Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, armed robbery, and burglary. The jury returned a death verdict for the murder. The Supreme Court remanded for a new penalty-phase proceeding on the murder conviction. On resentencing, Defendant was again sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s death sentence, holding (1) while the prosecutor engaged in misconduct in certain instances during trial, the improper remarks did not affect the jury’s verdict; (2) the trial court did not commit reversible error when it denied Defendant’s motion to retry the aggravated phase and prohibited him from offering the guilty verdict as an exhibit during the penalty-phase retrial; (3) the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury that Defendant would never be released if sentenced to prison; (4) the trial court did not violate Batson v. Kentucky when it permitted the State to strike five Hispanic jurors over Defendant’s objection; (5) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike a juror that had previously worked at the same hospital as one of the State’s witnesses; and (6) the death sentence was appropriate in this case. View "State v. Lynch" on Justia Law

The Lewises obtained a default money judgment against the MacKeans and recorded their judgment, attempting to create a lien on the MacKeans’ real property. Neither the initial recording nor the renewal affidavit subsequently filed by the MacKeans was accompanied by a separate information statement as required by Ariz. Rev. Stat. 33-961(C) and 33-967(A). The Debords, the defendants in this case, later bought the property. One month later, the Lewises attempted to foreclose their lien against the property. The trial court entered summary judgment for the Debords, concluding that the Lewises could not execute against the property due to their failure to file an information statement, which rendered their judgment lien invalid. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) failing to attach an information statement to a certified copy of the judgment does not invalidate an otherwise valid lien, but instead, the judgment lien lacks priority against competing creditors who record liens against the property before the information statement is filed; and (2) because the Debords had constructive notice of the certified judgment that the Lewises recorded, the Debords took the property subject to the lien, and the Lewises’ failure to file an information statement did not preclude them from executing against the property. View "Lewis v. Debord" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of first degree murder for murdering his two young sons. The jury sentenced Defendant to death for each murder. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences, holding (1) the trial court did not err by admitting statements Defendant made to police officers at his home; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting other acts evidence under Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b); (3) the trial court erred in excluding some evidence of Defendant’s mental health and prescription drug use, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (4) the trial court erred in giving a jury instruction defining the Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-751(F)(6) aggravating factor, but the error was harmless; (5) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by precluding testimony of the former warden in the Department of Corrections; (6) the trial court did not err in admitting testimony of Defendant’s former neighbor about the effect of the murders on the neighbor; and (7) the imposition of the death sentence in this case was not an abuse of discretion. View "State v. Leteve" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. Defendant later filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), asserting that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to timely raise on appeal the issue of an unconstitutional jury instruction. The superior court denied the claim, concluding (1) Defendant was precluded from arguing the issue because it could have been, but was not, raised on appeal; and (2) any prejudice caused by appellate counsel’s failure to timely raise the issue on appeal was cured by the Supreme Court’s independent review of Defendant’s convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the PCR court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief because counsel’s failure to timely raise the issue on appeal did not prejudice Defendant. View "State v. Roseberry" on Justia Law

Martha and Mario Madrigal sued the City of Mesa. After the case was settled by the Madrigals’ second attorney, Raymond Slomski, the Madrigals’ first attorney, Edward Fitzhugh, assigned his rights under the parties’ contingent fee agreement to Al Carranza. Carranza later sued the Madrigals (“the fee-collection action”). The Madrigals subsequently divorced pursuant to a decree that allocated the remaining funds from the as-yet-unresolved fee-collection action. Mario and Carranza then entered into a settlement agreement that called for a portion of the disputed funds to be released to Mario and Carranza. The superior court approved the agreement. Slomski filed an interpleader action contesting the settlement. Thereafter, Martha successfully moved to set aside the order approving the settlement. Carranza then moved to substitute Fitzhugh as the real party in interest in both the fee-collection action and the interpleader action. The superior court denied the substitution request and court granted summary judgment in favor of Martha in the fee-collection action. The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment but reversed the denial of Carranza’s motion to substitute in the fee-collection action. The Supreme Court vacated in part, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions to substitute. View "Carranza v. Madrigal" on Justia Law

