Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was the constitutionality of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 28-1321(C), which allows law enforcement officers to make or direct nonconsensual blood draws from unconscious DUI suspects. Defendant was driving an SUV that was involved in a two-vehicle collision in Arizona. Defendant was airlifted to a Nevada hospital for treatment. Without seeking a warrant, a law enforcement officer instructed Department of Public Safety dispatch to request that Las Vegas police officers obtain a blood sample from Defendant. Defendant was unconscious when the blood sample was taken. Defendant was subsequently charged with numerous offenses, including aggravated driving under the extreme influence of intoxicating liquor with a suspended license. Defendant moved to suppress the results of his blood test, arguing that the statute authorizing his blood draw while unconscious violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, holding (1) section 28-1321(C) is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case; and (2) under Arizona law, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule would not apply in this case. Remanded to the trial court to determine whether Nevada or Arizona law applies and, if it is Nevada law, whether it supports application of the good-faith exception. View "State v. Havatone" on Justia Law

The Arizona Constitution and related laws forbid bail for defendants accused of sexual conduct with a minor under the age of fifteen when the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant committed such a crime. Defendant in this case was charged with multiple sexual offenses. Defendant petitioned to be released on bail, but the trial court concluded that the proof was evident and the presumption great that Defendant committed sexual conduct with a minor under the age of fifteen, rendering him ineligible for bail. Defendant challenged the facial constitutionality of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-3961(A)(3) and the corresponding provision of the Arizona Constitution, article 2, section 22(A)(1). The trial court denied relief. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the provisions were unconstitutional because an individualized determination of dangerousness is necessary to withhold bail. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision and vacated the court of appeals’ opinion, holding that the provisions at issue are unconstitutional on their face because they are not narrowly focused to protect public safety. Remanded. View "Simpson v. Hon. Phemonia Miller" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified certain questions to the Supreme Court regarding what impact, if any, a lender’s full-credit bid made at an Arizona trustee’s sale has on an insurer’s liability under standard form title insurance policies. The policy provisions at issue were (1) Section 2, which provides that coverage continues in force when an insured acquires the property in a foreclosure sale but the amount of coverage is reduced by all payments made; (2) Section 9, which provides that payments of principal or the voluntary satisfaction or release of the mortgage reduce available insurance coverage, except as provided under Section 2(a); and (3) Section 7, which explains how the insurer’s liability is calculated. The Supreme Court answered the certified questions as follows: (1) Section 2 applies when a lender purchases property by full-credit bid at a trustee’s sale; (2) the full-credit bid does not constitute a “payment” under Sections 2 or 9 of the policy; and (3) accordingly, the full-credit bid neither terminates nor reduces coverage under Section 2 or Section 7. View "Equity Income Partners, LP v. Chicago Title Insurance Co." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of reckless manslaughter. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress an involuntary blood sample taken for medical purposes when medical personnel rendered treatment against Defendant’s will. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion, holding that, to invoke the medical blood draw exception to the warrant requirement set forth in Ariz. Rev. Stat. 28-1388(E), the state must establish that a suspect expressly or impliedly consented to medical treatment or that medical personnel acted when the suspect was incapable of directing his or her own medical treatment. Remanded with directions that the trial court apply the standards set forth in this opinion. View "State v. Nissley" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first degree murder, sexual assault, and first degree burglary. Defendant was sentenced to death for the murder and to consecutive sentences of fifteen and twenty years’ imprisonment for the sexual assault and burglary counts, respectively. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and non-death sentences but vacated the death sentence and remanded for a new penalty phase, holding that, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Lynch v. Arizona, the trial court erred by refusing to tell the jury that Defendant was ineligible for parole, and the error was not harmless. View "State v. Escalante-Orozco" on Justia Law

The two defendants in this case were juveniles when they fatally shot their victims. Defendants were each convicted of first degree murder. Defendants were sentenced to natural life imprisonment under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-703, meaning they were not eligible for release. After Miller v. Alabama was decided, each defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(g). In each case, the trial court summarily denied relief, concluding that the sentencing court had complied with Miller and that any constitutional infirmity in Arizona’s sentencing scheme had been resolved by 2014 statutory amendments. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals, reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the petitions for post-conviction relief, and remanded for further proceedings, holding that Defendants were entitled to evidentiary hearings on their Rule 32.1(g) petitions because they made colorable claims for relief based on Miller. View "State v. Valencia" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of second degree burglary. In the middle of deliberations and after the jurors stopped for the day, the parties agreed to replace one juror with an alternate juror. The jury reconvened the next morning with the alternate juror, but the trial court did not instruct the jurors “to begin deliberations anew” pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 13.5(h). Defendant did not object to the court’s failure to give the instruction. The court of appeals vacated Defendant’s conviction and sentence and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury to begin deliberations anew violated Defendant’s constitutional right to a unanimous verdict and was fundamental, prejudicial error. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding that Defendant failed to show prejudice from the trial court’s failure to give the “deliberate-anew” instruction. View "State v. Dalton" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Jesse Mesa in May 2014 for first degree murder and other charges. Mesa was arraigned the same month. The State did not file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, and trial was set. In April 2015, the State obtained a new indictment of Mesa alleging the same charges as the first indictment but adding other charges. Mesa was arraigned the next month. Thereafter, the State dismissed the 2014 charges. The State subsequently filed a timely notice of intent to seek the death penalty. Mesa moved to strike the State’s notice of intent, asserting that it was invalid because the State had not timely filed a notice after he was arraigned for the 2014 charges. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when the State complies with Ariz. R. Crim. P. 16.6 in dismissing a prosecution and obtains a new indictment, the time limits for filing a notice under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.1(i)(1) restart, absent bad faith by the State or prejudice to the defendant; and (2) the untimely filing of a death notice does not itself invalidate the notice but may result in sanctions, including an order striking the notice. View "Mesa v. Honorable Warren J. Granville" on Justia Law

This case concerned the warrantless search of the residence of Defendant, a probationer. As a result of the search Defendant was charged with felony possession of narcotic drugs for sale and other offenses. Defendant sought to suppress the items seized during the search. The trial court ultimately granted Defendant’s motion to suppress, concluding that the probation search was not supported by a reasonable suspicion and did not have a sufficient legal basis. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a warrantless search of a probationer’s residence complies with the Fourth Amendment if it is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances, and its legality does not depend on whether the search is supported by reasonable suspicion; and (2) under the totality of the circumstances, the warrantless search conducted in this case was reasonable and thus constitutional. View "State v. Adair" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Arizona Legislature enacted Senate Bill 1609, which changed the Elected Officials’ Retirement Plan by changing the formula for calculating future benefit increases for retired Plan members and increased the amount that employed Plan members must contribute toward their pensions. Employed members of the Plan challenged the Bill, arguing that the unilateral changes to the benefit increases formula and to the amount they were required to contribute toward their pensions violated the Pension Clause and that the legislature could not unilaterally change the terms of their pensions to their detriment. The trial court agreed and invalidated the provisions at issue. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the employed Plan members, holding that the Bill’s change to the benefit increases formula and the contribution rate violates the Pension Clause and the Court’s holding in Yeazell v. Copins; and (2) contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the employed members are entitled to attorneys’ fees and prejudgment interest, and the judgment must run against the State as well as the Plan. View "Honorable Philip Hall v. Elected Officials’ Retirement Plan" on Justia Law