Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that a trial court should consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding a residential purchase loan and identify certain factors in determining whether a loan is a construction loan entitled to anti-deficiency protection or a home improvement loan not entitled to anti-deficiency protection.Homeowners borrowed money from Desert Hills Bank to renovate and expand their property. Later, Homeowners borrowed money from Helvetica Servicing Inc. to pay off the Desert Hills loan. Homeowners' property secured the deed of trust. After Homeowners defaulted on the Helvetica loan, Helvetica sued to judicially foreclose. The trial court entered judgment for Helvetica and entered a deficiency judgment. Homeowners appealed, arguing that the Helvetica loan was entitled to anti-deficiency protection. The trial court ultimately found that the Desert Hills loan was a home improvement loan not entitled to anti-deficiency protection because Homeowners did not build a new home from scratch. The Supreme Court remanded the matter, holding (1) the "built from scratch" standard does not further the legislative objectives of Arizona's anti-deficiency statutes; (2) courts should consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding a loan when determining whether it is a home improvement or construction loan; and (3) the trial court did not make an independent factual determination as to whether the Desert Hills loan was a construction loan or a home improvement loan. View "Helvetica Servicing, Inc. v. Pasquan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Arizona Department of Health Services' (ADHS) interpretation of Arizona Administrative Code R9-17-303, which governs ADHS's allocation of marijuana dispensary registration certificates, violated Ariz. Rev. Stat. 36-2804(C).On June 16, 2016, ADHS announced that, because every county had at least one dispensary, it would allocate new registration certificates based on other factors set forth in R9-17-303. Saguaro Healing LLC timely applied for a certificate for its dispensary in La Paz County. During the application period, the only dispensary in La Paz County relocated out of the county. ADHS, however, did not consider the vacancy when prioritizing registration certificates and did not issue a certificate to Saguaro, leaving La Paz County without a dispensary. Saguaro filed a complaint for special action. The trial court dismissed the complaint because R9-17-303(B) "does not say when, during the process of issuing new certificates, [ADHS] must determine how certificates will be allocated." The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Ariz. Rev. Stat. 36-2804(C) requires ADHS to issue at least one medical marijuana dispensary registration certificate in each county with a qualified applicant; and (2) ADHS's interpretation of R9-17-303 contrary to this statutory mandate violates section 36-2804(C). View "Saguaro Healing LLC v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Arizona's statutory framework for adjudicating intellectual disability complies with the constitutional requirements announced in the recent United States Supreme Court cases, Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017) (Moore I), and Moore v. Texas, 139 S. Ct. 666 (2019) (Moore II).Pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-753(K)(3), a finding that a defendant has an intellectual disability requires a mental deficit "existing concurrently with significant impairment in adaptive behavior" before the defendant is eighteen. At issue in this case was the impact of Moore I and Moore II on section 13-753(K)(1)'s definition of "adaptive behavior." The Supreme Court held that Moore I and Moore II did not eliminate section 13-753(K)(1)'s requirements that the trial court conduct an overall assessment to determine if the defendant has a deficit in any life-skill category and, if a deficit exists, determine whether it affects the defendant's ability to meet "the standards of personal independence and social responsibility expected of defendant's age and cultural group." Because the trial court did not conduct an overall assessment of Defendant's ability to meet society's expectations of him, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded this case for a new intellectual disability determination using the standard set forth in this opinion. View "State v. Honorable Michael W. Kemp" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part Defendant's convictions and sentences for two counts of theft, two counts of vehicle theft, and one count of robbery, holding that theft is a lesser-included offense of both vehicle theft and robbery but that vehicle theft is not a lesser-included offense of robbery.At issue was whether Defendant's convictions and sentences constituted multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court held (1) theft is a lesser-included offense of vehicle theft, and therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited Defendant's convictions for both theft and vehicle theft; (2) theft is a lesser-included offense of robbery; (3) vehicle theft is not a lesser-included offense of robbery, and vehicle theft and robbery may be punished separately; and (4) an offense with a greater penalty can be a lesser-included offense of one with a lesser penalty. View "State v. Carter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's probation revocation and sentence on the basis that Defendant was precluded from challenging her sentence on appeal because she had invited any potential error, holding that an appellate court may not apply the invited error doctrine to preclude review of an illegal, stipulated sentence in a plea agreement.Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter and reckless child abuse. Consistent with the agreement, the trial court sentenced Defendant to ten years' imprisonment for the manslaughter and a consecutive term of lifetime probation for child abuse. After Defendant violated her probation, Defendant argued that her convictions for manslaughter and child abuse comprised a single criminal act against a single victim, and therefore, the stipulated consecutive sentences in her plea agreement resulted in an illegal double punishment. The trial court disagreed and revoked Defendant's probation. