Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this criminal case, the prosecutor’s instruction to the grand jury regarding the defense of justification was not erroneous and did not deprive Petitioner of a substantial procedural right.A grand jury indicted Petitioner on two counts of child abuse. Before the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that he was denied a substantial procedural right because the prosecutor misstated the law regarding justification. Specifically, Petitioner argued that the prosecutor incorrectly advised the grand jurors that they were not allowed to consider whether his use of physical force on his son was justified under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-403(1). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the prosecutor correctly instructed the grand jury on the defense of justification. View "Cespedes v. Honorable Kenneth Lee" on Justia Law

The state may constitutionally prohibit a city’s practice, prescribed by local ordinance, of destroying firearms that the city obtains through forfeiture or as unclaimed property.In 2005, the City of Tucson passed an ordinance that enacted Tucson Code 2-142, which provides that the police “shall dispose” of unclaimed and forfeited firearms “by destroying” them. In 2013, the legislature amended two statutes governing the destruction of firearms - Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-3108(F) and 12-945(B). Concluding that the ordinance conflicts with section 13-3108(F), the Attorney General filed this special action. The Supreme Court held (1) sections 12-945(B) and 13-3108(F) control over the conflicting municipal ordinance regarding destruction of firearms; (2) the legislature may require the Attorney General to investigate and file a special action in the Supreme Court regarding alleged violations of the state law; (3) the Supreme Court has mandatory jurisdiction to resolve whether the allegedly conflicting ordinance violates state law; and (4) the state laws displace Tucson Code 2-142. View "State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Tucson" on Justia Law

In this criminal case arising from an incident of domestic violence, the trial court did not err in admitting the testimony of an expert witness that described general behavioral tendencies of adult victims of domestic abuse. Defendant was found guilty of two counts of aggravated assault (domestic abuse) and five counts of aggravated domestic violence, among other offenses. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the expert witness’s testimony did not constitute impermissible offender profiling. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert witness’s testimony but that trial court should exercise great caution in screening, admitting, and limiting evidence describing the characteristics of offenders. View "State v. Haskie" on Justia Law

To obtain an area variance, an applicant must show that strictly applying a zoning ordinance will cause “peculiar and exceptional practical difficulties” that deprive a property of privileges enjoyed by other similarly zoned properties.This dispute arose from the City of Phoenix Board of Adjustment’s grant of a variance on a parcel of land in Phoenix. The superior court upheld the variance, finding that the variance was an area variance and not a use variance, that the Board was authorized to consider area variances, and that sufficient evidence supported the Board’s decision. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the Board did not act within its authority in granting the variance. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding (1) the Board acted within its discretion in finding that special circumstances applied to the property; (2) the property owner did not create the special circumstances; (3) the variance required was an area variance that was necessary for the preservation and enjoyment of substantial property rights; and (4) the variance would not be materially detrimental to the surrounding area. View "Pawn 1st, LLC v. City of Phoenix" on Justia Law

Because the warranty of workmanship and habitability is imputed into every residential construction contract, it is a term of the contract, and therefore, the successful party on a claim for breach of the warranty qualifies for an attorney-fee award under a controlling contractual fee provision or, barring that, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-341.01.Defendants contracted with Plaintiff to build a basement at their home. Defendants refused to pay to the full contract amount after the work was completed, and Plaintiff sued for the unpaid contract amount. Defendants counterclaimed for breach of the implied warranty of workmanship and habitability. The jury found in Defendants’ favor on their claim for breach of the implied warranty. The trial court awarded Defendants attorney fees pursuant to a contractual fee provision and section 12-341.01. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the implied warranty was a term of the contract, and as the successful party in the claim to enforce the warranty, Defendants were entitled to their reasonable attorney fees. View "Sirrah Enterprises, LLC v. Wunderlich" on Justia Law

