Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that delivery of a pre-litigation notice to each of the three addresses referred to in Ariz. Rev. Stat. 42-18202(A)(1)(a)-(c) is sufficient to satisfy the statute's pre-litigation-notice requirement, even if the lienholder has reason to believe that the property owner never received the notice.HNT Holdings, LLC owned three continuous parcels of real property on which property tax payments became became delinquent. Lienholders each purchased a tax lien on one of the parcels and later sought to foreclose on the respective properties. After the statutorily-mandated time, Lienholders filed complaints to foreclose on their tax liens and attempted to serve the complaints on the HNT statutory agent. Three separate trial proceedings resulted in default judgments against HNT. HNT then successfully moved to set the judgments aside. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding (1) Lienholders' efforts to provide notice to HNT complied with the second method of notice under section 42-18202; and (2) Lienholders were not required to take any other action to provide notice of their intent to foreclose. View "4QTKids, LLC v. HNT Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant, following a jury trial, of murdering her ten-year-old cousin, but remanded the case for resentencing, holding that the sentence imposed for count four was illegal.A jury convicted Defendant of first-degree felony murder, conspiracy to commit child abuse, and three counts of child abuse (counts three through five). The jury imposed the death sentence on the murder conviction and maximum and aggravated terms of imprisonment on the remaining counts. Defendant appealed both the judgments and the sentences. The Supreme Court largely affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was not entitled to reversal of her convictions based on her allegations of error; and (2) as to count four, because only one aggravating factor was found, the imposition of an aggravated sentence was illegal. View "State v. Allen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the City of Peoria and dismissing Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice, holding that Plaintiff's statement in her notice of claim that her settlement offer was "valid for thirty (30) days" did not invalidate her notice of claim.At issue was whether a notice of claim is invalid under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-821.01 if it provides that the claimant's settlement offer will terminate less than sixty days after the notice is served. More than six months after serving her notice of claim, Plaintiff brought a wrongful death lawsuit against the City. The trial court granted summary judgment for the City on the grounds that the statutory 180-day time period to file a valid notice of claim had passed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a notice of claim otherwise in compliance with section 12-821.01(A) is not invalid because it purports to set a deadline for settlement prior to the sixty-day period in section 12-821.01(E); and (2) Plaintiff's attempt to shorten the City's statutory sixty-day response deadline in her notice of claim was a legal nullity that did not invalidate her notice of claim. View "James v. City of Peoria" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of thirteen felony counts of aggravated harassment, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in accepting Defendant's jury-trial waiver.At issue on appeal was whether, in a case where a criminal defendant's competency has been put at issue, a trial court must make a specific finding of heightened competency before determining that the defendant's waiver of the right to a jury trial is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative, holding (1) Arizona law does not require a finding of heightened competency for a jury-trial waiver where a defendant's competency has been put at issue; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Defendant had knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial. View "State v. Muhammad" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice case, the Supreme Court held that defendants do not violate the "One-Expert Rule" when offering the testimony of a treating physician on the standard of care, in addition to that of a retained or specially employed expert, when the testimony is based on the treating physician's personal observations and participation in providing treatment to the plaintiff.At issue was the One-Expert Rule set forth in Ariz. R. Civ. P. 26-(b)(4)(F)(i), which allows each side in a medical malpractice case presumptively to call only one retained or specially-employed expert to testify on the standard of care issue. The Supreme Court remanded this case for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court correctly declined to find a violation of the One-Expert Rule in this case; and (2) a treating physician dismissed on summary judgment is not an indispensable party to an appeal of the denial of a motion to name him a nonparty at fault. View "McDaniel v. Payson Healthcare Management, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court dismissing this action brought by Arizona corrections officers seeking overtime compensation for time spent in mandatory pre-shift security screenings, holding that whether the corrections officers were entitled to overtime should be decided as a matter of law.At issue was whether the State has incorporated the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. 