Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In considering whether online travel companies (OTCs) are subject to municipal privilege taxes under Model City Tax Code (the Code) 444 and 447 the Supreme Court held that the OTCs in this case were subject to taxation under section 444 but not under section 447.In 2013, the City of Phoenix and other cities (the Cities) issued privilege tax assessments against the OTCs based on the Cities' belief that the OTCs owed unpaid privilege taxes under sections 444 and 447 for engaging in the business of operating hotels or, alternatively, for acting as brokers for hotels. The tax court concluded that the OTCs were liable for the taxes. The court of appeals concluded that the OTCS were subject to taxation under section 444 but not under section 447 and that the Cities could assess the taxes, penalties, and interest under section 444 retroactively. The Supreme Court vacated in part the court of appeals' decision, holding (1) the OTCs are subject to taxation under section 444 because they are brokers engaging in the business of operating a hotel; and (2) the OTCs are not subject to taxation under section 447 because they are not hotels. View "City of Phoenix v. Orbitz Worldwide Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and death sentence for the murder of Xiaohung Fu, holding that none of Defendant's claims of error warranted reversal of his convictions.Specifically, the Court held (1) Defendant's challenges to the Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-751(F)(6) aggravator were unavailing; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion for mistrial; (3) Defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court's significant impairment instruction to the jury; (4) the trial court's error in allowing the State to introduce evidence of prison housing conditions was harmless; (5) there was no other error or abuse of discretion in the court's remaining challenged evidentiary rulings; (6) no abuse of discretion occurred during voir dire; (7) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motions to strike jurors for cause; (8) any error on the part of the prosecution was harmless; (9) the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motions to change counsel; and (10) the jury did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to death. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court set aside an administrative law judge's (ALJ) denial of Gilbert Aguirre's workers' compensation claim for benefits, holding that a claimant does not waive appellate review of the legally sufficiency of findings before the Industrial Commission of Arizona (ICA).In Post v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 160 Ariz. 4, 7-9 (1989), the Supreme Court held that when an ALJ fails to make findings on all material issues necessary to resolve the case the award is legally deficient and must be set aside. In this case, after an ALJ denied Aguirre's claim for benefits he filed a request for administrative review. In his request, Aguirre did not specifically challenge the ALJ's failure to make material findings as required by Post. The ALJ summarily affirmed the award. The court of appeals set aside the award based on the absence of legally-sufficient findings. At issue on appeal was whether, because Aguirre did not challenge the lack of material findings required by Post in his request for review, Appellant waived appellate review on that issue. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the ALJ's award was legally deficient and must be set aside regardless of whether Aguirre raised the issue. View "Aguirre v. Industrial Commission of Arizona" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a parent must provide evidence of a "meritorious defense" to succeed on a Rule 46(E) motion to set aside a severance judgment following a Rule 64(C) acceleration of a final adjudication as a result of a missed initial hearing, pretrial conference, or status conference.Mother received a notice of the parental termination proceedings but failed to appear for a status hearing and pretrial conference (January hearing). The court proceeded to an accelerated severance hearing under Rule 64(C), after which the court found grounds for severance and that termination was in the children's best interests. The juvenile court subsequently granted Mother's motion to set aside the severance judgment. The court reinstated its January severance order, finding Mother failed to establish good cause for her absence at the hearing. The court of appeals vacated the severance order, holding that requiring a meritorious defense to set aside the accelerated hearing judgment violated Mother's right to due process. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) requiring a meritorious defense in a Rule 46(E) motion to set aside a severance judgment following a Rule 64(C) accelerated hearing does not violate due process; and (2) the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Mother failed to show good cause for her nonappearance at the January hearing. View "Trisha v. Department of Child Safety" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for first degree murder, kidnapping, and burglary in the first degree and death sentence, holding that none of Defendant's allegations of error warranted reversal.Specifically, the Court held (1) Defendant's challenges to the Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-751 sentencing scheme were unavailing; (2) the Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-751(F)(6) aggravator is constitutional; (3) the court's instructions to the jury were not erroneous; (4) even if the court erred by allowing the introduction of evidence of prison housing conditions the error was harmless; (5) the court did not abuse its discretion by excluding execution impact evidence or limitation of mitigation evidence; (6) the court did not abuse its discretion by ordering the disclosure of defense counsel's attorneys' notes; (7) there was no abuse of discretion during voir dire; (8) the court did not abuse its discretion in failing to strike certain jurors for cause; (9) Defendant failed to show that prosecutorial misconduct so infected his trial as to deprive him due process; (10) the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to change counsel; and (11) the jury did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Defendant to death. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction and sentence, holding that trying Defendant a second time for first-degree murder under the circumstances of this case violated his constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy.In 2013, Defendant was tried for first-degree murder. The jury was unable to agree on that charge and found Defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. Defendant appealed on procedural grounds, and the court of appeals reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. Before the second trial, the trial court granted the State's motion to retry Defendant for first-degree murder. Defendant was then retried and convicted of first-degree murder. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' decision, holding that double jeopardy barred Defendant's retrial for first-degree murder because the State had a full and fair opportunity to try him on that charge in the first trial, and the jury refused to convict. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court to consider whether to reduce Defendant's conviction to the lesser-included offense or to order a new trial. View "State v. Martin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences for first-degree murder, second-degree murder, kidnapping, and two counts of abandonment or concealment of a dead body, holding that Defendant's allegations of error did not warrant reversal.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) while the trial court did not explicitly refer to the factors set forth in State v. LaGrand, 152 Ariz. 483 (1987), the court considered those factors in assessing and denying Defendant's request for change of counsel; (2) the trial court did not err by telling the jury during voir dire and in the jury questionnaire that a life sentence could result in the possibility of Defendant's release after twenty-five years; (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate Defendant's constitutional rights by refusing to suppress incriminating statements Defendant made to an undercover police detective while Defendant was incarcerated; and (4) Defendant's remaining allegations of error and challenges to Arizona's death penalty scheme were unavailing. View "State v. Champagne" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the superior court denying relief to the Arizona Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America and David Martin (collectively, Contractors) on their complaint seeking to enjoin placement of the "Building a Better Phoenix Act" initiative measure on the City of Phoenix's August 2019 special election ballot, holding that the initiative qualified for the ballot.Contractors filed a complaint seeking to enjoin placement of the Initiative on the ballot, alleging that petition signatures were void pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 19-118.01(A) because the measure's proponent paid petition circulators by the signature and that the measure's 100-word description failed to comply with Ariz. Rev. Stat. 19-102(A) because it created a significant danger of confusion or unfairness. The superior court denied relief, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 19-118.01(A) does not apply to local measures such as the Initiative, and therefore, the superior court correctly refused to apply that provision here; and (2) the description was not misleading and therefore did not create a significant danger of either confusion or unfairness. View "Arizona Chapter of Associated General Contractors of America v. City of Phoenix" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for premeditated first degree murder, holding that a defendant who introduces expert evidence of a character trait for impulsivity to challenge premeditation cannot introduce evidence of brain damage to corroborate the existence of that trait.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion by precluding expert testimony from a psychologist that Defendant likely had diffuse brain damage, meaning that he was more likely to have a character trait for impulsivity. The court of appeals agreed, holding that the trial court erred by precluding the testimony but that the error was harmless. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' opinion and affirmed, holding (1) mental disease or defect evidence cannot be admitted to show that a defendant was less likely to have formed the mens rea element of a crime even if that evidence corroborates behavioral-tendency evidence; and (2) the trial court did not err in precluding the expert from testifying that Defendant suffered from brain damage even if the impairment made it more likely that Defendant had a character trait for impulsivity. View "State v. Malone" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the lower courts concluding that Defendant, an undocumented immigrant, received ineffective assistance of counsel resulting in his mandatory deportation, holding that Defendant was entitled to post-conviction relief.Defendant entered a guilty plea to possession of drug paraphernalia, resulting in his mandatory deportation. Defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he would not have entered the guilty plea if his counsel had accurately advised him of the immigration consequences. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that Defendant had established ineffective assistance of counsel. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, the State argued that it met its burden of proving that the violation was harmless because Defendant would have been deported regardless of his plea. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, while Defendant had little chance of winning at trial, he was entitled to effective assistance of counsel in deciding whether to go to trial or to accept a plea offer and that by giving up his right to trial based on counsel's deficient advice, he was assured the outcome he most feared. View "State v. Nunez-Diaz" on Justia Law