Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court vacated the portion of the order of the Arizona Corporation Commission requiring a public utility to apply for Commission approval of a proposed condemnation, holding that Ariz. Rev. Stat. 40-285(A) does not give the Commission power over a city's exercise of eminent domain.Section 40-285(A) gives the Commission authority to approve the sale or disposition of a public service corporation's assets. In the instant case, voters authorized and the city council approved the filing of a condemnation action by the City of Surprise of condemning substantially all the assets of Circle City Water Company, LLC, including the right to four thousand acre-feet of water per year from the Central Arizona Project (CAP). A residential developer asked the Commission to enter an order preventing the "sale" of Circle City's CAP allocation to the City. The Commission ordered Circle City to file an application under section 40-285 seeking Commission authorization to "dispose of" its utility. The Supreme Court vacated the order in part, holding that the Commission has no authority to regulate condemnations under section 40-285(A). View "City of Surprise v. Arizona Corporation Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences, holding that the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System (AHCCCS) statutory scheme, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 36-2901 to -2999.57, abrogates and creates an exception to Arizona’s statutory physician-patient privilege, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-4062(4), in cases of suspected AHCCCS fraud.Defendant was convicted of defrauding AHCCCS for lying about having cancer so her abortion would fall within the exception to the rule that AHCCCS does not cover abortions except when necessary to save a woman’s life or to protect her health. On appeal, Defendant argued that the superior court erred by admitting her medical records and by allowing her physicians to testify against her. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the AHCCCS statutes abrogated the physician-patient privilege in cases of suspected AHCCCS fraud. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the legislature’s grant of brand authority to AHCCCS to investigate suspected fraud necessarily implies an exception to the privilege for internal AHCCCS investigations and proceedings; and (2) the AHCCCS statutes implicitly abrogate the privilege in the criminal investigation and prosecution of suspected AHCCCS fraud because the provisions at issue exhibit an intent to provide law enforcement access to patient information when investigating and prosecuting AHCCCS fraud. View "State v. Zeitner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s ruling that reversed the municipal court’s grant of Petitioner’s motion to suppress, holding that, apart from any constitutional considerations, Arizona’s implied consent statute does not require that an arrestee’s agreement to submit to a breath test be voluntary.In her motion to suppress, Petitioner argued that her consent was not voluntary under either the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or Ariz. Rev. Stat. 28-1321, Arizona’s implied consent statute. The municipal court concluded that Petitioner’s consent to testing was involuntary, found the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule inapplicable, and granted Petitioner’s motion to suppress. The superior court reversed, holding that consent to testing was involuntary but that the good-faith exception was applicable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statutory requirement of “express agreement to testing” does not equate to or necessarily imply a voluntary consent requirement. View "Diaz v. Honorable Deborah Bernini" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant’s motion to suppress results of a blood test he submitted to after he was arrested for driving under the influence, holding that Defendant’s consent was not involuntary under the Fourth Amendment.Before Defendant was asked if he would submit to a blood test, the police officer told Defendant his driving privileges would be suspended if he refused. Defendant moved to suppress the blood test results, arguing that under State v. Valenzuela, 239 Ariz. 299 (2016) (Valenzuela II), his consent was involuntary. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, unlike the officer in Valenzuela II, the officer in the instant case did not tell Defendant he was required to submit to the test, and the officer’s identifying the consequences of refusal before asking whether Defendant would submit to the testing did not in itself establish that Defendant’s consent was involuntary. View "State v. De Anda III" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals in this class action, holding that the surcharge imposed by Maricopa County on car rental agencies to fund a stadium and other sports and tourism-related ventures violated neither the dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution nor the anti-diversion provision of the Arizona Constitution.Plaintiff, which rented vehicles in Maricopa County and paid the car rental surcharges, sued the Arizona Department of Revenue seeking refunds and injunctive relief for all similarly situated car rental companies. The tax court certified the class and granted summary judgment for Plaintiff, concluding that the surcharge did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause but did violate the anti-diversion provision. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the surcharge did not violate the anti-diversion provision. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the Arizona Constitution’s anti-diversion clause, which requires that revenues derived from taxes relating to the operation of motor vehicles must be allocated for public highways, does not apply to a tax relating to the operation of motor vehicles. View "Saban Rent-a-Car LLC v. Arizona Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences, holding that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies in a prosecution for driving under the influence (DUI) to admit blood evidence unconstitutionally obtained after State v. Butler, 232 Ariz. 84 (2013), but before State v. Valenzuela (Valenzuela II), 239 Ariz. 299 (2016).Before her trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained through a warrantless search and seizure of her blood sample. The trial court denied the motion, and Defendant was convicted of aggravated DUI while impaired to the slightest degree and one count of aggravated DUI with blood-alcohol concentration of .08 or more. Defendant appealed, arguing that her blood was obtained without a warrant and without valid consent and that the good-faith exception recognized in Valenzuela II did not apply. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule did not apply in this case because the police followed binding appellate precedent that persisted in the wake of Butler. View "State v. Weakland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded this case to the superior court to grant Defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis that issue preclusion prevented the State from relitigating whether Defendant had abused his infant child, holding that issue preclusion may apply in a criminal proceeding when an issue of fact was previously adjudicated in a dependency proceeding and the other elements of preclusion are met.The Department of Child Safety (DCS) filed a dependency petition alleging that C.C. was dependent as to Defendant because he abusively shook her to the point of causing bleeding in her eyes and brain. While the dependency hearing was ongoing, the State charged Defendant with one count of child abuse. The juvenile court subsequently dismissed the dependency proceeding, ruling that DCS had not met its burden of proving that Defendant inflicted physical injury on C.C. Defendant then moved to discuss the criminal proceeding. The trial judge denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals and remanded for dismissal of the criminal charge, holding that, under the circumstances, the State could not force Defendant to relitigate the same issue. View "Crosby-Garbotz v. Honorable Howard P. Fell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated a potion of the court of appeals’ opinion and affirmed the family court’s order giving Father final legal decision-making authority over certain issues regarding the parties' child, holding that the words “final” and “sole” have different meanings in the context of a family court’s award of joint legal decision-making that gives one parent final legal decision-making authority over certain matters.The court of appeals determined that an award of joint legal decision-making that gives authority to one parent is, in essence, an award of sole legal decision-making. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that joint legal decision-making with final decision-making authority and sole legal decision-making authority are separate and distinct categories. View "Nicaise v. Sundaram" on Justia Law

At issue was whether Arizona’s automatic assignment provision in Ariz. Rev. Stat. 23-1023(B) applies when an employee receives workers’ compensation benefits under another state’s laws. The Supreme Court held that the law of the state in which the employee’s workers’ compensation is paid determines the assignment rights of the employer and employee, thus reversing the superior court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the third-party tortfeasor in this case.Plaintiff, a South Carolina resident, was employed as a semi-trick driver with a Nebraska limited liability company, which, in turn, contracted with Defendant, an Arizona company, to provide training for Plaintiff in Arizona. Plaintiff was a passenger in a semi-truck driving by Defendant’s employee was the truck rolled, injuring Plaintiff. Plaintiff received workers’ compensation in Nebraska paid for by the LLC. Plaintiff then filed this personal injury action against Defendant. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, concluding that, pursuant to section 23-1023(B), Plaintiff had no legal interest in the action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because Plaintiff received workers’ compensation benefits in Nebraska, Nebraska’s law regarding assignment applied to her claims against Defendant in this action; and (2) because Nebraska does not have an automatic assignment provision, Plaintiff had a legal interest in those claims. View "Jackson v. Eagle KMC LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that an Arizona common law failure-to-warn claim based on a medical device manufacturer’s failure to submit adverse event reports to the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is impliedly preempted.Plaintiff and his wife sued Defendant alleging several common law tort claims, including strict liability and negligence claims for failure to provide adequate and timely warnings. Defendant moved to dismiss under Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(6)(b), asserting that Plaintiff’s claims were expressly and impliedly preempted under federal law. The superior court granted the motion and dismissed the action with prejudice. The court of appeals vacated the dismissal of Plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim, finding it neither expressly nor impliedly preempted, and otherwise affirmed. The Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals and affirmed the superior court’s judgment, holding that because only federal law, not state law, imposes a duty on Defendant to submit adverse event reports to the FDA, Plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim was impliedly preempted under 21 U.S.C. 337(a). View "Conklin v. Medtronic, Inc." on Justia Law