251–262, into Ariz. Rev. Stat. 23-392 to govern Arizona corrections officers’ claims for overtime compensation for time spent in mandatory pre-shift security screenings. The trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss, concluding that the pre-shift security screening was not compensable. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that for purposes of defining "work" to determine overtime eligibility for law enforcement officers under section 23-392, the state has not incorporated the Act in the statute, and state agency regulations purporting to do so are not legally binding. View "Roberts v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts in this matter arising from two criminal cases, holding that the Cochise County Superior Court's innominate jury system does not violate the First Amendment.This case arose from two criminal cases that used innominate juries without objection by either party. In both cases, Appellant, a journalist, unsuccessfully sought access to prospective and impaneled jurors' names before and after trial. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, Appellant argued that the First Amendment provides a qualified right of public access to jurors' names during voir dire, thus creating a presumption of access that can be overcome only on a case-by-case basis by showing both that a compelling state interest exists in a particular case to shield the names and that denying access is a remedy narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the First Amendment does not provide the press or public with a qualified right to access jurors' names, and the law is facially valid. View "Morgan v. Honorable Dickerson" on Justia Law

On July 18, 2012, Robinson beat, bound, and immolated his nine-months-pregnant girlfriend, S.H., in their apartment, killing her and their unborn child, B.H. He then placed a 9-1-1 call to report a fire. Upon extinguishing the fire, responders discovered S.H.’s partially burned body lying face down on the bedroom floor with her feet and hands bound, wrists handcuffed, mouth and eyes covered with duct tape, and mouth stuffed with cloth. A search of Robinson’s backpack revealed rolls of duct tape, pieces of crumpled duct tape, a matchbook with at least one match missing, and a receipt reflecting purchases of duct tape and a bottle of lighter fluid that day. Police found a handcuff key in Robinson’s pocket.Robinson was sentenced to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed, first rejecting “Batson” challenges to the dismissal of potential minority jurors. The court upheld the jury’s “especial cruelty” and its “heinous or depraved conduct” findings. The legislature’s decision to equate feticide with infanticide also makes B.H.’s murder senseless as a matter of law. Robinson’s double-counting argument failed. Although the jury was prohibited from weighing B.H.’s age twice as it “assesse[d] aggravation and mitigation” at the penalty phase, it was permitted to “use one fact to find multiple aggravators” at the aggravation phase. The court also rejected challenges to jury instructions and statements made by the prosecutor. View "State of Arizona v Robinson" on Justia Law

Cal-Am, a developer and operator of RV and mobile-home parks leased the Yuma Sundance RV Resort from its owner, intending to construct a new banquet and concert hall on the property. The property owner provided the funding for the construction. Cal-Am managed the project. Cal-Am hired a contractor, Nickle, to design and construct the hall, who then hired Edais Engineering to survey the property and place construction stakes to mark the Hall’s permitted location. No contract existed between Edais and Cal-Am. Edais acknowledges that its placement of the stakes was defective. Cal-Am was forced to adjust its site plan, eliminating eight RV parking spaces. Cal-Am sued Edais for claims including negligence. The trial court granted Edais summary judgment on the negligence claim finding that Cal-Am could not recover its purely economic damages. The court of appeals affirmed.The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed, repudiating its 1984 Donnelly Construction holding that a design professional’s duty to use ordinary skill, care, and diligence in rendering professional services extends both to persons in privity with the professional and to persons foreseeably affected by a breach of that duty. Under Arizona’s current framework, which repudiated foreseeability as a basis for duty, design professionals lacking privity of contract with project owners do not owe a duty to those owners to reimburse purely economic damages. View "Cal-Am Properties, Inc. v. Edais Engineering, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Indian Reorganization Act did not expressly preempt Mohave County's ad valorem property tax on a power plant owned by non-Indian lessees of land purportedly acquired by the federal government under the Act and held in trust for the benefit of an Indian tribe.Plaintiff initiated these consolidated lawsuits seeking a refund of payments for property taxes imposed from 2010 to 2018 to the extent they were based on valuations of the power plant at issue, arguing that section 5 of the Act, 25 U.S.C. 5108, expressly preempts states from imposing property taxes on any real property improvements located on land held in trust by the federal government for the benefit of Indian tribes or individuals. The tax court granted summary judgment for the County, but the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in part, holding that section 5 of the Act expressly preempts taxing permanent improvements constructed on tribal lands acquired under that section when those improvements are owned by non-Indians. View "South Point Energy Center LLC v. Arizona Department of Revenue" on Justia Law