Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences for first-degree murder, second-degree murder, kidnapping, and two counts of abandonment or concealment of a dead body, holding that Defendant's allegations of error did not warrant reversal.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) while the trial court did not explicitly refer to the factors set forth in State v. LaGrand, 152 Ariz. 483 (1987), the court considered those factors in assessing and denying Defendant's request for change of counsel; (2) the trial court did not err by telling the jury during voir dire and in the jury questionnaire that a life sentence could result in the possibility of Defendant's release after twenty-five years; (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate Defendant's constitutional rights by refusing to suppress incriminating statements Defendant made to an undercover police detective while Defendant was incarcerated; and (4) Defendant's remaining allegations of error and challenges to Arizona's death penalty scheme were unavailing. View "State v. Champagne" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the superior court denying relief to the Arizona Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America and David Martin (collectively, Contractors) on their complaint seeking to enjoin placement of the "Building a Better Phoenix Act" initiative measure on the City of Phoenix's August 2019 special election ballot, holding that the initiative qualified for the ballot.Contractors filed a complaint seeking to enjoin placement of the Initiative on the ballot, alleging that petition signatures were void pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 19-118.01(A) because the measure's proponent paid petition circulators by the signature and that the measure's 100-word description failed to comply with Ariz. Rev. Stat. 19-102(A) because it created a significant danger of confusion or unfairness. The superior court denied relief, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 19-118.01(A) does not apply to local measures such as the Initiative, and therefore, the superior court correctly refused to apply that provision here; and (2) the description was not misleading and therefore did not create a significant danger of either confusion or unfairness. View "Arizona Chapter of Associated General Contractors of America v. City of Phoenix" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for premeditated first degree murder, holding that a defendant who introduces expert evidence of a character trait for impulsivity to challenge premeditation cannot introduce evidence of brain damage to corroborate the existence of that trait.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion by precluding expert testimony from a psychologist that Defendant likely had diffuse brain damage, meaning that he was more likely to have a character trait for impulsivity. The court of appeals agreed, holding that the trial court erred by precluding the testimony but that the error was harmless. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' opinion and affirmed, holding (1) mental disease or defect evidence cannot be admitted to show that a defendant was less likely to have formed the mens rea element of a crime even if that evidence corroborates behavioral-tendency evidence; and (2) the trial court did not err in precluding the expert from testifying that Defendant suffered from brain damage even if the impairment made it more likely that Defendant had a character trait for impulsivity. View "State v. Malone" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the lower courts concluding that Defendant, an undocumented immigrant, received ineffective assistance of counsel resulting in his mandatory deportation, holding that Defendant was entitled to post-conviction relief.Defendant entered a guilty plea to possession of drug paraphernalia, resulting in his mandatory deportation. Defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he would not have entered the guilty plea if his counsel had accurately advised him of the immigration consequences. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that Defendant had established ineffective assistance of counsel. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, the State argued that it met its burden of proving that the violation was harmless because Defendant would have been deported regardless of his plea. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, while Defendant had little chance of winning at trial, he was entitled to effective assistance of counsel in deciding whether to go to trial or to accept a plea offer and that by giving up his right to trial based on counsel's deficient advice, he was assured the outcome he most feared. View "State v. Nunez-Diaz" on Justia Law

In these consolidated cases involving alleged breaches of fiduciary duties the Supreme Court answered questions certified to it by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona by applying common law agency principles to questions involving fiduciary duties between members and managers of a limited liability company (LLC).The Court answered the three certified questions as follows: (1) a manager of an Arizona LLC owes common law fiduciary duties to the company; (2) a member of an Arizona LLC owes common law fiduciary duties to the company, provided that the member is an agent of the LLC; and (3) an Arizona LLC's operating agreement may lawfully limit or eliminate those fiduciary duties, but the agreement may not eliminate the implied contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing. View "Sky Harbor Hotel Properties, LLC v. Patel Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's convictions and sentences arising from his possession of hashish, a form of cannabis resin, holding that the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act (AMMA) immunized Defendant's conduct because AMMA's definition of marijuana includes both its dried-leaf/flower form and extracted resin, including hashish.Defendant, a registered qualifying patient under AMMA, was charged with possession of cannabis and possession of drug paraphernalia after he was found in possession of a jar containing hashish. Defendant moved to dismiss the charges on the grounds that his use was allowed under AMMA. The trial court denied the motion and convicted Defendant. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the definition of marijuana in Ariz. Rev. Stat. 36-2801(8) includes resin, and by extension hashish, and that Ariz. Rev. Stat. 36-2811(B)(1) immunizes the use of such marijuana consistent with AMMA. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

