Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this medical malpractice case, the Supreme Court held that defendants do not violate the "One-Expert Rule" when offering the testimony of a treating physician on the standard of care, in addition to that of a retained or specially employed expert, when the testimony is based on the treating physician's personal observations and participation in providing treatment to the plaintiff.At issue was the One-Expert Rule set forth in Ariz. R. Civ. P. 26-(b)(4)(F)(i), which allows each side in a medical malpractice case presumptively to call only one retained or specially-employed expert to testify on the standard of care issue. The Supreme Court remanded this case for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court correctly declined to find a violation of the One-Expert Rule in this case; and (2) a treating physician dismissed on summary judgment is not an indispensable party to an appeal of the denial of a motion to name him a nonparty at fault. View "McDaniel v. Payson Healthcare Management, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court dismissing this action brought by Arizona corrections officers seeking overtime compensation for time spent in mandatory pre-shift security screenings, holding that whether the corrections officers were entitled to overtime should be decided as a matter of law.At issue was whether the State has incorporated the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. 251–262, into Ariz. Rev. Stat. 23-392 to govern Arizona corrections officers’ claims for overtime compensation for time spent in mandatory pre-shift security screenings. The trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss, concluding that the pre-shift security screening was not compensable. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that for purposes of defining "work" to determine overtime eligibility for law enforcement officers under section 23-392, the state has not incorporated the Act in the statute, and state agency regulations purporting to do so are not legally binding. View "Roberts v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts in this matter arising from two criminal cases, holding that the Cochise County Superior Court's innominate jury system does not violate the First Amendment.This case arose from two criminal cases that used innominate juries without objection by either party. In both cases, Appellant, a journalist, unsuccessfully sought access to prospective and impaneled jurors' names before and after trial. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, Appellant argued that the First Amendment provides a qualified right of public access to jurors' names during voir dire, thus creating a presumption of access that can be overcome only on a case-by-case basis by showing both that a compelling state interest exists in a particular case to shield the names and that denying access is a remedy narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the First Amendment does not provide the press or public with a qualified right to access jurors' names, and the law is facially valid. View "Morgan v. Honorable Dickerson" on Justia Law

On July 18, 2012, Robinson beat, bound, and immolated his nine-months-pregnant girlfriend, S.H., in their apartment, killing her and their unborn child, B.H. He then placed a 9-1-1 call to report a fire. Upon extinguishing the fire, responders discovered S.H.’s partially burned body lying face down on the bedroom floor with her feet and hands bound, wrists handcuffed, mouth and eyes covered with duct tape, and mouth stuffed with cloth. A search of Robinson’s backpack revealed rolls of duct tape, pieces of crumpled duct tape, a matchbook with at least one match missing, and a receipt reflecting purchases of duct tape and a bottle of lighter fluid that day. Police found a handcuff key in Robinson’s pocket.Robinson was sentenced to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed, first rejecting “Batson” challenges to the dismissal of potential minority jurors. The court upheld the jury’s “especial cruelty” and its “heinous or depraved conduct” findings. The legislature’s decision to equate feticide with infanticide also makes B.H.’s murder senseless as a matter of law. Robinson’s double-counting argument failed. Although the jury was prohibited from weighing B.H.’s age twice as it “assesse[d] aggravation and mitigation” at the penalty phase, it was permitted to “use one fact to find multiple aggravators” at the aggravation phase. The court also rejected challenges to jury instructions and statements made by the prosecutor. View "State of Arizona v Robinson" on Justia Law

Cal-Am, a developer and operator of RV and mobile-home parks leased the Yuma Sundance RV Resort from its owner, intending to construct a new banquet and concert hall on the property. The property owner provided the funding for the construction. Cal-Am managed the project. Cal-Am hired a contractor, Nickle, to design and construct the hall, who then hired Edais Engineering to survey the property and place construction stakes to mark the Hall’s permitted location. No contract existed between Edais and Cal-Am. Edais acknowledges that its placement of the stakes was defective. Cal-Am was forced to adjust its site plan, eliminating eight RV parking spaces. Cal-Am sued Edais for claims including negligence. The trial court granted Edais summary judgment on the negligence claim finding that Cal-Am could not recover its purely economic damages. The court of appeals affirmed.The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed, repudiating its 1984 Donnelly Construction holding that a design professional’s duty to use ordinary skill, care, and diligence in rendering professional services extends both to