Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed a lower court's decision involving a dispute over a 135 square foot piece of land between two neighboring property owners, the Becks and the Nevilles. The Becks had landscaped their property and mistakenly installed decorative pavers outside their actual property line, encroaching on the Nevilles' land. The Nevilles claimed ownership of this disputed land based on the doctrine of "boundary by acquiescence" and "adverse possession."The Court held that Arizona law recognizes a cause of action for boundary by acquiescence. To succeed in such a claim, a claimant must prove by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) they occupied or possessed the property up to a clearly defined line, (2) the adjoining landowners mutually acquiesced to that line as the dividing line between their properties, (3) they continuously acquiesced for ten years, and (4) the actual boundary was uncertain or disputed.The Court also held that occasionally parking a car partially on an adjoining landowner’s property is insufficient to establish the open and notorious element of an adverse possession claim.In this instance, the Court found that the Nevilles failed to provide sufficient evidence to satisfy the elements of either boundary by acquiescence or adverse possession. Consequently, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision that the Becks were the rightful owners of the disputed land. View "BECK v NEVILLE" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona, the appellant, Yvette Rosenberg, contested the validity of a beneficiary deed executed by her late uncle, Alex Brandt, which left two properties to Marilyn Sanders, Brandt's former girlfriend. Rosenberg claimed that Sanders procured the deed through undue influence. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Sanders, holding that Rosenberg had not presented evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Sanders unduly influenced Brandt in executing the deed. The court of appeals reversed, adding a new ninth factor to the existing eight-factor test for undue influence, namely the relevance of a grantor's post-execution statements.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona affirmed the trial court's decision and held that adding a grantor's post-execution statements as a new ninth factor in the undue influence test was unnecessary. The Court found that Brandt's post-execution statements were not relevant to the claim of undue influence as they did not address his state of mind, mental condition, or the circumstances present at the time of the execution of the deed. The Court concluded that Rosenberg's evidence of susceptibility and the existence of a close relationship between Brandt and Sanders were insufficient to defeat summary judgment. The Court also found that Rosenberg's inferences did not create a genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether Sanders exerted undue influence at the time of executing the deed, or whether the deed was the product of Sanders' undue influence. Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Sanders. View "ROSENBERG v SANDERS" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona, Phoenix Police Sergeant Stefani McMichael-Gombar appealed against her suspension for posting content on Facebook that violated the Phoenix Police Department’s Social Media Policy. She argued that the policy was overbroad and violated the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, or that she reasonably believed she had a First Amendment right to make the post. The Phoenix Civil Service Board upheld the suspension, and McMichael-Gombar sought relief in the superior court. The superior court dismissed her complaint, stating that the Phoenix City Charter neither requires nor authorizes the Board to consider the constitutionality of the City’s policies, and this is only tasked with determining if the allegations against an employee are true and if the level of discipline was appropriate. The court of appeals vacated this ruling, determining that the Board must consider whether the disciplinary action properly regards McMichael-Gombar’s constitutional rights.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona affirmed the superior court’s decision, holding that the Board does not have the authority to decide whether a city policy is unconstitutional, as this power is not explicitly granted to it by the Phoenix City Charter, the rules governing disciplinary proceedings, or the Peace Officers Bill of Rights. However, the court did agree that McMichael-Gombar was entitled to argue and introduce supporting evidence that she reasonably believed she was acting within her First Amendment rights. The court concluded that McMichael-Gombar did not meet her burden to show that the Board precluded her from doing so. Thus, the court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and affirmed the superior court’s order dismissing McMichael-Gombar’s special action complaint. View "MCMICHAEL-GOMBAR v PHOENIX CIVIL SERVICE" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the "anti-abrogation clause" set forth in Ariz. Const. art. XVIII, 6 guaranteeing that the "right of action to recover damages for injuries shall never be abrogated" does not extend to dram-shop actions because they were recognized after statehood.At issue was whether the anti-abrogation clause extends to rights of action created after the Arizona Constitution was ratified, such as the common law dram-shop action recognized in Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500 (1983). Plaintiffs sued Defendant, the owner of Jaguars Club in Phoenix, under theories of statutory and common law dram-shop liability. The jury found Defendant was liable under the common law dram-shop action recognized in Ontiveros but not liable under the dram-shop cause of action codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. 4-311(A). The jury apportioned forty percent of the fault to Defendant. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for entry of judgment in favor of Defendant, holding that the legislature's limitation of dram-shop liability to actions brought under section 4-311 did not run afoul of the anti-abrogation clause by abrogating the common law dram-shop action recognized in Ontiveros. View "Torres v. JAI Dining Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In this wrongful death action, the Supreme Court held that the statutory duty to report child abuse or neglect or under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-3620(A) does not encompass reporting a risk of future harm and that mental health professionals owe a duty to third parties based on their special relationship and public duty and not on foreseeability of harm.A licensed professional counselor initiated the process for involuntary court-ordered evaluation and treatment pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 36-523 alleging that Mother was a danger to herself and others and persistently disabled. The superior court granted the petition. After court-ordered treatment Mother was discharged, and