Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty on sixty-seven counts, including nine counts of first-degree murder. The jury returned death verdicts on all nine murder charges. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; (2) any error in the denial of Defendant’s request to observe or participate in the State’s DNA testing procedures that consumed certain DNA samples was harmless; (3) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion to sever; (4) Defendant was not deprived of his constitutional right to counsel; (5) Defendant was not deprived of a fundamentally fair trial; (6) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence other-act evidence, pretrial and in-court identifications, firearms expert testimony, and an autopsy photograph; (7) the trial court did not violate Defendant’s right to present a complete defense; (8) although the prosecutor made some improper remarks during trial, they did not deprive Defendant of a fair trial; (9) the trial court did not prejudicially err during the penalty phase; and (10) the jury did not abuse its discretion in finding death sentences appropriate for each of the nine murders. View "State v. Goudeau" on Justia Law

First American Title Insurance Company issued title insurance policies to Johnson Bank for properties that secured the Bank’s loans. The policies failed to list covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) that prohibited commercial development on the properties. When the property owners defaulted on their loan obligations to the Bank, they sued First American, alleging that they had intended to develop the properties and were prevented from doing so by the CC&Rs. Judgment was entered in favor of the owners, and the properties were sold at a trustee’s sale. Johnson purchased the parcels and notified First American of claims under its lender’s title insurance policies. The superior court ruled that the parcels should be valued as of the foreclosure date. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the policy was breached when the loans were made. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and reversed the superior court's judgment, holding (1) when an undisclosed title defect prevents the intended use of the property and causes the borrower to default on the loan, the lender’s diminution-in-value loss should be calculated as of the date the title policy was issued; and (2) the record here did not establish that the title defect caused the borrowers’ default and resulting foreclosure. Remanded. View "First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Johnson Bank" on Justia Law

The State charged Alejandra Moran with the first-degree murder of L.U., who was stabbed. Moran moved to exclude an excerpt from a cellphone video recorded by a witness to the stabbing on the ground that it was inadmissible under Ariz. R. Evid. 106, 1002, 801 and 901. The witness had cropped the video before it was obtained by the police. The trial court granted the motion. The State sought special action relief, arguing that the excerpt was erroneously excluded because the State was not responsible for the absence of the complete video recording. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the suppression order, holding that the trial court erred by precluding the video excerpt based on Rules 106, 1002, 801 and 901. Remanded for consideration of whether the evidence should be precluded under Ariz. R. Evid. 403. View "State v. Hon. Ronald J. Steinle" on Justia Law

Patients filed suit to set aside accord and satisfaction agreements and to recover the amounts paid to release liens. Hospitals, health care providers who treated patients injured by third parties, were paid by the Patients' insurer, AHCCCS, which had negotiated reduced rates with the Hospitals. The Hospitals then recorded liens against the Patients pursuant to A.R.S. 33-931 and A.R.S. 36-2903.01(G) for the difference between the amount typically charged for their treatment and the reduced amount paid by AHCCCS. In order to receive their personal injury settlements with the third parties, Patients settled with the Hospitals by paying negotiated amounts to release the liens. At issue is the validity of these accord and satisfaction agreements. The court assumed, without deciding, that Arizona’s lien statutes are preempted by federal law. But, because there was a bona fide dispute about the enforceability of these liens when the Patients and Hospitals entered into settlement agreements to achieve lien releases, the agreements were supported by adequate consideration and addressed a proper subject matter. Therefore, the accord and satisfaction agreements are valid. View "Abbott v. Banner Health Network" on Justia Law

Francis Kraps was indicted on two counts of child prostitution in violation of A.R.S. 13-3212(B)(2). During a pre-trial hearing, the superior court advised Kraps that if he was convicted, the court was required to impose an enhanced sentence between seven and twenty-one years’ imprisonment for each count without the possibility of early release, and that the sentences would be served consecutively. Kraps moved for reconsideration, asserting that because the “minors” involved were actually undercover police officers posing as sixteen-year-old girls, these sentencing provisions did not apply. The court held that “minor,” as used in A.R.S. 13-3212(D) and (G) means a person who is fifteen, sixteen, or seventeen years of age, a peace officer posing as a minor aged fifteen to seventeen years, or someone assisting a peace officer by posing as a minor aged fifteen to seventeen years. Accordingly, the court vacated and reversed. View "State ex rel. Polk v. Hon. Campbell/Kraps" on Justia Law

Physicians are immunized from prosecution for providing written certifications under the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act (AMMA). In this case, Defendant, a physician, certified a drug task force confidential informant (C.I.) for medical marijuana use. Defendant never reviewed the C.I.’s medical records from the preceding twelve months but falsely attested that he did so before providing the written certification authorizing medical marijuana use. Defendant was indicted on one count of forgery and one count of fraudulent schemes and artifices. The trial court dismissed the indictment, ruling that Ariz. Rev. Stat. 36-2811(C) immunized Defendant against prosecution on those charges. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals and reversed the trial court’s order of dismissal, holding that AMMA does not immunize conduct such as making a false statement in a written certification. Remanded. View "State v. Gear" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (DUI) and taken to a police station, where he was read an “admin per se” form. The form provided that “Arizona law requires you to submit” to breath, blood, or other bodily substance tests chosen by law enforcement. Defendant subsequently submitted to breath and blood tests and was subsequently charged with five counts of aggravated DUI. Defendant moved to suppress the test results, arguing that the warrantless search violated his Fourth Amendment rights because he did not voluntarily consent to the tests. The trial court denied the motion. Based on the parties’ stipulated facts, the court dismissed three counts and convicted Defendant on the remaining counts. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) Defendant’s consent was not freely and voluntarily given in this case; but (2) because the admonition was given in good faith reliance on precedent, exclusion of the test results was not required. View "State v. Valenzuela" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for operating a motorized watercraft while under the influence of alcohol or drugs (OUI) and transported to an aid station used by the sheriff’s office. Defendant read an “OUI Admonishment” form, which provided that “Arizona law requires you to submit” to breath, blood, or other bodily substance tests chosen by law enforcement. Defendant agreed to submit to a blood draw and was subsequently charged with two counts of OUI and one count of extreme OUI. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the test results, arguing that the warrantless search violated his Fourth Amendment rights because he did not voluntarily consent to the test. The justice court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. A jury subsequently found Defendant guilty. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant did not consent to giving blood samples in this case. Remanded. View "Brown v. Hon. Crane McClennen" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of ten counts of sexual exploitation of a minor and one count of conspiracy to commit sexual exploitation of a minor. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences on appeal. Appellant later filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and juror misconduct. The trial court summarily dismissed Appellant’s petition for post-conviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) neither Appellant’s trial counsel nor his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance; and (2) even if Appellant properly raised his juror misconduct claim, he failed to show prejudice. View "State v. Kolmann" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendant for breach of contract, and Defendant counterclaimed. The trial lasted twelve trial days. During deliberations, a juror asked a bailiff “how long deliberations typically lasted.” The bailiff responded that “an hour or two should be plenty.” After deliberating for one to two hours, the jurors returned a verdict awarding Plaintiff $10,733. Plaintiff had sought more than $5 million in damages. Plaintiff moved for a new trial based on the bailiff’s statement. The trial court denied the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that prejudice should be presumed where it could not be determined from the record how the jury might have interpreted the bailiff’s comment, and therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the communication was not prejudicial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial without holding an evidentiary hearing, as the bailiff’s statement was not objectively prejudicial, and there was no significant fact question about what occurred. View "American Power Products, Inc. v. CSK Auto, Inc." on Justia Law