Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mesquite Power, LLC owns the Mesquite Power Plant, which operates under a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) guaranteeing specific electrical capacity to buyers in exchange for fixed payments. For the 2019 tax year, the Arizona Department of Revenue (ADOR) valued the plant at $196,870,000 using a cost-based approach as mandated by A.R.S. § 42-14156. Mesquite challenged this valuation in tax court, arguing that it exceeded the market value of the property, which they claimed was $105,000,000 based on the income approach, excluding income from the PPA.The Arizona Tax Court ruled partially in favor of Mesquite, determining that the PPA was a non-taxable, intangible asset and should not be included in the property valuation. However, the court allowed for the possibility that cash flows from the PPA could be considered in the valuation. At trial, Mesquite's expert valued the property at $105,000,000 using the income approach without the PPA, while ADOR's expert valued it at $432,000,000, including the PPA income. The tax court sided with Mesquite, setting the value at $105,000,000. ADOR appealed.The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the tax court's decision, holding that the PPA must be considered in the property valuation as it enhances the value of the plant. The court emphasized that any competent appraisal must reflect the property's current usage, which includes the PPA.The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that income from the PPA may be considered under the income approach if it is relevant to the property's income derivable as a power plant. The court also clarified that A.R.S. § 42-11054(C)(1) does not mandate the consideration of the PPA under the "current usage" requirement. The Supreme Court reversed the tax court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing both parties to offer new valuations consistent with this opinion. The Court of Appeals' opinion was vacated. View "MESQUITE v. ADOR" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Pima County and the State of Arizona regarding the reimbursement of desegregation expenses. Following amendments to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 15-910 in 2018, the State ceased reimbursing Pima County for desegregation expenses that exceeded the Arizona Constitution’s 1% limit on residential property taxes. The key issue was whether these expenses, previously classified as "primary property taxes," should still be reimbursed by the State under the new statutory framework.The Arizona Tax Court initially ruled in favor of Pima County, holding that the State must reimburse the desegregation expenses as additional state aid for education. The court found the State's interpretation of the amended statute unworkable and inconsistent with the constitutional mandate. The State appealed this decision.The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Court's decision, concluding that the legislature had the authority to amend the statutory scheme and reclassify the desegregation expenses as secondary property taxes. The court reasoned that the new classification did not violate the Arizona Constitution, as the legislature's amendments were within its purview to alter statutory tax classifications.The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Court held that the 2018 amendments to A.R.S. § 15-910 effectively reclassified desegregation expenses as secondary property taxes, which are not subject to reimbursement under A.R.S. § 15-972(E). The Court concluded that the State is not required to reimburse Pima County for these expenses, as the new classification aligns with the legislative intent and does not violate the constitutional 1% limit on residential property taxes. The case was remanded to the Tax Court for the entry of judgment in favor of the State. View "PIMA COUNTY v. STATE OF ARIZONA" on Justia Law

A commercial automobile liability insurance policy dispute arose from an accident at the Ina Pit Mine in Pima, Arizona, operated by Staker & Parson Companies ("Staker"). Staker had a Haul and Materials Agreement with BDR Transport ("BDR"), which required BDR to name Staker as an additional insured on its insurance policy. William Baughn, a BDR employee, was injured while attempting to dislodge a rock from his trailer's tires. Baughn sued Staker, BDR, and others, alleging negligence by Staker in loading the trailer, maintaining the road, and providing safety training.The United States District Court for the District of Utah reviewed the case and certified four questions to the Arizona Supreme Court regarding the interpretation of "use" under Arizona law in the context of the insurance policy. The district court had previously ruled that the policy's "Movement of Property by Mechanical Device" clause excluded coverage for Baughn's claims related to the loading of the truck.The Arizona Supreme Court answered the certified questions as follows: First, it held that "use" of a vehicle includes loading and unloading cargo, even if the additionally named insured does not have active control over the vehicle. Second, it determined that merely driving on private roads owned by the additionally named insured does not constitute "use" of the vehicle. Third, it concluded that managerial functions, such as establishing safety training procedures, do not constitute "use" of a vehicle. Finally, the court provided guidance on causation, stating that there must be a causal relationship between the injury and the use of the vehicle, but left the determination of a sufficient causal link to the trier of fact.The Arizona Supreme Court's main holdings clarified the scope of "use" under Arizona law, emphasizing that it includes loading and unloading but does not extend to managerial functions or the mere use of private roads. The court also outlined the causation standard for determining an insurer's duty to defend. View "Staker & Parson Companies v Scottsdale Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The case involves the San Carlos Apache Tribe's challenge to the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality's (ADEQ) issuance of a 2017 Permit Renewal to Resolution Copper Mining, LLC (Resolution) for the discharge of water from a copper mine. The Tribe argued that the construction of a new mine shaft (Shaft 10) and other new features at the mine constituted a "new source" under the Clean Water Act (CWA), which would subject the mine to more stringent regulations.Previously, an administrative law judge (ALJ) had determined that ADEQ should have analyzed whether Shaft 10 and the other new features were a "new source" under the CWA before issuing the permit. The Arizona Water Quality Appeals Board remanded the matter to ADEQ, which concluded that Shaft 10 and the new features were "existing sources" under the CWA. The Board affirmed ADEQ's issuance of the 2017 Permit Renewal. The Tribe appealed to the superior court, which affirmed the Board's decision. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Shaft 10 was a "new source" under the CWA.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona disagreed with the court of appeals. The court applied a three-step test to determine whether a construction is a "new source" under the CWA. The court found that Shaft 10 was not a "new source" under the CWA because it was integrated with existing infrastructure at the mine and engaged in the same general type of activity as the existing source. The court also found that Shaft 10 did not have a new source performance standard "independently applicable" to it. Therefore, the court concluded that ADEQ acted within its discretion by issuing the 2017 Permit Renewal to Resolution. The court vacated the court of appeals' decision and affirmed the superior court's decision. View "SAN CARLOS APACHE TRIBE v STATE" on Justia Law

The case involves Sherold D. Roaf, who was rear-ended by Francisco Ortiz, an employee of Medstar. Roaf sued Ortiz for negligence and Medstar for both vicarious liability for Ortiz's negligent driving and direct liability for Medstar's negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of Ortiz. Roaf sought compensatory and economic damages but did not seek punitive damages. Medstar admitted liability for the incident but did not move to dismiss the negligent hiring claim. Instead, it sought to prevent Roaf from introducing Ortiz’s personnel record and driving history, arguing that such evidence would be irrelevant and could improperly influence the jury. The trial court denied the motion, allowing Roaf to pursue both theories of liability.The Superior Court in Maricopa County allowed the case to proceed to trial, where Roaf's counsel introduced evidence of Ortiz's driving record and Medstar's hiring policy. The jury found Roaf's full damages to be $4.625 million, allocating 40% fault to Ortiz and 60% to Medstar. Medstar moved for a new trial, arguing that the negligent hiring claim was superfluous and had allowed Roaf to put prejudicial evidence before the jury. The court denied the motion, finding that the evidence of Ortiz’s driving history had no unfair influence and that the damage award was supported by other evidence.The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision, agreeing that the jury’s award was appropriate based on the evidence and that Medstar failed to show that the trial court committed prejudicial error by allowing the separate claims of negligent hiring and vicarious liability to go to the jury.However, the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reversed the lower courts' decisions. The Supreme Court held that because Medstar admitted liability, it was wholly responsible for Roaf’s damages. Therefore, evidence of liability relating to the negligent hiring claim should have been precluded. The court also found that Medstar suffered prejudice because of the erroneous admission of Ortiz’s personnel record and driving history. The case was remanded to the trial court for a new trial. View "ROAF v REBUCK CONSULTING" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over jurisdiction in a divorce proceeding between Maria Del Carmen Rendon Quijada and Julian Javier Pimienta Dominguez. The couple, originally from Mexico, moved to the U.S. in 2007. Pimienta held a TN visa, allowing him to work temporarily in the U.S., while Rendon held a TD visa, reserved for spouses and minor children of TN visa holders. Rendon's TD visa expired in March 2020, and she began seeking lawful permanent resident status in December 2020. In May 2022, Rendon filed for divorce in Arizona. Pimienta argued that Rendon could not establish domicile in Arizona due to her expired TD visa, which precludes her from intending to remain in the state indefinitely. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case.The court of appeals reversed the decision, holding that Rendon's TD visa did not prevent her from establishing a U.S. domicile, as she had begun seeking lawful permanent resident status. The court concluded that federal immigration law did not preempt Arizona jurisdiction over the dissolution proceeding.The Supreme Court of Arizona disagreed with the lower courts' focus on federal immigration law. It held that the question was not whether federal immigration law divested Arizona courts of jurisdiction over a divorce sought by an expired TD visa holder, but whether the visa holder could meet the domicile requirements under Arizona law. The court concluded that federal immigration law did not prevent Rendon from establishing domicile in Arizona, and thus, the state courts had jurisdiction over the divorce proceeding. The court vacated the court of appeals' opinion, reversed the trial court's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF QUIJADA/DOMINGUEZ" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Kevin Dunbar, who was convicted of multiple felonies. Dunbar requested to represent himself during the final stages of his resentencing, but the trial court denied his request. Dunbar appealed this decision, arguing that his right to self-representation had been violated. The court of appeals agreed with Dunbar, concluding that the trial court's denial constituted structural error and remanded the case back to the trial court for reconsideration of Dunbar's request.Previously, the court of appeals had upheld Dunbar's convictions but remanded for resentencing on different grounds. The court had found that Dunbar had forfeited his right to self-representation due to his inconsistent positions and his signed waiver of the right to self-representation.The Supreme Court of Arizona was tasked with deciding whether the denial of the right to self-representation at sentencing is subject to harmless error or structural error review. The court held that erroneous denials of the right to self-representation at sentencing constitute structural error. However, the court also clarified that not all denials of self-representation requests are erroneous and provided guidance on the analysis a trial court must employ in determining whether it should grant a