Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held in this case that a crime victim has a constitutional and statutory right to be heard on the merits of a defendant's motion for a delayed appeal of a restitution order.Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. Beth Fay was a victim of Defendant's crime under Arizona law. Defendant and Fay entered into an agreement regarding restitution, and the trial court entered a restitution award according to the agreement. Eight months later, Defendant filed a limited petition for post-conviction relief to contest the award pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(f). Fay filed a response, arguing that Defendant was not entitled to a delayed appeal. The trial court struck Fay's response on the ground that Fay lacked standing to be heard on Defendant's limited petition. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Fay had a right to be heard on the question of whether Defendant was entitled to file a delayed appeal. View "Fay v. Honorable Fox" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Arizona's open-meeting and conflict-of-interest laws broadly confer standing based upon a claimant's interest in preserving the values of transparency and accountability that the laws enshrine, not because of a claimant's equitable ownership of tax revenues.The laws at issue in this case grant people affected by either an alleged violation or a public agency's decision standing to enforce their respective requirements. The open-meeting law also provides that legal action taken in violation of the law is null and void unless the public body later takes the proper steps to "ratify" that action. Before the Supreme Court was private claimants' standing to challenge alleged violations of Arizona's public accountability laws and the effect statutory ratification has on a private claimant's open-meeting claim. The Supreme Court vacated the portions of the court of appeals' opinion analyzing the laws' enforcement provisions through the lens of taxpayer standing, holding (1) Ariz. Rev. Stat. 38-431.07(A), and -506(B) grant standing to all who fall within the broader "zone of interests" protected by Arizona's public accountability laws; and (2) ratification under section 38-431.05(B) does not act as a complete cure to an open-meeting violation but merely negates the original action's default nullification. View "Welch v. Cochise Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a hospital may not directly recover from a third party the costs of uncompensated medical care provided to patients whose need for treatment the third party allegedly caused because the exclusive right for a hospital to recover from a third-party tortfeasor is through the medical lien statutes.Tuscon Medical Center (TMC) brought this action against CVS Health Corporation and other CVS entities (collectively, CVS) alleging that CVS failed to exercise due care in dispensing opioids into Arizona communities. CVS filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Arizona's medical lien statutes precluded all of TMC's claims against it. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling denying CVS's motion to dismiss TMC's negligence claims, holding (1) TMC was barred from pursing a negligence claim against CVS to recover indirect damages and was limited to suing the patient or perfecting and collecting on a statutory lien; and (2) CVS did not owe a duty to TMC under the facts alleged. View "CVS Pharmacy, Inc. v. Honorable Bostwick" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted a question certified to it by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and answered that Arizona has not consented to damages liability for a state agency's violation of the minimum wage or overtime provisions of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 206-207.Plaintiff brought this putative claims action complaint asserting that the State violated the FLSA by failing to pay minimum wage and overtime compensation to state-employed in-home caretakers who, like herself, provide around the clock care to beneficiaries of the Arizona Long-Term Care System. The State removed the case to federal district court. The court granted the State's motion to dismiss, thus rejecting Plaintiff's contentions that the State waived its sovereign immunity by removing the case to the federal court and that the State waived its sovereign immunity as a matter of law. The Ninth Circuit then certified its question to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered that the legislature has neither expressly consented nor implied its consent to federal damages liability, and therefore, Arizona has not consented to damages liability for a state agency's violation of the FLSA's minimum wage or overtime provisions. View "Redgrave v. Ducey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the direct funding provision of Proposition 208 did not fall within the constitutional definition of grants in Ariz. Const. art. IX, 21 (the Education Expenditure Clause) and was therefore unconstitutional to the extent it mandated expanding tax revenues in violation of the Education Expenditure Clause.Proposition 208 was a citizens' initiative passed in 2020 imposing an income tax purchase on high-income Arizona taxpayers to provide direct funding to schools. Petitioners brought this action challenging the constitutionality of the tax and the initiative's characterization of the direct funding as "grants" exempt from the Education Expenditure Clause and seeking to enjoin the collection of that tax pending the resolution of their challenge. The Supreme Court held (1) because Ariz. Rev. Stat. 15-1285 incorrectly characterizes the allocated monies in order to exempt Proposition 208 from the Education Expenditure Clause, it is facially unconstitutional; (2) the remaining non-revenue related provisions of Proposition 208 are not severable; (3) this Court declines to enjoin the imposition of the tax pending