Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that the Indian Reorganization Act did not expressly preempt Mohave County's ad valorem property tax on a power plant owned by non-Indian lessees of land purportedly acquired by the federal government under the Act and held in trust for the benefit of an Indian tribe.Plaintiff initiated these consolidated lawsuits seeking a refund of payments for property taxes imposed from 2010 to 2018 to the extent they were based on valuations of the power plant at issue, arguing that section 5 of the Act, 25 U.S.C. 5108, expressly preempts states from imposing property taxes on any real property improvements located on land held in trust by the federal government for the benefit of Indian tribes or individuals. The tax court granted summary judgment for the County, but the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in part, holding that section 5 of the Act expressly preempts taxing permanent improvements constructed on tribal lands acquired under that section when those improvements are owned by non-Indians. View "South Point Energy Center LLC v. Arizona Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the identity of an alleged narcotic drug is an element of Arizona's drug possession statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-3408, and therefore, jury unanimity is required as to which drug or drugs listed in Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-3401(6), (19), (20), or (23) was involved in an offense under section 34-3408.Petitioners in this case were Mexican natives lawfully residing in the United States who were convicted of drug-related counts. Based on their convictions, the immigration court ordered them removed from the country. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified for the Supreme Court questions regarding whether Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-3415 and section 13-3408 were divisible as to drug type. The Supreme Court declined to answer the first two certified questions but did hold that jury unanimity regarding the identity of a specific drug is required for a conviction under section 13-3408. View "Romero-Millan v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the tax court dismissing Counts I through III of the Attorney General's complaint and granting summary judgment on Count IV, holding that the tax court erred in part.At issue was the scope of three statutes the Attorney General (AG) invoked to challenge an agreement between the Arizona Board of Regents (ABOR) and a private company for the company to construct and operate a hotel and conference center on property owned by ABOR. The Supreme Court held (1) to initiate an action under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 42-1004(E) there must be an applicable tax law to enforce; (2) the AG may bring a quo warranto action pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-2041 to challenge the unlawful usurpation or exercise of a public franchise; and (3) the AG's public-monies claim was subject to the five-year statute of limitations set forth in Ariz. Rev. Stat. 35-212(E). View "State v. Arizona Board of Regents" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a homeowners' association (HOA) may not rely on a general amendment power provision in its covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) to place restrictions on landowners' use of their land only as to those restrictions for which the HOA's original declaration has provided sufficient notice.Plaintiff brought this action against Calabria Ranch Estates, a residential subdivision, and other property owners seeking a declaratory judgment to invalidate recently amended CC&RS that were voted upon without Plaintiff's consent or knowledge. The superior court invalidated portions of the amended CC&RS. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that all of the amendments were invalid without unanimous consent. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that an HOA cannot create new affirmative obligations where the original declaration did not provide notice to the homeowners that they might be subject to such regulations. View "Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that because the alleged conduct of a victim of the collision in this case occurred simultaneously with Max Fontes's alleged criminal conduct, Fontes was not entitled to a superseding cause jury instruction.Max Fontes was speeding when he struck Angel Shelby's vehicle. Shelby and his son were not restrained, and the child died. Shelby later pled guilty to driving under the influence and endangerment. Fontes was charged with, inter alia, manslaughter. Before trial, the State filed a motion in limine to preclude Fontes from raising a superseding cause defense. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Shelby's acts could constitute a superseding cause. The court of appeals vacated the trial court's order, concluding that a superseding cause instruction was precluded under the circumstances. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts, holding (1) Fontes was not entitled to a superseding cause jury instruction because Shelby's alleged acts and omissions were not intervening events; but (2) the court of appeals failed to analyze the predicate issue of whether Shelby's alleged acts and omissions were intervening events. View "State v. Honorable Aragon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Pinal County Regional Transportation Authority (RTA) and the Penal County Board of Supervisors (Board) acted unlawfully when they adopted a two-tiered retail transaction privilege tax (TPT) on tangible personal property as part of a transportation excise tax.At issue was (1) Pinal County's adoption of Proposition 416, a regional transportation plan, and Proposition 417, a transportation excise tax; and (2) a two-tiered TPT structure whereby the first $10,000 of any single item was taxed at one rate and any amount in excess was taxed at a rate of zero percent adopted as part of a transportation excise tax in Pinal County. The Supreme Court held (1) Pinal County complied with state law in adopting the transportation excise tax; but (2) the County's two-tiered retail transaction privilege tax was invalid. View "Vangilder v. Arizona Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court in this parental rights termination case, holding that the juvenile court applied the incorrect definition of "normal home" in Ariz. Rev. Stat. 8-533(B) in terminating the parental interest of Father to his child.The juvenile court found H.B. and her half-siblings dependent as to Mother and their respective fathers. As to Father, the court found that DCS had proved termination pursuant to the length-of-sentence ground listed 8-533(B)(4) and that termination was in H.B.'s best interests. Specifically, the court concluded that Father's incarceration had and would continue to deprive H.B. of a normal home for a period of years, thus demonstrating the legnth-of-sentence ground for termination. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the juvenile court erred by not considering whether a permanent guardianship could provide H.B. with a "normal home" while Father maintained his parental rights; and (2) remand was necessary for consideration of Father's past and ongoing efforts to parent H.B. from prison and their impact on H.B.'s interest in a stable home life in the court's best interests analysis. View "Timothy B. v. Department of Child Safety" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (the Agency) has not established a clear policy objective concerning automatic emergency breaking (AEB) technology that preempts state tort law claims based on an auto manufacturer's alleged failure to install AEB.Plaintiff sued Chrysler alleging negligence, defective product design, defective product warning, and wrongful death. Chrysler moved to dismiss the lawsuit, asserting that it was preempted given the Agency's objectives regarding the development and deployment of AEB technology. The trial court granted Chrysler's motion. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the Agency did not intend to preempt tort claims based on the absence of AEB. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order, holding (1) the Agency has neither conveyed an authoritative statement establishing manufacturer choice as a significant federal policy objective nor made explicit a view that AEB should not be regulated; and (2) therefore, the Agency has not established a policy objective that actually conflicts with the claims at issue. View "Varela v. FCA US LLC" on Justia Law

In this criminal case concerning a defendant who asserted the attorney-client privilege the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the trial court ruling that all of the defendant's communications with his mitigation specialist, Anna Nelson, and the defense team's paralegal, Nicole Erich, were confidential, privileged, and non-discoverable, holding that there was no error.Defendant was in jail awaiting trial on charges of, among other things, first degree murder. Defendant used the jail's electronic tablets, including its text messaging capabilities, to communicate with members of the defense team. The State issued and served a criminal subpoena duces tecum on the jail requesting Defendant's texts to dispute his claimed intellectual disability. The State filed a motion to determine non-privileged status of communications with the trial court, arguing that Defendant's texts with the defense team were not privileged. The court ruled in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's ruling, holding the remand was required pursuant to Clements v. Bernini ex rel. County of Pima, 249 Ariz. 434 (2020), and the reasoning in this opinion. View "State ex rel. Adel v. Honorable Adleman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a defendant seeking an award of attorney fees and costs in a lawsuit filed by a married plaintiff does not need to join the plaintiff's spouse to later execute a judgment for fees and costs against the plaintiff's community assets.The trial court entered judgment judgment for Shamrock Materials, LLC and an LLC member and her husband (collectively, Shamrock) in this action brought by Kristi Lattin, "a married woman dealing with her own separate property." The court further awarded Shamrock attorney fees and costs as the prevailing party. Shamrock sought to garnish a bank account jointly owned by Lattin and her husband, Robert DeRuiter, a non-party. The trial court quashed Shamrock's garnishment on Wells Fargo Bank to pay funds held in the joint bank account because the judgment was not entered against DeRuiter. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Ariz. Rev. Stat. 25-215(D) did not require Shamrock to join DeRuiter in the case to execute its judgment for attorney fees and costs against community assets. View "Lattin v. Shamrock Materials LLC" on Justia Law