Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this issue concerning whether Defendant was precluded from seeking collateral review of a matter he could have raised during his direct appeal the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court denying Defendant's petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), holding that Lynch v. Arizona (Lynch II), 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016), was not a significant change in the law for purposes of permitting relief pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(g).In 2005, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. After the Supreme Court decided Lynch II, which held that this Court misapplied Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994), Defendant filed his present PCR petition. The PCR court denied the petition, concluding that Lynch II did not amount to a significant change in the law permitting relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Lynch II was not a significant change in the law, and therefore, Defendant was not entitled to relief under Rule 32.1(g). View "State v. Cruz" on Justia Law

In this matter concerning vicarious disqualification of a prosecutor's office, the Supreme Court held that a trial court has broad discretion to vicariously disqualify a prosecutor's office based on an appearance of impropriety.Darren Goldin was indicted for first-degree murder. Goldin sought to disqualify the entire Tuscon branch of the Attorney General's office based on ethical violations committed by Richard Wintory, the assistant attorney general. Wintory was removed from the case. Goldin accepted a plea agreement, the plea was revoked, and charges were reinstated after Goldin prevailed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Upon his return to the trial court, Golden again attempted to vicariously disqualify the Tuscon office. The superior court granted the motion based on the appearance of impropriety and the importance of Defendant's constitutional right to counsel. The court of appeals overturned the superior court's disqualification order. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' opinion, holding that, where actual misconduct may have tainted the proceeding, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying the Tucson office. View "State v. Honorable Goldin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the trial court declining to exercise its discretion to deny a sexually violent person (SVP) screening when the State requested one under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-4518(A), holding that remand was required for the trial court to decide whether a screening should occur.Defendant was charged with one count of sexual conduct with a minor. Thereafter, the trial court found Defendant not competent and not restorable. The State requested an SVP screening, arguing that the procedure was warranted under the circumstances. The trial court ordered the screening, concluding that the State was entitled to a screening because the State made a prima facie showing that section 13-4518(A)'s requirements were met. The Supreme Court vacated the order, holding (1) under section 13-4518, trial courts have discretion to deny the State's SVP screening request; and (2) the trial court in this case erred by not exercising that discretion. View "Garcia v. Honorable Butler" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals vacating Defendant's conviction and sentences and remanding for a new trial, holding that the trial court did not adequately confirm that Defendant waived his right to conflict-free counsel.Defendant and his co-defendant were charged with conspiracy, possession and transportation of marijuana for sale, and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. At Defendant's arraignment, the prosecutor noted his concern about one attorney representing both codefendants were they were competing defenses. Defense counsel dismissed the concerns because the codefendants had signed a waiver of potential conflict after being advised of their rights. The jury ultimately convicted both defendants on all counts. The Supreme Court vacated the convictions, holding that the joint representation presented an actual conflict that violated Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free representation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive the right to conflict-free counsel. View "State v. Duffy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the post-conviction court granting Defendant post-conviction relief (PCR) on the ground that counsel's ineffectiveness challenged Defendant, holding that Defendant's lawyers were not deficient by failing to challenge a challenged jury instruction.Defendant was convicted of five counts of first-degree murder and other charges. The jury returned death sentence verdicts on each murder count. Defendant later brought his petition for PCR, claiming that his counsel were constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to the Revised Arizona Jury Instruction's (RAJI) definition of "significantly impaired." The post-conviction court concluded that the RAJI had misstated the law by using the word "prevented" and that both trial and appellate counsel were constitutionally ineffective for failing to challenge the instruction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that even if Defendant's counsel were deficient for failing to challenge the RAJI, Defendant's defense was not prejudiced. View "State v. Miller" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Ariz. Rev. Stat. 28-672(G), which limits the amount of restitution that can be awarded to a victim for an unconstitutional limitation on the right to receive restitution or a valid legislative enactment, is unconstitutional and void.The Victims' Bill of Rights (VBR), Ariz. Const. art. II, 2.1, guarantees a victim's right to receive prompt restitution for loss or injury caused by a defendant's criminal conduct and authorizes the legislature to enact laws to define, implement, preserve and protect victims' rights. At issue was whether section 28-672(G), which limits the restitution that can be awarded to a victim for loss resulting from a violation of specified traffic offenses, was unconstitutional, either as a limitation on the right to receive restitution or a valid legislative enactment. The Supreme Court held (1) the constitutional right under the VBR to receive restitution is a right to receive the full amount of economic loss or injury caused by a defendant's criminal conduct; and (2) therefore, section 28-672(G)'s limitation on a restitution award is an unconstitutional limitation on the right to receive prompt restitution, as guaranteed by the VBR. View "State v. Patel" on Justia Law

In this special action challenging the trial court's ruling that Defendant's due process rights required disclosure of the victim's privileged records for in-camera review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in ordering in-camera review.Defendant was charged with second-degree murder for killing M.S., his girlfriend. Before trial, Defendant moved to compel Magellan Hospital to disclose for in-camera review M.S.'s privileged mental health records. The trial court ruled that Defendant's due process rights required dislosure of the privileged records for in-camera review. M.S.'s siblings filed a special action under Arizona's Victims' Bill of Rights challenging the ruling. The court of appeals granted relief, concluding that there was not a substantial probability that the records contained information critical to Defendant's justification defense. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' opinion and affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that a record of M.S.'s purported mental illness would be material to Defendant's justification defense. View "R.S. v. Honorable Peter A. Thompson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-204.01 cannot apply to require a city to consolidate local elections with state and national elections if the city's charter provides otherwise.Section 16-204.01 requires political subdivisions to consolidate local elections with state and national elections when voter turnout for local elections significantly decreases. At issue in this case was whether the home rule charter provision barred application of section 16-204.01 to the City of Tuscon, whose charter required electing local officials on non-statewide election dates. The Supreme Court held that section 16-204.01 was unconstitutional as applied to the City charter and therefore could not preempt the City's election-scheduling provision. View "State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Tucson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court disqualifying the "Stop Surprise Billing and Protect Patients Act" ballot initiative (the Initiative) from the November 2020 general election ballot, holding that there were an insufficient number of signatures to qualify for the ballot.On appeal, Appellant argued that signatures gathered by registered circulators may not be disqualified pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 19-118(E) if the circulators "de-registered" pursuant to the provisions of the Arizona Secretary of State 2019 Election Procedures Manual (2019 EPM) before the signatures are challenged and that subpoenas were not properly served on the circulators. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) by de-registering pursuant to the provisions of the 2019 EPM a registered petition circulator may not evade the statutory requirement in section 19-118(E) that registered circulators subpoenaed in an election challenge appear for trial; and (2) the subpoenas were properly served on the circulators. View "Leach v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the decisions of the court of appeals affirming Defendants' convictions of aggravated assault, holding that the prosecutor's misstatement of the reasonable-doubt standard during a rebuttal argument constituted fundamental error and was prejudicial.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the prosecutor’s material misstatement of the reasonable-doubt standard was both fundamental error and prejudicial error because it went to the foundation of the case and deprived Defendants of an "essential right" necessary to rebut the State's case; and (2) neither the jury instructions nor the presumption that the jury followed the court's instructions cured the prejudice. View "State v. Murray" on Justia Law