persons in privity with the professional and to persons foreseeably affected by a breach of that duty. Under Arizona’s current framework, which repudiated foreseeability as a basis for duty, design professionals lacking privity of contract with project owners do not owe a duty to those owners to reimburse purely economic damages. View "Cal-Am Properties, Inc. v. Edais Engineering, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Indian Reorganization Act did not expressly preempt Mohave County's ad valorem property tax on a power plant owned by non-Indian lessees of land purportedly acquired by the federal government under the Act and held in trust for the benefit of an Indian tribe.Plaintiff initiated these consolidated lawsuits seeking a refund of payments for property taxes imposed from 2010 to 2018 to the extent they were based on valuations of the power plant at issue, arguing that section 5 of the Act, 25 U.S.C. 5108, expressly preempts states from imposing property taxes on any real property improvements located on land held in trust by the federal government for the benefit of Indian tribes or individuals. The tax court granted summary judgment for the County, but the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in part, holding that section 5 of the Act expressly preempts taxing permanent improvements constructed on tribal lands acquired under that section when those improvements are owned by non-Indians. View "South Point Energy Center LLC v. Arizona Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the identity of an alleged narcotic drug is an element of Arizona's drug possession statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-3408, and therefore, jury unanimity is required as to which drug or drugs listed in Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-3401(6), (19), (20), or (23) was involved in an offense under section 34-3408.Petitioners in this case were Mexican natives lawfully residing in the United States who were convicted of drug-related counts. Based on their convictions, the immigration court ordered them removed from the country. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified for the Supreme Court questions regarding whether Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-3415 and section 13-3408 were divisible as to drug type. The Supreme Court declined to answer the first two certified questions but did hold that jury unanimity regarding the identity of a specific drug is required for a conviction under section 13-3408. View "Romero-Millan v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the tax court dismissing Counts I through III of the Attorney General's complaint and granting summary judgment on Count IV, holding that the tax court erred in part.At issue was the scope of three statutes the Attorney General (AG) invoked to challenge an agreement between the Arizona Board of Regents (ABOR) and a private company for the company to construct and operate a hotel and conference center on property owned by ABOR. The Supreme Court held (1) to initiate an action under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 42-1004(E) there must be an applicable tax law to enforce; (2) the AG may bring a quo warranto action pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-2041 to challenge the unlawful usurpation or exercise of a public franchise; and (3) the AG's public-monies claim was subject to the five-year statute of limitations set forth in Ariz. Rev. Stat. 35-212(E). View "State v. Arizona Board of Regents" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a homeowners' association (HOA) may not rely on a general amendment power provision in its covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) to place restrictions on landowners' use of their land only as to those restrictions for which the HOA's original declaration has provided sufficient notice.Plaintiff brought this action against Calabria Ranch Estates, a residential subdivision, and other property owners seeking a declaratory judgment to invalidate recently amended CC&RS that were voted upon without Plaintiff's consent or knowledge. The superior court invalidated portions of the amended CC&RS. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that all of the amendments were invalid without unanimous consent. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that an HOA cannot create new affirmative obligations where the original declaration did not provide notice to the homeowners that they might be subject to such regulations. View "Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that because the alleged conduct of a victim of the collision in this case occurred simultaneously with Max Fontes's alleged criminal conduct, Fontes was not entitled to a superseding cause jury instruction.Max Fontes was speeding when he struck Angel Shelby's vehicle. Shelby and his son were not restrained, and the child died. Shelby later pled guilty to driving under the influence and endangerment. Fontes was charged with, inter alia, manslaughter. Before trial, the State filed a motion in limine to preclude Fontes from raising a superseding cause defense. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Shelby's acts could constitute a superseding cause. The court of appeals vacated the trial court's order, concluding that a superseding cause instruction was precluded under the circumstances. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts, holding (1) Fontes was not entitled to a superseding cause jury instruction because Shelby's alleged acts and omissions were not intervening events; but (2) the court of appeals failed to analyze the predicate issue of whether Shelby's alleged acts and omissions were intervening events. View "State v. Honorable Aragon" on Justia Law