Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that a jury in a medical malpractice case may not be left to "infer" causation without the guidance of expert testimony where the cause of death is disputed and not obvious to an ordinary person.Plaintiff brought a wrongful death actin against several healthcare defendants, including the Surgery Center of Peoria and Dr. Guido, after her four-year-old son died following a routine tonsillectomy and adenoidectomy. As required by Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-2603, Plaintiff identified Dr. Greenberg as her expert witness to establish cause of death, proximate cause, and standard of care. After trial, the court granted partial summary judgment for the Surgery Center and Dr. Guido, finding that Dr. Greenberg's testimony failed to state a causal connection between the Surgery Center's actions and omissions and the child's death. The court later entered final judgment against Plaintiff. The court of appeals reversed as to the Surgery Center, concluding that the jury could properly infer proximate cause under the facts presented. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding (1) in this case, expert testimony establishing causation was essential; and (2) the trial court did not err by granting partial summary judgment. View "Sampson v. Surgery Center of Peoria, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the superior court dismissing Father's paternity action, holding that an untimely filed paternity action is barred as a matter of law.Shortly after Child was born, Mother served Father with notice of her intention to place the child for adoption pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 8-106(G). Father's attorney accepted service. Sixteen days after the applicable deadline, Father filed a paternity action. The trial court dismissed the action. Father appealed, asserting that he was entitled to equitable relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the principles of equity did not apply to provide Father relief from the statutory requirement that he timely file and serve Mother with his paternity action. View "Cox v. Honorable Ponce" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Ariz. R. Crim. P. 7.2(c), which addresses a defendant's right to release after a conviction but before the defendant is sentenced, applies to a release determination required under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 27.7(c) when a probationer is arrested on a warrant pursuant to a petition to revoke probation.In 2006, Defendant was convicted of transportation of marijuana for sale. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on probation. California then assumed supervision of Defendant. In 2009, Defendant was charged in California for felonies, and Arizona filed a petition to revoke probation. In 2018, a California court convicted Defendant of two counts of armed robbery. The California court sentenced Defendant to time served and granted him parole. In 2019, Defendant returned to Arizona for his probation revocation arraignment and denied the allegations in the petition to revoke. The court ordered that Defendant be held without bail pursuant to Rule 7.2(c) pending the disposition of the petition. Defendant petitioned for special action review, arguing that Rule 7.2(c) does not apply to a release determination under Rule 27.7(c). The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that Rule 7.2(c)(1)(A) applies to determining release conditions for a probationer pending a revocation proceeding under Rule 27.7(c). View "Wilson v. Honorable Higgins" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of resisting arrest, holding that neither federal or Arizona Batson jurisprudence requires a trial court to expressly address a demeanor-based justification when two race-neutral reasons are offered, the non-demeanor-based justification is explicitly deemed credible, and there is no finding that the demeanor-based justification is pretextual.On appeal, Defendant argued that the prosecutor's disparate treatment of jurors and failure to conduct voir dire on the issue of prior jury service demonstrated that the prosecutor had discriminatory intent during jury selection. The court of appeals remanded the case on the grounds that the trial court did not expressly determine whether the proffered justifications were not only race-neutral but also credible. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' opinion and affirmed the trial court's denial of Defendant's Batson challenge, holding that the trial court satisfied its obligations under federal and Arizona Batson jurisprudence. View "State v. Porter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss this lawsuit brought by Plaintiff, an electric representative in the Arizona House of Representatives, alleging that Defendant, the Speaker of the House, defamed him in an investigatory report and a news release, holding that Defendant was immune for allegedly defaming Plaintiff in the investigatory report but was not immune for allegedly defaming Defendant in the news release.Plaintiff was expelled by the Arizona House of Representatives as an elected representative for misconduct. Plaintiff initiated sued Defendant, alleging defamation and conspiracy defamation. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss as it concerned the issuance of a news release but reversed the ruling denying the motion as it concerned Defendant's alleged modification and release of an investigatory report, holding (1) Defendant performed a legislative function when he modified the report and released it to House members and the public and therefore was absolutely immune from liability based on these actions; and (2) issuing news releases is not generally a legislative function protected by legislative immunity. View "Mesnard v. Honorable Theodore Campagnolo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court granting Rasean Clayton's application for a temporary and permanent injunction enjoining Kanye West and his presidential electors from appearing on the general election ballot for president in 2020, holding that West did not present the Secretary of State with the requisite number of qualified electors for placement on the ballot.The Supreme Court concluded that the presidential electors had failed to file the statement of interest required by Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-341(I) and that, therefore, the nomination petition signatures submitted on their behalf were invalid, making West unable to qualify for the ballot. Given the dispositive effect of the failure of West's electors' to qualify for the ballot, the Supreme Court did not address his other arguments. View "Clayton v. West" on Justia Law

In this issue concerning whether Defendant was precluded from seeking collateral review of a matter he could have raised during his direct appeal the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court denying Defendant's petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), holding that Lynch v. Arizona (Lynch II), 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016), was not a significant change in the law for purposes of permitting relief pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(g).In 2005, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. After the Supreme Court decided Lynch II, which held that this Court misapplied Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994), Defendant filed his present PCR petition. The PCR court denied the petition, concluding that Lynch II did not amount to a significant change in the law permitting relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Lynch II was not a significant change in the law, and therefore, Defendant was not entitled to relief under Rule 32.1(g). View "State v. Cruz" on Justia Law

In this matter concerning vicarious disqualification of a prosecutor's office, the Supreme Court held that a trial court has broad discretion to vicariously disqualify a prosecutor's office based on an appearance of impropriety.Darren Goldin was indicted for first-degree murder. Goldin sought to disqualify the entire Tuscon branch of the Attorney General's office based on ethical violations committed by Richard Wintory, the assistant attorney general. Wintory was removed from the case. Goldin accepted a plea agreement, the plea was revoked, and charges were reinstated after Goldin prevailed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Upon his return to the trial court, Golden again attempted to vicariously disqualify the Tuscon office. The superior court granted the motion based on the appearance of impropriety and the importance of Defendant's constitutional right to counsel. The court of appeals overturned the superior court's disqualification order. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' opinion, holding that, where actual misconduct may have tainted the proceeding, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying the Tucson office. View "State v. Honorable Goldin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the trial court declining to exercise its discretion to deny a sexually violent person (SVP) screening when the State requested one under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-4518(A), holding that remand was required for the trial court to decide whether a screening should occur.Defendant was charged with one count of sexual conduct with a minor. Thereafter, the trial court found Defendant not competent and not restorable. The State requested an SVP screening, arguing that the procedure was warranted under the circumstances. The trial court ordered the screening, concluding that the State was entitled to a screening because the State made a prima facie showing that section 13-4518(A)'s requirements were met. The Supreme Court vacated the order, holding (1) under section 13-4518, trial courts have discretion to deny the State's SVP screening request; and (2) the trial court in this case erred by not exercising that discretion. View "Garcia v. Honorable Butler" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals vacating Defendant's conviction and sentences and remanding for a new trial, holding that the trial court did not adequately confirm that Defendant waived his right to conflict-free counsel.Defendant and his co-defendant were charged with conspiracy, possession and transportation of marijuana for sale, and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. At Defendant's arraignment, the prosecutor noted his concern about one attorney representing both codefendants were they were competing defenses. Defense counsel dismissed the concerns because the codefendants had signed a waiver of potential conflict after being advised of their rights. The jury ultimately convicted both defendants on all counts. The Supreme Court vacated the convictions, holding that the joint representation presented an actual conflict that violated Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free representation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive the right to conflict-free counsel. View "State v. Duffy" on Justia Law