Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case concerning the administration of the Arizona State Retirement System (ASRS) the Supreme Court held that the requirement to submit a retirement application for receipt of retirement benefits pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 38-757(A) does not violate Ariz. Const. art. XXIX, 1(D) and that all conditions listed in Ariz. Rev. Stat. 38-764(A) must be satisfied in order to elect a retirement date under the ASRS Plan.Plaintiff began her Plan-qualified employment in 1978 and became eligible for a normal retirement in 2005. In 2016, Plaintiff submitted an application for retirement, listing 2005 as her date for commencing retirement. The ASRS Agency rejected that date and instead used the 2016 date as Plaintiff's retirement date. After unsuccessfully pursuing administrative remedies, Plaintiff sought judicial review in superior court. The court affirmed the Agency's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Plan processed Plaintiff's retirement date as provided for in statute and calculated her chosen monthly life annuity benefit as required; and (2) therefore, the Plan complied with section 38-757(A), and no forfeiture, impairment, or diminishment of Plaintiff's normal retirement benefits occurred in violation of article 29, section 1(D) of the Arizona Constitution. View "Lagerman v. Arizona State Retirement System" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that, for purposes of imposing mandatory sex offender registration under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-3821(A)(3), a judge has the authority to make the necessary factual finding that the victim is under the age of eighteen and that Arizona's sex offender registration statutes are civil regulatory statutes, not criminal penalties.Defendant was convicted by a jury of one count of sexual abuse. In reaching its verdict the jury determined that the victim was "fifteen or more years of age." At sentencing, the trial court ordered Defendant to register as a sex offender. Defendant objected, arguing that, pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), a jury was required to find whether Defendant was under eighteen pursuant to section 13-3821(A)(3). The trial court denied the objection. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Apprendi does not apply to factual findings that are necessary to impose registration because sex offender registration is a civil regulatory requirement, not a criminal penalty; and (2) the trial judge did not violate Apprendi by determining that the victim was under eighteen. View "State v. Trujillo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court ruling that Defendants did not obtain sufficient signatures to generate a recall election of Payson Mayor Thomas P. Morrissey, holding that the Arizona Constitution establishes the requisite number of signatures based upon the number of voters in the most recent election at which the candidate for the office at issue was voted into office.In August 12 2019, Defendants took out a petition to recall Morrissey. Because all Payson elections since 2002 were decided by primary election the town clerk determined that the number of signatures required for the recall petition was twenty-five percent of the number of votes cast in the 2002 general election. The town clerk called a recall election for March 10, 2020. Morrissey filed this lawsuit seeking to enjoin the recall election, arguing that the required number of signatures should be based on twenty-five percent of the votes cast in the 2018 primary election at which he was elected. The trial court agreed and enjoined the recall election based on insufficient signatures. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the town clerk should have based the number of signatures required for a recall election on twenty-five percent of the votes cast in the 2018 election. View "Morrissey v. Garner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first degree murder and his death sentence but vacated the sentences imposed for counts two, four, and five and remanded for resentencing on those counts, holding that the trial court committed fundamental error by imposing greater than presumptive sentences on those counts.Defendant was found guilty of first degree felony murder (count one), conspiracy to commit child abuse (count two), and three counts of child abuse (counts three through five). The court sentenced Defendant to death for the murder conviction. On the non-capital counts, the court sentenced Defendant to aggravated (counts two through four) and maximum (count five) prison sentences. Count four ran concurrently with the death sentences, with the remaining sentences running consecutively. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions but reversed three of the sentences imposed, holding (1) there was no error in the guilt phase of the trial; (2) the jury did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to death; (3) Defendant was incorrectly sentenced on count two as a dangerous crime against children in the first degree under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-705(D); and (4) insufficient aggravating factors supported the sentences on counts two, four and five. View "State v. Allen" on Justia Law

In this case involving the construction of Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4(i), the Supreme Court held that, under Rule 4(i), if a plaintiff shows good cause for failing to serve a defendant within ninety days, a court is required to extend the time for service, but also under the rule, a court in its discretion may extend the period for service without a plaintiff showing good cause.Melissa Langevin filed a complaint against Dr. Steven Sholem. More than ten months after the ninety-day deadline had expired, Langevin filed a motion pursuant to Rule 4(i) seeking to extend the time for service. The trial court determined there was good cause to grant the motion and extended the deadline. After Langevin served Sholem he moved to dismiss, arguing that the complaint did not show good cause for extending the deadline. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no good cause for an extension under rule 4(i), but there were discretionary grounds in the record to deny Sholem's motion to dismiss. View "Sholem v. Honorable David Gass" on Justia Law