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that Defendant was precluded from challenging her sentence on appeal because she had invited any potential error by stipulating to consecutive sentences in her plea agreement. The Supreme Court vacated the court's opinion, holding that the court of appeals erred in applying the invited error doctrine to preclude Defendant from challenging the error on appeal. View "State v. Robertson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the practice of placing a cap on the amount of restitution a defendant may be liable for in a plea agreement, without the victim's consent, violates the right to restitution.In State v. Lukens, 151 Ariz. 502 (1986), State v. Phillips, 152 Airz. 533 (1987), and State v. Crowder, 155 Ariz. 477 (1987), the Supreme Court held that a specific amount of restitution or a cap is necessary for a defendant to make a voluntary and intelligent plea. Here, the Supreme Court overruled these former decisions, holding (1) there is no constitutional requirement to inform a defendant of a specific amount of restitution or to cap the amount of restitution that a court may order; and (2) the change will apply prospectively. Further, the Court held that a lawyer representing a victim has a presumptive right to sit in the well of the courtroom during a hearing involving a victim's constitutional or statutory right, subject to the physical limitations of a courtroom or other trial exigencies.In the instant case, the Supreme Court vacated the cap on restitution available to the victim. View "E.H. v. Honorable Dan Slayton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the constitutional prohibition on state and local governments from imposing or increasing taxes or other "transaction-based" fees on services does not extend to "trip fees" imposed by the City of Phoenix on commercial ground transportation providers who transport passengers to and from an airport.The Attorney General filed a special action pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 41-194.01(B)(2) asking whether the City's newly adopted ordinance adjusting passenger pick-up fees and imposing new trip fees for dropping off departing passengers at the Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport violates Ariz. Const. Art. IV, 25 as to commercial ground transportation providers. The Supreme Court held (1) the ordinance does not violate section 25 because the fees are not "transaction-based"; and (2) the bond provision in section 41-194.01(B)(2) is incomplete and unintelligible and therefore unenforceable. View "State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Phoenix" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a defendant presenting an appellate claim of fundamental error due to cumulative prosecutorial misconduct does not need to assert fundamental error for every allegation in order to preserve for review the argument that misconduct occurred.Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and other crimes. On appeal, Defendant argued that the prosecutor committed several instances of misconduct. For all but three of the alleged incidents of misconduct, the court of appeals concluded that Defendant waived argument that error occurred because he failed to set forth an argument of fundamental error for each allegation. The court then determined that Defendant failed to successfully argue misconduct for any of his allegations. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' decision, holding (1) when a defendant raises a claim on appeal that multiple incidents of prosecutorial misconduct, for which the defendant failed to object, cumulatively deprived him of a fair trial, the defendant need not argue that each instance of alleged misconduct individually deprived him of a fair trial; and (2) Defendant indisputably argued that cumulative error entitled him to a new trial due to pervasive prosecutorial misconduct. View "State v. Vargas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Arizona Corporation Commission may appoint an interim manager to operate a public service corporation (PSC) based on its permissive authority under Ariz. Const. art. XV, 3.Under article 15, section 3, the Commission has permissive authority to make and enforce reasonable orders for the convenience, comfort, safety, and health of the public. Concluding that it was necessary to protect public health and safety, the Commission appointed EPCOR Water Arizona as an interim manager for Johnson Utilities, LLC, an Arizona PSC. Johnson filed a special action seeking to enjoin its enforcement, but the court of appeals denied relief, holding that the Commission has both constitutional and statutory authority to appoint an interim manager of a PSC. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' opinion, holding that the Commission may appoint an interim manager based on its permissive authority under article 15, section 3 of the Arizona Constitution. View "Johnson Utilities, LLC v. Arizona Corp. Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a one-time payout for accrued sick leave does not form part of an employee's compensation for purposes of calculating that employee's pension benefit.The City of Phoenix paid pension benefits to eligible retiring employees, and the amount of that benefit partly depended on the employee's highest average annual compensation paid over a multi-year period. The City also paid employees for unused accrued sick leave upon retirement. Petitioners brought this action alleging that the City violated their constitutional rights by not considering accrued sick leave payouts upon retirement as pensionable compensation. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Petitioners, ruling that Petitioners had common law and constitutional rights to have one-time payouts for accrued sick leave included in the calculation of the employee's average compensation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that one-time payouts for accrued sick leave upon retirement are not salary or wages because they are not paid annually or at regular intervals. View "Piccioli v. City of Pheonix" on Justia Law