Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

When Robert and Diane Merrill divorced in 1993 the family court awarded each party one-half of Robert’s military retirement pay (MRP) disability benefits as their separate property. In 2004, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) found Robert eligible to receive Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC). Robert waived a portion of MRP to receive CRSC. Consequently, Diane’s monthly share of MRP decreased significantly. In 2010, Diane requested that the family court award her arrearages from her reduced share of MRP and compensate her for future reduced payments of MRP. The family court denied the petition, concluding that Ariz. Rev. Stat. 25-318.01 - which prohibits courts from “making up” for a reduction in MRP due to a retired veteran receiving CRSC benefits by awarding additional assets to the non-military ex-spouse - proscribed the requested relief. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that section 25-318.01 does not apply to CRSC awards. The legislature subsequently amended section 25-318.01 to make it applicable to CRSC benefits. Thereafter, the court of appeals vacated its order and deemed Diane’s 2010 petition denied. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ decision, holding that section 25-318.01 cannot apply to preclude indemnification when a retired veteran makes a post-decree waiver of MRP to obtain CRSC benefits and the decree was entered before section 25-318.01’s effective date. View "Merrill v. Merrill" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder, assault, and kidnapping. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences, holding (1) the trial court properly admitted evidence of statements by Defendant’s brother recounting the events preceding the victim’s death; (2) the admission of gang expert testimony was proper; (3) the trial judge did not commit fundamental error by allowing the jury to consider the Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-751(F)(6) “especially cruel” aggravator under appropriate limiting instructions; and (4) the jury did not abuse its discretion when it declined to grant Defendant leniency. View "State v. Guarino" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a divorce decree entered in 1991, Sandra Powell began receiving fifty percent of John Howell’s military retirement pay (MRP) when John retired from the Air Force. John later qualified for monthly, tax-exempt VA disability payments. A veteran who receives MRP cannot collect VA disability benefits unless the veteran waives an equivalent amount of MRP. John elected a VA waiver. Accordingly, monthly MRP payments to both John and Sandra were reduced. Sandra moved to enforce the decree’s division of MRP and also sought an arrearage amount equaling the reductions in her share of MRP after the VA waiver. John opposed the request, arguing that Ariz. Rev. Stat. 25-318.01 barred the family court from requiring him to indemnify Sandra for the reduction in her share of MRP. The family court granted Sandra’s motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) federal law does not preempt the family court’s authority to order a retired veteran to indemnify an ex-spouse for a reduction in MRP caused by a post-decree waiver of MRP made to obtain disability benefits; and (2) section 25-318.01 does not prohibit the court from entering an indemnification order in these circumstances if the ex-spouse’s share of MRP vested as a property right before 2010. View "Howell v. Howell" on Justia Law

DBT Yuma subleased property at the Yuma International Airport from the Yuma County Airport Authority - a nonprofit corporation that operated the airport under a lease from Yuma County - and operated a fixed base operation there. YCAA later evicted DBT Yuma and entered into a new sublease with another tenant. DBT Yuma sued YCAA for breaching its sublease. DBT Yuma later added Yuma County as a defendant, alleging that YCAA was the County’s “instrumentality and alter ego,” and therefore, the County was liable for YCAA’s breach. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the County. At issue on appeal was the interpretation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 28-8424(A)(3), under which a nonprofit corporation that leases airport property from a county “[p]erforms an essential governmental function as an agency or instrumentality” of the county. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 28-8424(A)(3) by itself does not make YCAA the County’s agent for purposes of imputed liability. View "DBT Yuma LLC v. Yuma County Airport Auth." on Justia Law

Petitioners were each charged with two counts of driving under the influence (DUI). Count two alleged a violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 28-1381(A)(3), which prohibits driving a vehicle while there is cannabis (marijuana) or its metabolite in the defendant’s body. Both petitioners were medical marijuana cardholders. Petitioners were each convicted. At issue on appeal was whether the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act (AMMA) immunizes a medical marijuana cardholder from DUI prosecution under section 28-1381(A)(3). The Supreme Court affirmed Petitioners’ conviction, holding (1) the AMMA does not shield a medical marijuana cardholder from prosecution under section 28-1381(A)(3); but (2) the AMMA does but does afford an affirmative defense for those patients who can show that the marijuana or its metabolite was in a concentration insufficient to cause impairment. View "Dobson v. Hon. Crane McClennen" on Justia Law