In this termination of parental rights case the Supreme Court held that when a juvenile court finds a parent unfit for neglecting or willfully abusing a child the court may also find the parent unfit as to that parent's non-abused children but must first determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence of a risk of harm to the children.After then six-week-old J.M. was diagnosed with a large subdural hemorrhage on her brain the juvenile court terminated Mother's rights to J.M., F.M., and M.R., and terminated Father's rights to J.M. and F.M. The court found that J.M.'s injuries were the result of willful abuse and that both parents demonstrated their lack of protective capacities for all the children. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that when a juvenile court determines whether to terminate parental rights to non-abused children, the risk of harm to such children should be considered under a totality of the circumstances analysis during the best-interests inquiry. The Supreme Court affirmed the severance order but vacated the court of appeals' opinion in part, holding that a juvenile court's extrapolation of parental unfitness will not pass constitutional muster unless the risk of harm to non-abused children is proven by clear and convincing evidence. View "Sandra R. v. Department of Child Safety" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for first degree murder and assisting a criminal street gang and his sentence of death, holding that there was not prejudicial error in the proceedings below.(1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to change lead counsel; (2) Defendant failed to show that he was prejudiced by the trial court's failure to question jurors on questionnaire answers sua sponte; (3) any error in the admission of certain evidence was harmless; (4) Defendant did not suffer any prejudice by the trial court's instructions to the jury; (5) Defendant provided no valid arguments challenging the constitutional sufficiency regarding Arizona's (F)(6) aggravator or the constitutional applicability of the aggravator by a jury, rather than a judge; (6) the prosecutor's recitation of the guilt-phase accomplice liability instruction in the aggravation phase did not constitute error; and (7) any other errors in the trial court proceedings did not prejudice Defendant. View "State v. Riley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court enjoining the application of Arizona statutes authorizing the recording of liens against third-party tortfeasors to allow hospitals to recover health care costs for Medicaid patients beyond the amounts provided by Medicaid, holding that the statues are preempted to the extent hospitals utilize them against third-party tortfeasors for "balance billing" to recover costs beyond Medicaid reimbursement.Plaintiffs were patients who were treated at defendant hospitals under the state's contract provider for the federal Medicaid program, which negotiates reimbursement rates with hospitals. Defendants recorded liens against the third-party tortfeasors who caused the patients' injuries in order to recover the remainder of their fees exceeding Medicaid reimbursement. Plaintiff brought this class action challenging the liens, arguing that Ariz. Rev. Stat. 33-931(A) and 36-2903.01(G)(4) (the lien statutes) were preempted by federal Medicaid law. The trial court enjoined application of the lien statutes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs had a private right of action to challenge the lien statutes; and (2) the lien statutes are unconstitutional as applied. View "Ansley v. Banner Health Network" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a certified question by holding that a sentence imposing "life without possibility of parole for twenty-five years" means the convicted defendant is eligible for parole after serving twenty-five years' imprisonment despite Ariz. Rev. Stat. 41-1604.09's prohibition of parole for persons convicted of offenses occurring on or after January 1, 1994 and that a court lacks jurisdiction to correct and illegally lenient sentence absent timely correction or appeal.Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder committed in 1995. The trial court sentenced Defendant to "life without possibility of parole for 25 years." After serving twenty-four years of his sentence, Defendant sued the Arizona Department of Corrections under 42 U.S.C. 1983 asserting his entitlement to parole eligibility. The State sought a determination as to whether Defendant's sentence entitled him to parole eligibility. The district court issued a certification order. The Supreme Court held (1) regardless of section 41-1604.09, Defendant was eligible for parole after serving twenty-five years pursuant to his sentence because the sentencing hearing and order manifested the trial court's intent for Defendant to be parole eligible; and (2) Defendant's illegally lenient sentence was final under Arizona law. View "Chaparro v. Shinn" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions but vacated his sentences and remanded for resentencing, holding that convictions for possession of drugs for sale, whether completed or inchoate, are not disqualifying convictions for purposes of determining eligibility for mandatory probation and drug treatment under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-901.01 and that the statute applies equally to qualifying inchoate and completed drug offenses.In 2017, Defendant was convicted of two counts of possession of a narcotic drug and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant argued that he should be sentenced to probation under section 13.901.01 because his 2006 conviction for solicitation to sell a narcotic drug did not qualify as a personal possession or use offense under section 13.901.01. Therefore, Defendant argued, his 2017 drug convictions did not count as a third personal possession or use conviction. The trial court ruled that Defendant's 2006 conviction was a strike, and therefore, Defendant was not eligible for mandatory probation. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's sentences, holding that Defendant's conviction for solicitation to sell a narcotics drug was not a strike. View "State v. Green" on Justia Law