Charles Stenz suffered a workplace injury. His employer’s insurance carrier, Pinnacle Risk Management, accepted Stenz’s claim and paid the benefits. Stenz subsequently died, and his widow, Elizabeth Stenz, filed a claim for death benefits. An administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld the denial. The court of appeals set aside the award. The ALJ eventually awarded death benefits and, almost four years after Elizabeth filed her claim, entered a final order affirming the award. Pinnacle paid the benefits dating back to Stenz’s death but did not pay interest on the unpaid benefits. The ALJ concluded that no interest was owed on the death benefit before the award became final. The court of appeals set this ruling aside, concluding that the claim was liquidated as of the date Pinnacle received notice of it. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals and set aside the ALJ’s award, holding that a claim for death benefits filed pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 23-1046 is a liquidated claim, and interest is owed on the claim from the date on which the carrier receives notice that a survivor has filed a claim with the Industrial Commission. View "Stenz v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz." on Justia Law

Under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 20-259.01, insurers must offer uninsured motorist (UM) and underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage to their insureds and may prove compliance by having their insureds sign a Department of Insurance (DOI) approved form selecting or rejecting such coverage. Plaintiff obtained car insurance from State Farm through Defendant, an insurance agent. Plaintiff requested that her policy include both UM and UIM coverage, but Defendant procured insurance that did not include UIM coverage. Plaintiff signed the DOI-approved form, which had been filled out by Defendant to reject UIM coverage. Plaintiff and her husband later sued Defendant for malpractice for failing to procure the insurance coverage they had requested. The trial court concluded that Defendant’s compliance with section 20-259.01 demonstrated that it fulfilled its duties to Plaintiff regarding the offer of UM/UIM coverage, and therefore, Defendant breached no duty owed to Plaintiffs. The court of appeals reversed, holding that section 20-259.01(B) did not abolish the common law duty of reasonable care insurance agents owe their clients. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that compliance with section 20-259.01 does not bar a negligence claim alleging that the insurance agent failed to procure the UIM coverage requested by the insured. View "Wilks v. Manobianco" on Justia Law

The defendant in this criminal case moved to suppress the pretrial identification of a police officer that responded to an emergency call. The trial judge denied the motion to suppress without making any findings regarding the procedure’s suggestiveness or the identification’s reliability. On appeal, the State conceded that the one-person show-up identification procedure was inherently suggestive and that the trial court erred in concluding that the officer’s identification was not subject to a due process identification analysis. Relying on the pretrial hearing transcript, the court of appeals concluded that the officer’s identification of Defendant was reliable and therefore admissible. At issue in this case was whether an appellate court may make a reliability determination in the first instance when the trial court has failed to do so. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an appellate court may make a reliability determination if the trial court record permits an informed analysis; and (2) the court of appeals in this case had a sufficient record from which to analyze the reliability of the officer’s identification of Defendant, and therefore, the court of appeals did not err in conducting a reliability analysis of Defendant’s identification in the first instance on appeal. View "State v. Rojo-Valenzuela" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-820.02(A)(7), under which public entities and employees enjoy qualified immunity from liability for an injury to a motor vehicle driver that is attributable to the driver’s violation of statutes prohibiting reckless driving and driving while under the influence. Faith Mascolino died after she was arrested for driving under the influence and placed in the rear seat of a Department of Public Safety (DPS) cruiser, which was struck by another motorist. Plaintiff, the conservator for Mascolino’s minor children, filed this wrongful death action against DPS. The trial court instructed the jury on section 12-820.02(A)(7)’s qualified immunity. The jury found the motorist seventy-five percent at fault, Mascolino twenty-five percent at fault, and assigned no fault to DPS. The court of appeals upheld the giving of the section 12-820.02(A)(7) instruction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 12-820.02(A)(7)’s qualified immunity applies only when the driver was injured while driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle; and (2) the statute was inapplicable in this case, as Mascolino was not a driver of the motor vehicle at the relevant time. View "Fleming v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety" on Justia Law

The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of Father to his two children. Father appealed. While the appeal was pending, the juvenile court ordered the children’s adoption. Thereafter, the court of appeals reversed the termination of Father’s parental rights. Father then filed a motion asking the juvenile court to set aside the adoption pursuant to Arizona Rule of Procedure for Juvenile Court 85(A). The juvenile court denied the motion. The court of appeals vacated the adoption order as void, concluding that Arizona Rule of Procedure for Juvenile Court 103(F) divests the juvenile court of authority to enter an adoption order pending a biological parent’s appeal of a termination-of-rights order. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion, holding that the court of appeals misinterpreted Rule 103(F) and that the juvenile court had authority to enter the adoption order. Remanded to the court of appeals to decide whether the juvenile court properly denied Father’s motion to set aside the adoption pursuant to Rule 85(A). View "Roberto F. v. Dep’t of Child Safety" on Justia Law