Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the trial court denying a motion to compel arbitration, holding that a fee agreement between a client and her attorney, especially where the attorney agrees to advance the costs of arbitration, is relevant to determining a plaintiff's ability to arbitrate her claims.Plaintiff signed two contracts with Defendants when arranging for her mother, Concetta Rizzio, to live at a nursing care facility. Each contract included an arbitration clause with a cost-shifting provision (the agreement) stating that Rizzio would be responsible for all costs of arbitration if she made a claim against the nursing home. When a fellow resident attacked Rizzio, Plaintiff brought this action alleging negligence and abuse of a vulnerable adult. The trial court denied Defendants' motion to compel arbitration, finding that the agreement was unduly oppressive, unenforceable, and unconscionable. The court of appeals reversed as to the issue of procedural unconscionability but agreed that the cost-shifting provision was substantively unconscionable. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the agreement was not substantively unconscionable and that it was enforceable. View "Rizzio v. Surpass Senior Living LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court summarily denying relief as to Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief and affirmed the trial court's ruling dismissing Petitioner's PCR petition, holding that Petitioner's claims did not warrant relief.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) a defendant need not present a standard of care expert affidavit to support his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Petitioner failed to present colorable IAC claims; (2) Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228 (2012), did not cause a significant change in Arizona law; and (3) Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-4234(G) unconstitutionally conflicts with the procedure established by the Supreme Court in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4. View "State v. Bigger" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Deer Valley Unified School District on Plaintiff's negligence claims based on the off-campus murder of her daughter, a student at Sandra Day O'Connor High School, by a fellow student, holding that the school did not owe Plaintiff's daughter a duty of care.The court of appeals reversed the summary judgment as to the school district, concluding that the district and its agents owed Plaintiff's daughter a duty based on the special relationship between a school and its students and that a material fact existed precluding summary judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals and affirmed summary judgment for the school district, holding that the district did not owe a duty to Plaintiff's daughter based on the school-student relationship. View "Dinsmoor v. City of Phoenix" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Specialty Companies Group, LLC's claims under an alter ego theory against Meritage Homes of Arizona were time-barred under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-548(A)(1)'s six-year limitation period for claims founded on or evidenced by a written contract.Maricopa Lakes, LLC hired G&K South Forty Development to serve as project manager on a real estate development project. G&K hired Specialty to assist with the project. Specialty later sued G&K to collect unpaid invoices. G&K filed a third-party complaint against Maricopa Lakes, was awarded a default judgment, and assigned to Specialty its claims against Maricopa Lakes. Specialty subsequently sued Meritage, which formed Maricopa Lakes, under an alter ego theory. The trial court granted summary judgment to Meritage, ruling that Specialty's claims were time-barred. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the alter ego claim was an action on a judgment governed by a five-year statute of limitations that began to run when the judgment was final. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the statute of limitations for alter ego actions is determined by reference to the cause of action from which the alter ego claim derives; and (2) Specialty was bound by the six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract. View "Specialty Companies Group, LLC v. Meritage Homes of Arizona, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a jury in a medical malpractice case may not be left to "infer" causation without the guidance of expert testimony where the cause of death is disputed and not obvious to an ordinary person.Plaintiff brought a wrongful death actin against several healthcare defendants, including the Surgery Center of Peoria and Dr. Guido, after her four-year-old son died following a routine tonsillectomy and adenoidectomy. As required by Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-2603, Plaintiff identified Dr. Greenberg as her expert witness to establish cause of death, proximate cause, and standard of care. After trial, the court granted partial summary judgment for the Surgery Center and Dr. Guido, finding that Dr. Greenberg's testimony failed to state a causal connection between the Surgery Center's actions and omissions and the child's death. The court later entered final judgment against Plaintiff. The court of appeals reversed as to the Surgery Center, concluding that the jury could properly infer proximate cause under the facts presented. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding (1) in this case, expert testimony establishing causation was essential; and (2) the trial court did not err by granting partial summary judgment. View "Sampson v. Surgery Center of Peoria, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the superior court dismissing Father's paternity action, holding that an untimely filed paternity action is barred as a matter of law.Shortly after Child was born, Mother served Father with notice of her intention to place the child for adoption pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 8-106(G). Father's attorney accepted service. Sixteen days after the applicable deadline, Father filed a paternity action. The trial court dismissed the action. Father appealed, asserting that he was entitled to equitable relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the principles of equity did not apply to provide Father relief from the statutory requirement that he timely file and serve Mother with his paternity action. View "Cox v. Honorable Ponce" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Ariz. R. Crim. P. 7.2(c), which addresses a defendant's right to release after a conviction but before the defendant is sentenced, applies to a release determination required under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 27.7(c) when a probationer is arrested on a warrant pursuant to a petition to revoke probation.In 2006, Defendant was convicted of transportation of marijuana for sale. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on probation. California then assumed supervision of Defendant. In 2009, Defendant was charged in California for felonies, and Arizona filed a petition to revoke probation. In 2018, a California court convicted Defendant of two counts of armed robbery. The California court sentenced Defendant to time served and granted him parole. In 2019, Defendant returned to Arizona for his probation revocation arraignment and denied the allegations in the petition to revoke. The court ordered that Defendant be held without bail pursuant to Rule 7.2(c) pending the disposition of the petition. Defendant petitioned for special action review, arguing that Rule 7.2(c) does not apply to a release determination under Rule 27.7(c). The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that Rule 7.2(c)(1)(A) applies to determining release conditions for a probationer pending a revocation proceeding under Rule 27.7(c). View "Wilson v. Honorable Higgins" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of resisting arrest, holding that neither federal or Arizona Batson jurisprudence requires a trial court to expressly address a demeanor-based justification when two race-neutral reasons are offered, the non-demeanor-based justification is explicitly deemed credible, and there is no finding that the demeanor-based justification is pretextual.On appeal, Defendant argued that the prosecutor's disparate treatment of jurors and failure to conduct voir dire on the issue of prior jury service demonstrated that the prosecutor had discriminatory intent during jury selection. The court of appeals remanded the case on the grounds that the trial court did not expressly determine whether the proffered justifications were not only race-neutral but also credible. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' opinion and affirmed the trial court's denial of Defendant's Batson challenge, holding that the trial court satisfied its obligations under federal and Arizona Batson jurisprudence. View "State v. Porter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss this lawsuit brought by Plaintiff, an electric representative in the Arizona House of Representatives, alleging that Defendant, the Speaker of the House, defamed him in an investigatory report and a news release, holding that Defendant was immune for allegedly defaming Plaintiff in the investigatory report but was not immune for allegedly defaming Defendant in the news release.Plaintiff was expelled by the Arizona House of Representatives as an elected representative for misconduct. Plaintiff initiated sued Defendant, alleging defamation and conspiracy defamation. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss as it concerned the issuance of a news release but reversed the ruling denying the motion as it concerned Defendant's alleged modification and release of an investigatory report, holding (1) Defendant performed a legislative function when he modified the report and released it to House members and the public and therefore was absolutely immune from liability based on these actions; and (2) issuing news releases is not generally a legislative function protected by legislative immunity. View "Mesnard v. Honorable Theodore Campagnolo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court granting Rasean Clayton's application for a temporary and permanent injunction enjoining Kanye West and his presidential electors from appearing on the general election ballot for president in 2020, holding that West did not present the Secretary of State with the requisite number of qualified electors for placement on the ballot.The Supreme Court concluded that the presidential electors had failed to file the statement of interest required by Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-341(I) and that, therefore, the nomination petition signatures submitted on their behalf were invalid, making West unable to qualify for the ballot. Given the dispositive effect of the failure of West's electors' to qualify for the ballot, the Supreme Court did not address his other arguments. View "Clayton v. West" on Justia Law