In this divorce case, the Supreme Court vacated a portion of the divorce decree providing for an order under Koelsch v. Koelsch, 148 Ariz. 176 (1986), holding that federal law does not permit a state court to order a military spouse to pay the equivalent of military retirement benefits to a former spouse if the military spouse continues to work past an eligible retirement date.When the parties divorced, Husband was still an active duty service member. The trial judge ordered Husband, if he chose to work beyond his retirement eligibility date, to begin making payments to Wife equivalent to what she would have received as her share of Husband's military retirement pay (MRP) had Husband retired. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that federal law precluded such indemnification. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that state courts cannot order service members to make MRP-based payments to former spouses before retirement. View "Barron v. Barron" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment in favor of Encanto Adventures LLC on Marcie Normandin's premises liability claim, holding that Encanto was not immunized by Arizona's recreational use statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 33-1551, for injuries Normandin, a recreational user, sustained after falling in Encanto Park.The trial court granted summary judgment for Encanto based on the recreational use immunity provided by section 33-1551(A). The court of appeals affirmed, concluding, among other things, that Encanto was immune as a "manager" under section 33-1551(A). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Encanto was not a "manager" of land used for recreational purposes and, therefore, was not immune from liability under the statute. View "Normandin v. Encanto Adventures, LLC" on Justia Law

In this opinion, the Supreme Court explained its March 20, 2019 order affirming the trial court's decision enjoining a recall election of Phoenix City Councilman Michael Nowakowski, holding that the trial court did not err in ruling that the recall petition did not comply with Ariz. Rev. 19-202.01(D) and -203(D) because the petition sheets were not attached to a time-and-date-marked copy of the recall application.Displeased with Nowakowski's conduct as a councilman, some electors from District 7 of the City of Phoenix sought to initiate a recall election. Urban Phoenix Project PAC (the Committee) later submitted a recall petition to the Phoenix City Clerk for verification. The City Clerk certified that the petition had sufficient signatures to be on the ballot for the March 2019 election. Plaintiff challenged the recall petition. The trial court ruled that the recall was not eligible to be placed on the ballot because the Committee had failed to comply with the statutory requirements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Arizona Constitution guarantees voters the right to recall elected officers, but that right must be exercised pursuant to constitutional and statutory provisions; and (2) the signatures could not be certified because none of the Committee's petition sheets were attached to the complete time-and-date-marked application. View "Morales v. Archibald" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the family court's orders to the extent those orders appointed and granted authority to specific treatment professionals for the child in this case and otherwise limited Father's sole legal decision-making authority, holding that the family court exceeded its authority.Under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 25-410(A), when a family court designates one parent as the sole legal decision-maker for a child, the court may limit the decision-maker's authority only to prevent endangering the child's physical health or significantly impairing the child's emotional development. Upon the parties' divorce in this case, the family court awarded Father final legal decision-making authority concerning their child's education and medical and dental care. The current dispute arose over the parties' handling of the child's gender identification. Eventually, the family court appointed a specific treating therapist for the child and a consulting expert for the court and parties, with attendant restraints on Father's authority. The Supreme Court vacated the family court's orders, holding (1) section 25-410(A) did not authorize the court's appointment orders; and (2) neither Ariz. Rev. Stat. 25-405(B) nor Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure 95(A) authorized the family court to appoint the professionals as "consulting experts." View "Paul E. v. Courtney F." on Justia Law