Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Based on the odor of marijuana emanating from a storage warehouse, police officers obtained a warrant to search a unit in the warehouse. In the ensuing search, the officers seized marijuana growing equipment and hundreds of marijuana plants. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress, concluding that the passage of the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act (AMMA) did not impact the determination that the odor of marijuana suffices to establish probable cause of issuance of a search warrant. The court of appeals reversed, holding that after the adoption of AMMA, the scent of marijuana, alone, is insufficient evidence of criminal activity to supply probable cause. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and affirmed the trial court’s ruling denying the motion to suppress, holding (1) the odor of marijuana emanating from inside a vehicle suffices to establish probable cause unless other facts would cause a reasonable person to believe the marijuana use or possession is authorized by AMMA; and (2) under the totality of the circumstances of this case, the odor of marijuana established probable cause. View "State v. Sisco" on Justia Law

Police officers stopped Defendant’s vehicle for unlawful window tinting. Upon approaching the vehicle and speaking with Defendant, the officers noticed an odor of burnt marijuana emanating from inside the vehicle. The officers searched the car and found a small amount of unburnt marijuana. Defendant was arrested and charged with possession or use of marijuana. Defendant filed a motion to suppress arguing that, after passage of the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act, the odor of marijuana coming from a vehicle does not alone provide probable cause. The trial court denied the motion and then found Defendant guilty. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in the instant case, the odor of marijuana sufficed to establish probable cause, and therefore, the search was authorized by the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. View "State v. Cheatham" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of nine counts of first degree murder, among other crimes. The trial court imposed nine death sentences for the murders. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of his home; (2) the trial court did not unconstitutionally deny Defendant the opportunity to observe or participate in the State’s DNA testing procedures that consumed certain DNA samples; (3) the trial court did not fundamentally err by ending Defendant’s motion to sever and by permitting joinder of all the counts in the indictment; (4) the trial court did not deprive Defendant of his constitutional right to counsel; (5) the trial court did not prejudicially err in its evidentiary rulings; (6) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and the jury’s findings that Defendant committed the murders in an especially cruel manner; (7) although the State made some improper remarks during the State’s opening arguments, they did not deprive Defendant of a fair trial; (8) Defendant’s waiver of his right to present mitigation was voluntary, knowing, and informed; and (9) the jury did not abuse its discretion in finding death sentences appropriate for the murders. View "Arizona v. Goudeau" on Justia Law

After Defendant resisted, two police officers subdued and handcuffed him. The resistance and arrest formed one uninterrupted course of conduct. Defendant was indicted on two counts of resisting arrest under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13—2508 - one for each officer resisted. The trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent rather than consecutive terms of imprisonment. The court of appeals vacated one of Defendant’s resisting arrest convictions, concluding that the second conviction arose from the same offense and violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals, vacated Defendant’s second conviction for resisting arrest, and affirmed the remaining convictions, holding that the legislature did not intend, and the Double Jeopardy Clause does not allow, multiple convictions under section 13-2508 for a single, continuous act of resisting arrest. View "State v. Jurden" on Justia Law

An undercover police officer approached Gray at a bus stop and, in a secretly-recorded conversation, asked if Gray could help him get some crack cocaine. Gray agreed to obtain 20 dollars’ worth of cocaine for a 10-dollar fee. The officer drove with Gray to an apartment complex and gave him 20 dollars; Gray left the car and returned 10 minutes later with the cocaine. The officer gave him the fee. Gray was arrested and charged with sale of narcotics. Gray requested a jury instruction on the entrapment defense, A.R.S. 13-206, which requires a defendant to “admit by [his] testimony or other evidence the substantial elements of the offense charged.” Concluding that Gray had not admitted these elements, the trial court refused. The jury found Gray guilty and the trial court sentenced him to 9.25 years in prison. The court of appeals and Arizona Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting Gray’s argument that his recorded statements were “other evidence” sufficient to show that he affirmatively admitted the substantial elements of the charged offense. A defendant cannot invoke the affirmative defense merely by declining to challenge the state’s evidence, even when it includes incriminating statements made by the defendant to an undercover officer. View "Arizona v. Gray" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty on sixty-seven counts, including nine counts of first-degree murder. The jury returned death verdicts on all nine murder charges. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; (2) any error in the denial of Defendant’s request to observe or participate in the State’s DNA testing procedures that consumed certain DNA samples was harmless; (3) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion to sever; (4) Defendant was not deprived of his constitutional right to counsel; (5) Defendant was not deprived of a fundamentally fair trial; (6) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence other-act evidence, pretrial and in-court identifications, firearms expert testimony, and an autopsy photograph; (7) the trial court did not violate Defendant’s right to present a complete defense; (8) although the prosecutor made some improper remarks during trial, they did not deprive Defendant of a fair trial; (9) the trial court did not prejudicially err during the penalty phase; and (10) the jury did not abuse its discretion in finding death sentences appropriate for each of the nine murders. View "State v. Goudeau" on Justia Law

