Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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In this insurance dispute, the Supreme Court held that Ariz. Rev. Stat. 20-259.01 mandates that a single policy insuring multiple vehicles provides different underinsured motorist (UIM) coverages for each vehicle rather than a single UIM coverage that applies to multiple vehicles.Plaintiff's mother died in a car crash caused by a neglectful driver. Plaintiff submitted a UIM to CSAA General Insurance Company, her mother's insurer. At the time of the accident, Plaintiff's mother's CSAA policy covered the mother's two vehicles and provided UIM coverage of $50,000 per person. When CSAA paid only $50,000 Plaintiff sought an additional $50,000 under an "intra-policy stacking" theory. After CSAA rejected the claim, Plaintiff sued for declaratory judgment, alleging breach of contract, bad faith, and a class action. CSAA moved to certify two questions. The Supreme Court answered (1) insurers seeking to prevent insureds from stacking UIM coverages under a single, multi-vehicle policy must employ section 20-259.01(H)'s sole prescribed method for limiting stacking; and (2) section 20-259.01(B) does not bar an insured from receiving UIM coverage from the policy in an amount greater than the bodily injury or death liability limits of the policy. View "Franklin v. CSAA General Insurance" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that Arizona law does not permit an insurer to challenge the validity of a life insurance policy based on a lack of insurable interest after the expiration of the two-year contestability period required by Ariz. Rev. Stat. 20-1204.Columbus Life Insurance Policy, which issued a life insurance policy on the lives of Howard and Eunice Peterson, filed a lawsuit following the Petersons' death seeking a declaratory judgment that the policy was unenforceable and seeking to retain the premiums. Wilmington Trust N.A., which was designated as the owner of the policy, filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Columbus could not challenge the policy's validity in light of the incontestability provision in the provision and section 20-1204. The federal district court certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether Columbus could challenge the policy's validity. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative, holding that section 20-1204 allows challenges to the validity of the policy after the incontestability period only for nonpayment of premiums. View "Columbus Life Insurance Co. v. Wilmington Trust, N.A." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court resolved a conflict between Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure (ARCAP) 7(a)(4)(A), which instructs courts to include "damages, costs, attorney's fees, and prejudgment interest" when setting the amount of a supersedeas bond, and Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-2108(A)(1), which instructs courts only to include damages, in favor of the rule.The superior court entered judgment against Robert Wallace for wrongfully filing a UCC-1 lien and awarded statutory damages plus attorney fees and costs. Wallace appealed, asking the court to set a supersedeas bond at $0 under section 12-2108(A)(1). The court, however, calculated the bond under ARCAP 7(a)(4)(A), including the statutory damages, attorney fees, and costs. Wallace filed a petition for special action in the Supreme Court challenging the rule's validity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) ARCAP 7(a)(4)(A) and section 12-2108(A)(1) are in direct conflict; and (2) section 12-2108(A)(1) regulates a procedural area of law within the purview of the judicial branch and therefore must yield where it conflicts with ARCAP 7(a)(4)(A). View "Wallace v. Honorable Smith" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's amended final judgment finding that an initiative entitled the "Arizona Fair Elections Act" failed to qualify for the November 8, 2022 ballot, holding that the Act fell short of the required number of valid signatures, and therefore the trial court properly disqualified the initiative from the ballot.At issue in these multiple expedited election appeals and cross-appeals was the interpretation and application of the statutes governing initiative petitions and the method for determining whether an initiative has sufficient valid signatures to qualify for placement on an election ballot. The trial court found that the initiative had an insufficient number of valid signatures and ordered the Secretary of State to rescind the previous determination that the initiative qualified for placement on the ballot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs failed in their challenge. View "Mussi v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

Posted in: Election Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed the pre-trial orders of the trial court precluding Defendant from presenting at trial expert and lay witness testimony about his intellectual disability, holding that the trial court properly precluded the evidence but that Defendant could introduce admissible "behavioral-tendency evidence" through expert and lay witness testimony.Defendant was charged with child abuse, kidnapping, and first-degree felony murder for his daughter's death in the course of committing child abuse. Defendant was originally found incompetent to stand trial but, after restoration treatment, was determined competent to stand trial. At issue was certain pre-trial rulings made by the trial court. The Supreme Court held (1) the trial court properly precluded Defendant's proffered expert and lay witness testimony about his intellectual disability; (2) Defendant, however, may introduce what is sometimes referred to as "observation evidence" through expert and lay witness testimony; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in reducing Defendant's proposed list of lay witnesses from eleven to two. View "Cruz v. Honorable Blair" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The Supreme Court held that Ariz. Rev. Stat. 19-118.01 does not facially violate the First Amendment where it only prohibits per-signature compensation to petition circulators.A political action committee (PAC) hired AZ Petition Partners to collect signatures for the Invest in Education Act initiative. Initiative opponents brought this action for declaratory judgment against the PAC, alleging that Petitioner Partners' hourly rates and incentive programs violated section 19-118.01. Thereafter, the State filed fifty charges against Petition Partners. The court of appeals concluded that section 19-118.01(A) bans more than just per-signature payments, and therefore, the statute facially violates the First Amendment. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' opinion and remanded the case, holding that section 19-118.01 only prohibits per-signature compensation. View "AZ Petition Partners LLC v. Honorable Thompson" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that felony resisting arrest constitutes a single unified offense, thus affirming the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of felony resisting arrest and other offenses and sentencing him accordingly.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court's instruction regarding the elements of resisting arrest under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-2508(A)(2) improperly conflated subsections (A)(1) and (A)(2). The court of appeals rejected the argument and affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 13-2508 is ambiguous because it may be reasonably read as setting forth a single unified offense or distinct crimes, and this Court concludes that subsections (A)(1) and (A)(2) are alternative means of committing one offense; (2) this Court's interpretation of section 13-2508 comports with the Sixth Amendment; and (3) because the two subsections set forth a single unified offense the jury instruction regarding this crime did not constitute error. View "State v. Luviano" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts' dismissal of Appellants' complaint against Maricopa County for appeal of an administrative action and the final judgment on the County's counterclaim, holding that the plain meaning of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-904(A) did not bar jurisdiction.Maricopa County's Planning and Development Department fined Appellants for violations of the county zoning ordinance, and the decision was affirmed. Appellants filed a complaint against the County requesting declaratory relief and alleging due process violations. The County filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the complaint was deficient. The trial court denied the motion and allowed Appellants to file an amended complaint. Thereafter, Appellants brought an amended complaint seeking judicial review of the administrative decision. The County asserted a counterclaim seeking to enforce the fine. The trial court ruled the complaint failed to comply with Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-904(A), and therefore, Appellants failed timely to file a "notice of appeal." The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and reversed the trial court, holding that Appellants' complaint complied with section 12-904(A)'s three jurisdictional requirements that the timely filing's substance provide notice of the appeal, identify the decision being appealed, and state the issues argued on appeal. View "Shea v. Maricopa County" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court overruled in substantial part DeGraff v. Smith, 62 Ariz. 261 (1945), which concluded that dismissing a claim against an employee with prejudice serves to exonerate that employee from negligence and thus simultaneously adjudicates a respondent superior claim against the employer, holding that if a tort claim against the employee was dismissed for reasons unrelated to its merits, the respondent superior claim remains viable.Jacob Laurence and his son were injured when a truck owned by Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District (SRP) and driven by John Gabrielson, SRP's employee, collided with Laurence's vehicle. Laurence brought this action claiming that SRP was vicariously liable for Gabrielson's negligence. The superior court granted Gabrielson's motion for summary judgment as it pertained to Laurence's claim due to untimeliness but denied the motion as it pertained to the minor son's claim. The court then granted SRP's motion for summary judgment on Laurence's respondeat superior claim because the court had granted summary judgment for Gabrielson on that claim. The court ultimately dismissed all claims, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated and reversed, holding (1) DeGraff was based on incorrect reasoning; and (2) therefore, the superior court erred in entering summary judgment for SRP. View "Laurence v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District" on Justia Law

Posted in: Personal Injury
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The Supreme Court held that Jorge Othon, who purchased property from Victalina Carreon but never recorded the deed with the county recorder, may not collaterally challenge a default judgment entered in a separate tax lien foreclosure action.The property Othon purchased was encumbered by delinquent property taxes. Advanced Property Tax Liens, Inc. (APTL) purchased a tax lien on the property and then filed a tax lien foreclosure action against Carreon. The trial court entered default judgment against Carreon. APTL then filed this quiet title action seeking to establish its title to the property. Othon filed an answer and counterclaim requesting that the trial court determine that the default judgment in the foreclosure action was void due to invalid service on Carreon, and declare that title to the property vested in Othon. The trial court granted summary judgment for Othon. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Othon could not, in this quiet title action, collaterally attack the default judgment entered in the foreclosure action. View "Advanced Property Tax Liens, Inc. v. Othon" on Justia Law