further proceedings; and (4) Proposition 208 does not violate the Tax Enactment Clause of the Arizona Constitution, and therefore, the bicameralism, presentment, and supermajority requirements found therein are inapplicable. View "Fann v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the trial court denying a motion to compel arbitration, holding that a fee agreement between a client and her attorney, especially where the attorney agrees to advance the costs of arbitration, is relevant to determining a plaintiff's ability to arbitrate her claims.Plaintiff signed two contracts with Defendants when arranging for her mother, Concetta Rizzio, to live at a nursing care facility. Each contract included an arbitration clause with a cost-shifting provision (the agreement) stating that Rizzio would be responsible for all costs of arbitration if she made a claim against the nursing home. When a fellow resident attacked Rizzio, Plaintiff brought this action alleging negligence and abuse of a vulnerable adult. The trial court denied Defendants' motion to compel arbitration, finding that the agreement was unduly oppressive, unenforceable, and unconscionable. The court of appeals reversed as to the issue of procedural unconscionability but agreed that the cost-shifting provision was substantively unconscionable. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the agreement was not substantively unconscionable and that it was enforceable. View "Rizzio v. Surpass Senior Living LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court summarily denying relief as to Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief and affirmed the trial court's ruling dismissing Petitioner's PCR petition, holding that Petitioner's claims did not warrant relief.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) a defendant need not present a standard of care expert affidavit to support his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Petitioner failed to present colorable IAC claims; (2) Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228 (2012), did not cause a significant change in Arizona law; and (3) Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-4234(G) unconstitutionally conflicts with the procedure established by the Supreme Court in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4. View "State v. Bigger" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Deer Valley Unified School District on Plaintiff's negligence claims based on the off-campus murder of her daughter, a student at Sandra Day O'Connor High School, by a fellow student, holding that the school did not owe Plaintiff's daughter a duty of care.The court of appeals reversed the summary judgment as to the school district, concluding that the district and its agents owed Plaintiff's daughter a duty based on the special relationship between a school and its students and that a material fact existed precluding summary judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals and affirmed summary judgment for the school district, holding that the district did not owe a duty to Plaintiff's daughter based on the school-student relationship. View "Dinsmoor v. City of Phoenix" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Specialty Companies Group, LLC's claims under an alter ego theory against Meritage Homes of Arizona were time-barred under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-548(A)(1)'s six-year limitation period for claims founded on or evidenced by a written contract.Maricopa Lakes, LLC hired G&K South Forty Development to serve as project manager on a real estate development project. G&K hired Specialty to assist with the project. Specialty later sued G&K to collect unpaid invoices. G&K filed a third-party complaint against Maricopa Lakes, was awarded a default judgment, and assigned to Specialty its claims against Maricopa Lakes. Specialty subsequently sued Meritage, which formed Maricopa Lakes, under an alter ego theory. The trial court granted summary judgment to Meritage, ruling that Specialty's claims were time-barred. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the alter ego claim was an action on a judgment governed by a five-year statute of limitations that began to run when the judgment was final. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the statute of limitations for alter ego actions is determined by reference to the cause of action from which the alter ego claim derives; and (2) Specialty was bound by the six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract. View "Specialty Companies Group, LLC v. Meritage Homes of Arizona, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a jury in a medical malpractice case may not be left to "infer" causation without the guidance of expert testimony where the cause of death is disputed and not obvious to an ordinary person.Plaintiff brought a wrongful death actin against several healthcare defendants, including the Surgery Center of Peoria and Dr. Guido, after her four-year-old son died following a routine tonsillectomy and adenoidectomy. As required by Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-2603, Plaintiff identified Dr. Greenberg as her expert witness to establish cause of death, proximate cause, and standard of care. After trial, the court granted partial summary judgment for the Surgery Center and Dr. Guido, finding that Dr. Greenberg's testimony failed to state a causal connection between the Surgery Center's actions and omissions and the child's death. The court later entered final judgment against Plaintiff. The court of appeals reversed as to the Surgery Center, concluding that the jury could properly infer proximate cause under the facts presented. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding (1) in this case, expert testimony establishing causation was essential; and (2) the trial court did not err by granting partial summary judgment. View "Sampson v. Surgery Center of Peoria, LLC" on Justia Law