Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Sammantha Allen and John Allen, a married couple, were indicted by a grand jury for first degree felony murder. The indictment concurrently charged the Allens with multiple counts of child abuse. The State filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, alleging the child abuse offenses as “serious offense” aggravating circumstances under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-751(F)(2). At the Allens’ request, the trial court conducted a hearing under the procedures outlined in Chronis v. Steinle and determined that probable cause existed for the serious offense aggravators because the grand jury found that probable cause existed for the alleged aggravating circumstances. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Sanchez v. Ainley required the trial court to independently determine whether probable cause existed for the serious offense aggravators. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court must independently determine if a concurrently charged offense qualifies as a serious offense, but the court should accept the grand jury’s determination that probable cause exists for the concurrently charged offense. View "Allen v. Honorable Teresa A. Sanders" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of child molestation and sexual abuse of a minor under age fifteen. Under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-1407(E), it is a defense to a prosecution for sexual abuse or child molestation that a defendant was not motivated by a sexual interest. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that Defendant bore the burden of proving “his conduct was not motivated by a sexual interest” but that the error was harmless. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences, holding (1) section 13-1407(E) provides an affirmative defense that a defendant must prove, and therefore, the State need not prove as an element of those crimes that a defendant’s conduct was motivated by a sexual interest; and (2) the trial court properly instructed the jury that Defendant was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was not motivated by a sexual interest. View "State v. Holle" on Justia Law

For many years, the City of Phoenix has contracted in collective bargaining agreements with police officers to pay officers for certain time spent on behalf of a police union (“release time”) rather than regular police duties. Taxpayers sued the City, allowing that four release time provisions in a 2012 collective bargaining agreement violated the Gift Clause of the Arizona Constitution. The trial court issued a permanent injunction, ruling that the provisions violate the Gift Clause because they lack a public purpose and are not support by adequate consideration. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the challenged release time provisions do not violate the Gift Clause. View "Cheatham v. DiCiccio" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with necrophilia and two counts of sexual assault. Defendant moved to suppress evidence of a video taken with his cell phone that he left in the victim’s apartment where he was an overnight guest, contending that the warrantless search of his phone was unconstitutional. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion and suppressed of the video and of statements Defendant made to the police about that video, holding that the evidence resulted from an illegal search. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the warrantless search of the phone was permissible because Defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in either the victim’s apartment or his cell phone. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his phone; (2) as an overnight guest, Defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment; and (3) no exception to the warrant requirement existed, and therefore, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply. View "State v. Peoples" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and kidnapping and sentenced to death. For reasons unrelated to this appeal, the Supreme Court remanded for a new penalty phase trial on the murder conviction. After a penalty phase retrial, a jury again determined that Defendant should be sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in allowing Defendant to represent himself during the penalty phase on remand; (2) the trial court did not err by permitting Defendant to waive the presentation of mitigation evidence; (3) the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to strike a certain aggravator was not erroneous; (4) the trial court’s response to a jury question during deliberations was not fundamental error; and (5) there was no prosecutorial misconduct. View "State v. Gunches" on Justia Law

Premier Physicians Group, a non-hospital health care provider, treated Mandy Gipson for injuries sustained in a car accident allegedly caused by Kimberly Navarro. Premier was statutorily entitled to record a lien for its customary charges in treating Gipson, and the lien applied to claims Gipson may have had for damages related to her injury. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 33-932(A) requires that such liens must be recorded “before or within thirty days after the patient has received any services relating to the injuries….” The Navarros’ insurer paid Gipson to settle her claim but did not satisfy the lien, and Gipson failed to pay Premier for its services. Premier sued the Navarros to enforce the lien. The trial court dismissed the complaint because the lien was recorded more than thirty days after Premier first provided services to Gipson. Premier appealed, arguing that section 33-932() allowed it to perfect with lien within thirty days after services were last provided. The court of appeals agreed with Premier and reversed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint, holding that section 33-932(A) requires non-hospital providers to record liens before services are first provided or within thirty days thereafter. View "Premier Physicians Group, PLLC v. Navarro" on Justia Law