Freeport Minerals Corporation (Freeport) filed applications with the Arizona Department of Water Resources (ADWR) to sever certain water rights appurtenant to land in Mohave County and transfer them to a wellfield to be used at a mining complex in Yavapai county. As required by Ariz. Rev. Stat. 45-172(A)(7), ADWR published notice of Freeport’s severance and transfer applications, stating that “any interested person” could file written objections. Mohave County filed objections. ADWR rejected the County’s objections. The superior court vacated ADWR’s final decision on the grounds that it was arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and affirmed ADWR’s final decision, holding (1) section 45-172 defines the only grounds on which ADWR can deny a properly filed application to sever and transfer a water right; (2) the “interested persons” entitled to object to a proposed severance and transfer are limited to those with an interest that is protected by section 45-172; and (3) ADWR in this case properly denied the County’s objections to the proposed transfers because those objections did not identify any violation of section 45-172 and because the County did not qualify as an “interested person.” View "Ariz. Dep’t of Water Res. v. Hon. Crane McClennen" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, armed robbery, and burglary. The jury returned a death verdict for the murder. The Supreme Court remanded for a new penalty-phase proceeding on the murder conviction. On resentencing, Defendant was again sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s death sentence, holding (1) while the prosecutor engaged in misconduct in certain instances during trial, the improper remarks did not affect the jury’s verdict; (2) the trial court did not commit reversible error when it denied Defendant’s motion to retry the aggravated phase and prohibited him from offering the guilty verdict as an exhibit during the penalty-phase retrial; (3) the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury that Defendant would never be released if sentenced to prison; (4) the trial court did not violate Batson v. Kentucky when it permitted the State to strike five Hispanic jurors over Defendant’s objection; (5) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike a juror that had previously worked at the same hospital as one of the State’s witnesses; and (6) the death sentence was appropriate in this case. View "State v. Lynch" on Justia Law

The Lewises obtained a default money judgment against the MacKeans and recorded their judgment, attempting to create a lien on the MacKeans’ real property. Neither the initial recording nor the renewal affidavit subsequently filed by the MacKeans was accompanied by a separate information statement as required by Ariz. Rev. Stat. 33-961(C) and 33-967(A). The Debords, the defendants in this case, later bought the property. One month later, the Lewises attempted to foreclose their lien against the property. The trial court entered summary judgment for the Debords, concluding that the Lewises could not execute against the property due to their failure to file an information statement, which rendered their judgment lien invalid. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) failing to attach an information statement to a certified copy of the judgment does not invalidate an otherwise valid lien, but instead, the judgment lien lacks priority against competing creditors who record liens against the property before the information statement is filed; and (2) because the Debords had constructive notice of the certified judgment that the Lewises recorded, the Debords took the property subject to the lien, and the Lewises’ failure to file an information statement did not preclude them from executing against the property. View "Lewis v. Debord" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of first degree murder for murdering his two young sons. The jury sentenced Defendant to death for each murder. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences, holding (1) the trial court did not err by admitting statements Defendant made to police officers at his home; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting other acts evidence under Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b); (3) the trial court erred in excluding some evidence of Defendant’s mental health and prescription drug use, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (4) the trial court erred in giving a jury instruction defining the Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-751(F)(6) aggravating factor, but the error was harmless; (5) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by precluding testimony of the former warden in the Department of Corrections; (6) the trial court did not err in admitting testimony of Defendant’s former neighbor about the effect of the murders on the neighbor; and (7) the imposition of the death sentence in this case was not an abuse of discretion. View "State v. Leteve" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. Defendant later filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), asserting that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to timely raise on appeal the issue of an unconstitutional jury instruction. The superior court denied the claim, concluding (1) Defendant was precluded from arguing the issue because it could have been, but was not, raised on appeal; and (2) any prejudice caused by appellate counsel’s failure to timely raise the issue on appeal was cured by the Supreme Court’s independent review of Defendant’s convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the PCR court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief because counsel’s failure to timely raise the issue on appeal did not prejudice Defendant. View "State v. Roseberry" on Justia Law