First American Title Insurance Company issued title insurance policies to Johnson Bank for properties that secured the Bank’s loans. The policies failed to list covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) that prohibited commercial development on the properties. When the property owners defaulted on their loan obligations to the Bank, they sued First American, alleging that they had intended to develop the properties and were prevented from doing so by the CC&Rs. Judgment was entered in favor of the owners, and the properties were sold at a trustee’s sale. Johnson purchased the parcels and notified First American of claims under its lender’s title insurance policies. The superior court ruled that the parcels should be valued as of the foreclosure date. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the policy was breached when the loans were made. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and reversed the superior court's judgment, holding (1) when an undisclosed title defect prevents the intended use of the property and causes the borrower to default on the loan, the lender’s diminution-in-value loss should be calculated as of the date the title policy was issued; and (2) the record here did not establish that the title defect caused the borrowers’ default and resulting foreclosure. Remanded. View "First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Johnson Bank" on Justia Law

The State charged Alejandra Moran with the first-degree murder of L.U., who was stabbed. Moran moved to exclude an excerpt from a cellphone video recorded by a witness to the stabbing on the ground that it was inadmissible under Ariz. R. Evid. 106, 1002, 801 and 901. The witness had cropped the video before it was obtained by the police. The trial court granted the motion. The State sought special action relief, arguing that the excerpt was erroneously excluded because the State was not responsible for the absence of the complete video recording. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the suppression order, holding that the trial court erred by precluding the video excerpt based on Rules 106, 1002, 801 and 901. Remanded for consideration of whether the evidence should be precluded under Ariz. R. Evid. 403. View "State v. Hon. Ronald J. Steinle" on Justia Law

Patients filed suit to set aside accord and satisfaction agreements and to recover the amounts paid to release liens. Hospitals, health care providers who treated patients injured by third parties, were paid by the Patients' insurer, AHCCCS, which had negotiated reduced rates with the Hospitals. The Hospitals then recorded liens against the Patients pursuant to A.R.S. 33-931 and A.R.S. 36-2903.01(G) for the difference between the amount typically charged for their treatment and the reduced amount paid by AHCCCS. In order to receive their personal injury settlements with the third parties, Patients settled with the Hospitals by paying negotiated amounts to release the liens. At issue is the validity of these accord and satisfaction agreements. The court assumed, without deciding, that Arizona’s lien statutes are preempted by federal law. But, because there was a bona fide dispute about the enforceability of these liens when the Patients and Hospitals entered into settlement agreements to achieve lien releases, the agreements were supported by adequate consideration and addressed a proper subject matter. Therefore, the accord and satisfaction agreements are valid. View "Abbott v. Banner Health Network" on Justia Law

Francis Kraps was indicted on two counts of child prostitution in violation of A.R.S. 13-3212(B)(2). During a pre-trial hearing, the superior court advised Kraps that if he was convicted, the court was required to impose an enhanced sentence between seven and twenty-one years’ imprisonment for each count without the possibility of early release, and that the sentences would be served consecutively. Kraps moved for reconsideration, asserting that because the “minors” involved were actually undercover police officers posing as sixteen-year-old girls, these sentencing provisions did not apply. The court held that “minor,” as used in A.R.S. 13-3212(D) and (G) means a person who is fifteen, sixteen, or seventeen years of age, a peace officer posing as a minor aged fifteen to seventeen years, or someone assisting a peace officer by posing as a minor aged fifteen to seventeen years. Accordingly, the court vacated and reversed. View "State ex rel. Polk v. Hon. Campbell/Kraps" on Justia Law