidnapping charges, and therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting incriminating statements Defendant made to a television reporter; (2) the trial court did not commit fundamental error by failing to give an accomplice instruction; (3) the court’s exclusion of certain expert testimony did not violate Defendant’s right to present a defense or to a fair trial; (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to give a Willits instruction; (5) the use of Defendant’s kidnappings convictions, which were the predicate felonies for Defendant’s felony-murder convictions, to aggravate his sentence was not unconstitutional; (6) the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct during closing arguments; (7) any error in the trial court’s admission of victim impact statements was harmless; and (8) the remainder of Defendant’s arguments regarding his convictions and sentences were without merit. View "State v. Carlson" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers initiated a traffic stop that ultimately led to Defendant’s arrest for possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia and aggravated driving under the influence. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to pull him over. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment does not require officers to testify about how their observations reduce or eliminate the possibility that the innocent motoring public will be subject to seizures and does not require trial courts to make specific findings on that issue. View "State v. Evans" on Justia Law

After it was discovered that Defendant kept up mercury in his house, a firefighter and police officer entered Defendant’s home without a warrant in order to investigate. Once inside, the officer smelled marijuana and eventually discovered marijuana plants in the laundry room. Defendant was charged with production of marijuana and three counts of possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress, concluding that exigent circumstances permitted the warrantless search. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the search was not justified by exceptions to the warrant requirement. The Supreme Court affirmed a portion of the court of appeals’ opinion, ordered that the opinion be republished, and reversed the trial court’s order denying the motion to suppress, holding (1) the community caretaking exception does not apply to homes; and (2) if exigent circumstances or an emergency are present, police may make a warrantless entry into the home under those exceptions. Remanded. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

In 2007, the driver of a vehicle heading eastbound on Interstate 10 lost control of her vehicle, which crossed through a dirt median into the westbound lanes, and crashed into Plaintiff’s vehicle, killing Plaintiff’s husband and daughter and seriously injuring Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued the State for failing to install a median barrier in the area of the accident. The State moved for summary judgment based on Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-820.03, which provides public entities a “state of the art” affirmative defense against claims for injuries arising out of a plan or design for construction of a roadway. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that section 12-820.03 did not apply because Plaintiff did not allege that I-10 was unsafe when it was designed in 1967 but that the circumstances in 2007 rendered this portion of the interstate unreasonably unsafe. The court subsequently denied the State’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, which again asserted section 12-820.03’s affirmative defense. The jury found in favor of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the affirmative defense in section 12-820.03 remains available even if material changes to travel have rendered the roadway substandard; but (2) the State failed to establish every element of the defense in this case. View "Glazer v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her friend were involved in an automobile accident which killed Plaintiff’s friend and hospitalized Plaintiff. Arizona Department of Public Safety (DPS) officers erroneously identified the surviving patient and informed Plaintiff’s family that Plaintiff had died. Six days after the notification, Plaintiff was positively identified as the hospital patient. Plaintiff and her family (Plaintiffs) sued the State, alleging, as relevant to this appeal, negligence. The superior court granted partial summary judgment to the State, concluding that the officers did not owe a duty to Plaintiffs. The court of appeals reversed and reinstated Plaintiffs’ negligence claim. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and affirmed the superior court’s entry of summary judgment for the State, holding that, as a matter of policy, the DPS officers did not assume a legal duty to Plaintiffs by undertaking to provide the next-of-kin notification. View "Guerra v. State" on Justia Law

The real parties in interest here were eleven defendants charged with aggravated driving under the influence. The Scottsdale Crime Laboratory (SCL) tested each defendant’s blood for blood alcohol concentration (BAC). The defendants moved to exclude evidence of their BAC results under Ariz. R. Evid. 702, arguing that the instrument used by SCL to test their BAC had unresolved flaws that undermined its reliability. The trial court excluded evidence of the results as to all defendants, concluding that the State met its burden under Rule 702 for establishing the admissibility of the BAC results but that the State failed to show that the testing methodology had been reliably applied as required under the Rule 702(d). The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s order excluding evidence of the BAC results, holding (1) a trial court should exclude evidence resulting from errors in application of a methodology only if the errors render the expert’s conclusions unreliable; otherwise, a jury should consider whether the expert properly applied the methodology in determining the weight or credibility of the expert testimony; and (2) the trial court in this case applied the wrong legal standard under Rule 702(d) and thereby abused its discretion in excluding the evidence. View "State v. Hon. Bernstein" on Justia Law

At the time of Petitioner’s arrest, she had a registry identification card allowing her to use medical marijuana in compliance with the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act (AMMA). Petitioner pleaded guilty to three charges, including driving under the influence (DUI). Petitioner signed a plea agreement containing a provision that, as a condition of probation, she would not use marijuana in any form, whether or not she had a medical marijuana card issued by the State. Before sentencing, Petitioner filed a motion to strike the marijuana condition as prohibited by AMMA. The trial court granted the motion and struck the condition. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the condition was justified in a DUI case. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court’s order, holding (1) the trial court properly rejected the marijuana condition to the extent it prohibited Petitioner from using marijuana in compliance with AMMA during her probation; but (2) the trial court erred by refusing to permit the State to withdraw from the plea agreement after the court rejected the marijuana condition. View "State ex rel. Polk v. Hon. Cele Hancock" on Justia Law

While Petitioner was serving a prison term, the people passed the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act (AMMA). Petitioner obtained a registry identification card identifying him as a registered qualifying patient under the AMMA so that he might obtain medical marijuana for his chronic pain from a fractured hip. During his probation, Petitioner's probation officer added as a condition of probation that Petitioner “not possess or use marijuana for any reason.” Petitioner asked the superior court to amend his probation conditions to delete the “no marijuana” term. The superior court denied relief. The court of appeals, however, granted relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the immunity AMMA provides to qualified patients does not exclude probationers; (2) any probation term that threatens to revoke probation for medical marijuana use that complies with the terms of AMMA is unenforceable and illegal; (3) AMMA provides immunity for charges of violating Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-3408(G), which might otherwise subject a person to revocation of probation for marijuana use; and (4) by removing the probation condition at issue in this case, the trial court would not be authorizing a violation of federal law but would be recognizing that the court’s authority to impose probation conditions is limited by statute. View "Reed-Kaliher v. Hon. Wallace R. Hoggatt" on Justia Law