defendant’s untimely self-representation request.The court vacated parts of the court of appeals’ decision and remanded the case back to the trial court for reconsideration of Dunbar's request to represent himself. The trial court was instructed to consider whether denying Dunbar's request would substantially undermine his right to present his case at sentencing. If the trial court determines Dunbar's motion should have been granted, structural error has occurred, and Dunbar is entitled to resentencing. If the trial court again determines that Dunbar's motion should not have been granted, Dunbar's sentences stand. View "STATE OF ARIZONA v DUNBAR" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the issue of whether reimbursements paid to a hotel for a loyalty program member’s complimentary stay constitute gross income for purposes of Arizona’s transaction privilege tax (TPT). The hotel in question, Dove Mountain, participates in the Marriott Rewards Program. As part of the program, Dove Mountain and other participating hotels fund the program's marketing efforts by paying a percentage of room revenues and providing rooms for complimentary stays to program members. When a member redeems points for a complimentary stay at Dove Mountain, Marriott Rewards issues a reimbursement payment to the hotel.The Arizona Department of Revenue (ADOR) denied Dove Mountain's request for a refund of TPT paid on certain reimbursements between 2012 and 2016. Dove Mountain appealed ADOR’s decision to the tax court, arguing that the reimbursements were part of a rewards program not subject to TPT. The tax court concluded that Dove Mountain was not eligible for a refund and entered judgment for ADOR. The court of appeals affirmed the tax court's decision, holding that the reimbursements fell within the statutory definitions of gross receipts and gross income and were subject to TPT.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the reimbursements paid by Marriott Rewards to Dove Mountain constitute gross income for TPT purposes. The court distinguished the case from a previous case, Consumers Market, which Dove Mountain argued was materially indistinguishable. The court found that the nature and operation of the Rewards Program undermined Dove Mountain’s effort to characterize its Points-earning transactions, subsequent redemptions, and Reimbursements as analogous to the “whole transaction” at issue in Consumers Market. The court concluded that Dove Mountain's various characterizations of Reimbursements as “post-tax” reserves, returns of capital, or bank deposits were not supported by the facts or the law. View "DOVE MOUNTAIN v ADOR" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between investigative journalist Amy Silverman and the Arizona Department of Economic Security (ADES). Silverman requested access to records maintained by the Adult Protective Services (APS), a program within ADES, for her research on issues affecting individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities. ADES denied her request, citing a state law that generally shields APS records from public inspection, except for certain exceptions, including one for "bona fide research." Silverman sued ADES, arguing that her journalistic activities qualified as "bona fide research."The Superior Court in Maricopa County ruled in favor of Silverman, finding that her journalistic activities qualified as "bona fide research" and ordered ADES to produce the requested documents after redacting personally identifying information. ADES appealed this decision, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case back to the Superior Court. The Court of Appeals concluded that "research" under the exception must be conducted for "educational, administrative, or scientific purposes" and that ADES still has discretion whether to disclose APS records.Both parties were dissatisfied with the Court of Appeals' decision and filed petitions for review with the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona. The Supreme Court concluded that "bona fide research" under the relevant statute occurs when the researcher engages in a good faith and genuine study to acquire more knowledge, discover new facts, or test new ideas concerning reporting or stopping the abuse, exploitation, or neglect of vulnerable adults. The court also held that anyone, including journalists, can qualify under the bona fide research exception. However, the court found that ADES has discretion whether, and on what conditions, to release APS records for bona fide research. The court vacated the Court of Appeals' opinion, affirmed the Superior Court's judgment insofar as it denied ADES's motion to dismiss, but reversed the judgment for Silverman and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "SILVERMAN v ADES" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Manuel Perez-Gutierrez, who was convicted on eight counts of sexual conduct with a minor. The trial court sentenced Perez-Gutierrez to two twenty-year terms of imprisonment for the first two counts and one-year sentences for the remaining six counts, all to be served consecutively. The court had discretion to impose the remaining sentences consecutively or concurrently but failed to state on record the reason for its determination, as required by A.R.S. § 13-711(A). Perez-Gutierrez appealed this omission.The Court of Appeals agreed with Perez-Gutierrez and remanded the case, instructing the trial court to record the reasons for its sentencing determination. The court of appeals' decision was based on the precedent set in cases like State v. Anzivino and State v. Harrison, which established a limited-remand practice for such violations. However, a dissenting judge argued that the violation should be reviewed for fundamental error, not requiring a remand.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona held that a violation of A.R.S. § 13-711(A) is neither a structural error nor a trial error. Instead, it is akin to an administrative error that a trial court can correct without affecting the disposition. Therefore, the court concluded that a remand for the limited purpose of statutory compliance is appropriate. The court also clarified that the remedy for such a violation does not require resentencing but merely a statement on record explaining the sentencing determination. The court vacated the Court of Appeals' opinion and remanded the case with instructions to suspend the appeal and revest jurisdiction in the trial court to comply with § 13-711(A). View "State v. Perez-Gutierrez" on Justia Law