the petition was dismissed. Five days later, Mother drowned her twin boys. Father brought this action against, among others, Crisis Preparation and Recovery Inc. The superior court granted summary judgment for Crisis Prep, finding that it had no duty to report Mother's condition given that she was undergoing court-ordered treatment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 13-3620(A) did not impose a duty on Crisis Prep under the circumstances; and (2) Hamman v. County of Maricopa, 161 Ariz. 58 (1989), and Little v. All Phoenix South Community Mental Health Center, 186 Ariz. 97 (App. 1996), are overruled to the extent they found a duty in such circumstances based on foreseeability. View "Avitia v. Crisis Preparation & Recovery, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of Corizon Healthcare Inc. in this medical malpractice action, holding that the requirements of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-2604 do not apply to claims against medical institutions not based on vicarious liability.David Windhurst, an inmate, was provided with health care through the Arizona Department of Corrections' contractor Corizon Healthcare Inc. David later died due the infections complications of diabetes mellitus. Plaintiff, David's widow, filed a wrongful death action against Corizon and other defendants, alleging, inter alia, institutional negligence by Corizon and vicarious liability based on the negligence of its medical personnel. The trial court granted summary judgment for Corizon on the medical negligence claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when it is unclear which provider breached the standard of care, an expert on institutional standards of care may address an alleged breach by establishing that a class of providers failed to exercise appropriate care; (2) the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment for Corizon; and (3) a registered nurse may testify regarding gate cause of death in a medical malpractice case. View "Windhurst v. Ariz. Dep't of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner's petition seeking post-conviction relief (PCR), holding that Petitioner's natural life sentence was not mandatory within the meaning of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Petitioner was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.Petitioner was sixteen when he shot and killed two people. He was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and sentenced to natural life for one murder and life with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years for the other murder. Petitioner later filed the PCR petition at issue, claiming that his natural life sentence violated Miller and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016). The PCR court determined that a colorable claim existed and that and that a Valencia evidentiary hearing was warranted. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's ruling and dismissed the PCR petition, holding that Petitioner did not present a colorable claim for relief under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(g) because his natural life sentence was not mandatory within the meaning of Miller and there had not been a significant change in the law that, if applied to Petitioner's case, would probably overturn his sentence. View "State ex rel. Mitchell v. Honorable Cooper" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that an injury settlement agreement between the married couple in this case and a third party did constitute a valid and binding property settlement or postnuptial agreement, thus reversing the trial court's judgment and remanding the case for further proceedings.Husband and Wife sued the manufacturer of Husband's pacemaker, among other parties, claiming medical malpractice. The couple were awarded $2 million in compensatory damages and $5.4 million in punitive damages. Thereafter, the couple entered into a written settlement agreement with the pacemaker manufacturer requiring, for purposes of this appeal, Husband and Wife to use $5.4 million of the settlement to fund a series of annuity payments. Later, the parties separated, and the trial court entered a dissolution decree finding that the parties had agreed to the allocation of the settlement funds. Wife appealed, arguing that the punitive damages portion of the agreement was a community asset that should have been equitably divided. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's determination that the annuity payments were not community property based on the settlement, holding that the agreement was not a valid postnuptial agreement. View "Sowards v. Sowards" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that in determining whether a petition for court-ordered treatment complies with statutory requirements, courts may consider contents of an extrinsic document attached to an affidavit if the affidavit specifically incorporates the attachment by reference.The trial court found that G.B. was persistently or actually disabled and ordered treatment for one year. The court of appeals vacated the trial court's order on the grounds that involuntary treatment proceedings require strict statutory compliance and that two affidavits submitted by G.B. failed to comply with Ariz. Rev. Stat. 36-533(B). The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' opinion and affirmed the order of the trial court, holding that that there was no fundamental, prejudicial error in this case because the trial court's error did not deprive G.B. of a fair opportunity to oppose the petition for involuntary treatment or to otherwise receive a fair hearing. View "In re Pima County Mental Health No. 20200860221" on Justia Law

In this referendum matter concerning a city ordinance, the Supreme Court held that the proponent's error in failing to include the text of the to-be-referred ordinance within its application for a petition serial number, as required by Ariz. Rev. Stat. 19-111(A), could not be cured by showing that the City Clerk and petition signers knew what ordinance was being referred but that nothing authorized the City Clerk to reject petition sheets due to the application error.At issue was Ordinance 2022-18, which would take effect thirty days later unless referred to the ballot for a vote. Plaintiff sought to refer the ordinance to the ballot, but the City Clerk rejected Plaintiff's petition sheets and signatures based on Plaintiff's failure to attach the ordinance to the application for a petition serial number. Plaintiff brought this action seeking to compel the City Clerk to accept the sheets and signatures. The court concluded that the application's failure to strictly comply with section 19-111(A) was fatal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff did not strictly comply with section 19-111(A) when filing its application for a serial number and could not correct that error through its offered evidence; but (2) the City Clerk was not authorized to reject Plaintiff's circulated and signed petition sheets because the application for serial number was deficient. View "Voice of Surprise v. Hall" on Justia Law