Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case involving the construction of Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4(i), the Supreme Court held that, under Rule 4(i), if a plaintiff shows good cause for failing to serve a defendant within ninety days, a court is required to extend the time for service, but also under the rule, a court in its discretion may extend the period for service without a plaintiff showing good cause.Melissa Langevin filed a complaint against Dr. Steven Sholem. More than ten months after the ninety-day deadline had expired, Langevin filed a motion pursuant to Rule 4(i) seeking to extend the time for service. The trial court determined there was good cause to grant the motion and extended the deadline. After Langevin served Sholem he moved to dismiss, arguing that the complaint did not show good cause for extending the deadline. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no good cause for an extension under rule 4(i), but there were discretionary grounds in the record to deny Sholem's motion to dismiss. View "Sholem v. Honorable David Gass" on Justia Law

In this termination of parental rights case the Supreme Court held that when a juvenile court finds a parent unfit for neglecting or willfully abusing a child the court may also find the parent unfit as to that parent's non-abused children but must first determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence of a risk of harm to the children.After then six-week-old J.M. was diagnosed with a large subdural hemorrhage on her brain the juvenile court terminated Mother's rights to J.M., F.M., and M.R., and terminated Father's rights to J.M. and F.M. The court found that J.M.'s injuries were the result of willful abuse and that both parents demonstrated their lack of protective capacities for all the children. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that when a juvenile court determines whether to terminate parental rights to non-abused children, the risk of harm to such children should be considered under a totality of the circumstances analysis during the best-interests inquiry. The Supreme Court affirmed the severance order but vacated the court of appeals' opinion in part, holding that a juvenile court's extrapolation of parental unfitness will not pass constitutional muster unless the risk of harm to non-abused children is proven by clear and convincing evidence. View "Sandra R. v. Department of Child Safety" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for first degree murder and assisting a criminal street gang and his sentence of death, holding that there was not prejudicial error in the proceedings below.(1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to change lead counsel; (2) Defendant failed to show that he was prejudiced by the trial court's failure to question jurors on questionnaire answers sua sponte; (3) any error in the admission of certain evidence was harmless; (4) Defendant did not suffer any prejudice by the trial court's instructions to the jury; (5) Defendant provided no valid arguments challenging the constitutional sufficiency regarding Arizona's (F)(6) aggravator or the constitutional applicability of the aggravator by a jury, rather than a judge; (6) the prosecutor's recitation of the guilt-phase accomplice liability instruction in the aggravation phase did not constitute error; and (7) any other errors in the trial court proceedings did not prejudice Defendant. View "State v. Riley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court enjoining the application of Arizona statutes authorizing the recording of liens against third-party tortfeasors to allow hospitals to recover health care costs for Medicaid patients beyond the amounts provided by Medicaid, holding that the statues are preempted to the extent hospitals utilize them against third-party tortfeasors for "balance billing" to recover costs beyond Medicaid reimbursement.Plaintiffs were patients who were treated at defendant hospitals under the state's contract provider for the federal Medicaid program, which negotiates reimbursement rates with hospitals. Defendants recorded liens against the third-party tortfeasors who caused the patients' injuries in order to recover the remainder of their fees exceeding Medicaid reimbursement. Plaintiff brought this class action challenging the liens, arguing that Ariz. Rev. Stat. 33-931(A) and 36-2903.01(G)(4) (the lien statutes) were preempted by federal Medicaid law. The trial court enjoined application of the lien statutes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs had a private right of action to challenge the lien statutes; and (2) the lien statutes are unconstitutional as applied. View "Ansley v. Banner Health Network" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a certified question by holding that a sentence imposing "life without possibility of parole for twenty-five years" means the convicted defendant is eligible for parole after serving twenty-five years' imprisonment despite Ariz. Rev. Stat. 41-1604.09's prohibition of parole for persons convicted of offenses occurring on or after January 1, 1994 and that a court lacks jurisdiction to correct and illegally lenient sentence absent timely correction or appeal.Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder committed in 1995. The trial court sentenced Defendant to "life without possibility of parole for 25 years." After serving twenty-four years of his sentence, Defendant sued the Arizona Department of Corrections under 42 U.S.C. 1983 asserting his entitlement to parole eligibility. The State sought a determination as to whether Defendant's sentence entitled him to parole eligibility. The district court issued a certification order. The Supreme Court held (1) regardless of section 41-1604.09, Defendant was eligible for parole after serving twenty-five years pursuant to his sentence because the sentencing hearing and order manifested the trial court's intent for Defendant to be parole eligible; and (2) Defendant's illegally lenient sentence was final under Arizona law. View "Chaparro v. Shinn" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions but vacated his sentences and remanded for resentencing, holding that convictions for possession of drugs for sale, whether completed or inchoate, are not disqualifying convictions for purposes of determining eligibility for mandatory probation and drug treatment under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-901.01 and that the statute applies equally to qualifying inchoate and completed drug offenses.In 2017, Defendant was convicted of two counts of possession of a narcotic drug and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant argued that he should be sentenced to probation under section 13.901.01 because his 2006 conviction for solicitation to sell a narcotic drug did not qualify as a personal possession or use offense under section 13.901.01. Therefore, Defendant argued, his 2017 drug convictions did not count as a third personal possession or use conviction. The trial court ruled that Defendant's 2006 conviction was a strike, and therefore, Defendant was not eligible for mandatory probation. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's sentences, holding that Defendant's conviction for solicitation to sell a narcotics drug was not a strike. View "State v. Green" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the superior court denying a tribal entity's motion to dismiss a tort action against it, holding that the tribal entity did not prove it was a subordinate economic organization entitled to share the Indian tribe's sovereign immunity.Sara Fox was seriously injured while rafting on the Colorado River through the Grand Canyon. Fox suffered her injuries on Arizona state land. The rafting boat was operated by Grand Canyon Resort Corporation (GCRC), a tribal corporation whose sole shareholder was a federal recognized Indian tribe, the Hualapai Indian Tribe. Fox and her husband filed suit against GCRC and the Tribe. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction because Defendants possessed sovereign immunity from suit. The trial court dismissed the complaint against the Tribe but declined to dismiss the complaint against GCRC, finding it was not protected by sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that GCRC failed to carry its burden to show it was a subordinate economic organization of the Tribe so that a denial of immunity would "appreciably impair" the Tribe's "economic development, cultural autonomy, or self-governance." View "Hwal'Bay Ba: J Enterprises, Inc. v. Honorable Jantzen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals dismissing Richard Allen Reed's appeal from a criminal restitution order, holding that the legislature lacked authority to require the court to dismiss a pending appeal upon a convicted defendant's death but possessed authority to prohibit abatement of the defendant's conviction and sentence.Reed was convicted of voyeurism and required to pay $17,949.50 as restitution to the victim. Reed appealed, challenging the restitution amount. Reed appealed, but pending a decision, Reed died. Reed's wife moved to intervene or substitute as a party in the appeal. The court of appeals denied the motion because the wife did not cite authority permitting intervention or substitution in a criminal case. The court then dismissed the appeal pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-106(A). The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' opinion and remanded the case to the court of appeals, holding (1) the legislature lacked authority to require the court to dismiss a pending appeal upon a convicted defendant's death under section 13-106(A); but (2) the legislature possessed authority to prohibit abatement of that defendant's conviction and sentence under section 13-106(B). View "State v. Reed" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the family court directing the donation of cryopreserved embryos to another couple following the parties' divorce, holding that the parties' agreement directing the disposition of the embryos did not grant the family court discretion in awarding the embryos but, rather, directed donation of the embryos.After Husband petitioned for divorce he asked that the couple's seven viable cryogenically preserved embryos be donated to another couple. The family court found that the "Embryo Cryopreservation & Embryo Disposition" agreement entered into by the parties did not resolve whether either party should get the embryos or whether they should be donated. The court balanced the parties' interests and concluded that Husband's right not to be compelled to be a parent outweighed Wife's right to procreate and directed that the embryos be donated to another couple. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding that the agreement required donation of the embryos and did not grant the family court discretion to make either a unilateral award or direct donation. View "Terrell v. Torres" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the owners of Brush & Nib Studios, LC (together with Brush & Nib, "Plaintiffs") have the right to refuse to create custom wedding invitations celebrating same-sex wedding ceremonies in violation of their sincerely held religious beliefs under article 2, section 6 of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona's Free Exercise of Religion Act (FERA), Ariz. Rev. Stat. 41-1493.01.At issue was whether the City of Phoenix could apply its Human Relations Ordinance Plaintiffs to create custom artwork for same-sex weddings. The trial court granted summary judgment for the City, concluding that the Ordinance did not violate Plaintiffs' rights to free speech or free exercise of religion under FERA. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' opinion and reversed the trial court's rulings, holding that the Ordinance, as applied to Plaintiffs' custom wedding invitations, and the creation of those invitations, unconstitutionally compels speech in violation of the Arizona Constitution's free speech clause and substantially burdens Plaintiffs' free exercise of religion under FERA. View "Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix" on Justia Law