The plain language of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 3-1261(B), which provides that no two brands of the same design or figure shall be adopted or recorded, precluded the Arizona Department of Agriculture (Department) from recording “two brands of the same design or figure” regardless of their location.The Department in this case allowed Eureka Springs to record a “bar seven” brand, even though it was identical to a previously recorded brand owned by David Stambaugh, because it was placed on a different location on the cattle. Stambaugh sued the Department. The superior court granted summary judgment in part for the Department, concluding that section 3-1261 gave the Department discretion to consider the location of a brand on an animal in determining whether two brands are of the same design or figure. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that section 3-1261(B) is ambiguous. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute was unambiguous and precluded the Department from adopting or recording identical brands. View "Stambaugh v. Killian" on Justia Law

Proposition 206, “The Fair Wages and Healthy Families Act,” which increased the minimum wage and established earn paid sick leave, does not violate the Arizona Constitution’s Revenue Source Rule, Separate Amendment Rule, or Single Subject Rule.Proposition 206 was approved by the Arizona electorate in the November 2016 election. The Proposition increases Arizona’s minimum wage incrementally over a three-year period and then requires annual increases. It also requires employers to provide mandatory sick leave of one hour for every thirty hours worked. Petitioners filed suit seeking a declaration that Proposition 206 is unconstitutional and also sought to preliminarily enjoin implementation and enforcement of the Proposition. The superior court denied a preliminary injunction. Petitioner subsequently sought special action relief with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that Proposition 206 does not violate the identified provisions in the Arizona Constitution. View "Arizona Chamber of Commerce v. Honorable Daniel J. Kiley" on Justia Law

In this employment dispute, Employee filed an action in superior court alleging an unjust enrichment claim against Employee. Employee moved to compel arbitration under the parties’ employment contract’s arbitration provision and brought a claim for severance pay. The superior court granted the motion. Employer asserted various counterclaims. The arbitrator ruled in favor of Employer, finding that Employer properly rescinded the contract based on Employee’s underlying misrepresentations and omissions. The final arbitration award fully settled all claims and counterclaims submitted. The superior court confirmed the award but also granted Employer leave to amend its complaint to reassert its counterclaims. The superior court granted Employer’s motion to amend its complaint. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Employer, having not specifically challenged the contract’s arbitration provision, may not amend its complaint and litigate its various claims against Employee in this action. View "Hamblen v. Honorable Ralph Hatch" on Justia Law

Although a trial court should be circumspect when modifying a jury verdict, the court nonetheless may do so if it states the Ariz. R. Civ. P. 59(a) or (i) grounds for the order and explains its ruling with sufficient particularity to avoid speculation as to its order of a conditional new trial or additur or remittitur.After a jury trial in this personal injury case, Michael Soto was awarded $700,000. Defendants moved for a new trial, or to alter or amend the judgment, and for remittitur under Rule 59, requesting that Michael’s award be reduced. The trial court granted a remittitur pursuant to Rule 59(i) and reduced Michael’s award to $250,000. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order conditionally granting a new trial and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that Defendants carried their burden of establishing that the trial court’s remittitur and new trial order was supported by substantial evidence and was not an abuse of discretion. View "Soto v. Sacco" on Justia Law

Pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.4(b), a defendant who asserts an insanity defense and voluntarily undergoes a mental health exam must disclose a complete copy of the mental health expert’s examination report, including any statements made by the defendant concerning the pending charges against him.Defendant asserted the defense of insanity, or guilty except insane, to charges for armed robbery and felony murder. Two experts prepared reports that included statements that Defendant made about the pending charges. When the State requested copies of the experts’ reports defense counsel produced copies but redacted Defendant’s statements. The State filed a motion to compel, seeking disclosure of unredacted copies. The superior court denied the motion based on Austin v. Alfred, 163 Ariz. 397 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990). The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Rule 11.4(b) requires a defendant to disclose his statements contained in a mental health expert’s report. The court thus disapproved of Austin to the extent it holds that such statements must be redacted under Rule 11.4(b). View "State v. Honorable Hugh Hegyi" on Justia Law