Frank Tamburri seeks the Libertarian Party nomination for United States Senator in the 2016 election. Pursuant to A.R.S. 16-314, Tamburri timely filed a nomination petition which included 4,205 signatures. Robert Graham, Chairman of the Arizona Republican Party, filed suit challenging the validity of 2,845 signatures and sought to exclude Tamburri’s name from the Libertarian primary election ballot. On appeal, Tamburri challenges the trial court’s order excluding his name from the Libertarian primary election ballot for the office of United States Senator. Tamburri concedes that he did not collect at least 3,034 signatures from “qualified signers” under A.R.S. 16-321 and -322. As a preliminary matter, the court rejected Tamburri's procedural arguments. The court held that the signature requirements of H.B. 2608 do not severely burden the ability of candidates to exercise their First Amendment rights where Tamburri has failed to show that the increased signature requirements, either facially or as applied to him, would prevent “reasonably diligent” minor party candidates from gaining ballot access. The court concluded that the 0.25 percent signature requirement is rationally related to the state’s legitimate interest in ensuring that candidates who appear on the general election ballot have some significant modicum of support. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment excluding Tamburri’s name from the primary ballot. View "Graham v. Tamburri" on Justia Law

Medicare Part C, 42 U.S.C. 1395w-21 et seq., permits enrollees to obtain Medicare-covered healthcare services from private healthcare organizations and their third-party contractors. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., regulates health plans offered by private employers to employees. At issue is whether continued inpatient treatment by Providers was medically necessary, and therefore compensable, for several MA Plan Members and ERISA Plan Members initially hospitalized for mental health evaluations or treatment. The court held that the administrative appeals process provided under the Medicare Act preempts arbitration of Medicare-related coverage disputes between private healthcare administrators and providers, even though arbitration would otherwise be required by the parties’ contracts and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq. In this case, Providers’ coverage claims are inextricably intertwined with claims for Medicare benefits, and they therefore are subject to the Medicare Act. The Act provides mandatory administrative review procedures for these disputes, which preempt arbitration. The court concluded, however, that the court of appeals erred by deciding that whether Aurora’s ERISA-related claims are arbitrable depends on whether Aurora has standing to assert this claim. The court of appeals should decide on remand whether this claim is arbitrable without considering the standing issue or whether any valid defenses to the claim exist. Therefore, the court remanded to the court of appeals to decide whether ERISA similarly preempts arbitration of ERISA-related coverage disputes. View "United Behavioral Health v. Maricopa Integrated Health Sys." on Justia Law

First American Title Insurance Company issued two title insurance policies to Johnson Bank for two properties that secured the Bank’s loans. The policies failed to disclose encumbrances that allegedly affected the value of the property and thwarted its intended use. The property owners defaulted on their loan obligations to the Bank. Based on the undisclosed encumbrances, the owners successfully sued First American to recover damages under their owners’ title insurance policies. Johnson Bank purchased the properties and notified First American of claims under its lender’s title insurance policies. The parties disagreed on the date for calculating the diminution in value of the two properties - whether the date of the loans or the foreclosure date. The superior court granted summary judgment for First American, concluding that the foreclosure date should be used to calculate damages. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when an undisclosed title defect prevents the known, intended use of the property and causes the borrower to default on the loan, the lender’s diminution-in-value loss should be calculated as of the policy-issuance date; and (2) because the record in this case did not establish that the title defect caused the borrowers’ default and the Bank’s subsequent foreclosure, the cause must be remanded for further proceedings on that issue. View "First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Johnson Bank" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with importation of marijuana, transportation of marijuana for sale, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Before trial, Defendant notified the court that he intended to raise a duress defense by testifying that armed smugglers had forced him to carry the drugs. The trial court precluded Defendant from raising the duress defense or describing any related anticipated testimony in his opening statement on the grounds that Defendant might change his mind about testifying. The jury subsequently found Defendant guilty of transportation of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ decision, holding that the trial court erred in so limiting Defendant’s opening statement. Remanded to allow the court of appeals to consider whether the error was harmless. View "State v. Pedroza-Perez" on Justia Law