Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court rejecting objections based on the issue of whether signatures collected by some initiative petition circulators must be disqualified because those circulators failed to strictly comply with two registration requirements, holding that this Court declines to disqualify any signatures as a result of the circulators' failure to strictly comply with Ariz. Rev. Stat. 19-102.01(A).At issue was a challenge to the Voters' Right to Know Act, a proposed statewide initiative for the November 8, 2022 general election ballot. Challengers filed this lawsuit challenging the legal sufficiency of certain circulator registrations. The trial court denied most of Challengers' objections. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) circulators failed to strictly comply with one statutory requirement which ordinarily would require the Secretary of State to disqualify the signatures gathered by those circulators; and (2) because the registration process prevented compliance with the statute, enforcing the statutory disqualification requirement would "unnecessarily hinder or restrict" the constitutional right to engage in the initiative process. View "Leibsohn v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

In this marriage dissolution case, the Supreme Court held that the appropriate method of establishing the marital community's interest in separate property should begin with trial judges using the "Drahos/Barnett formula" and then adjust the calculation to account for the community's overall contribution of labor and funds to the separate property along with the market appreciation of the property.At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the formula laid out in Drahos v. Rent, 149 Ariz. 248 (App. 1985) and refined in Branett v. Jedymak, 219 Ariz. 550 (App. 2009) (the Drahos/Barnett formula) was the appropriate method of establishing the marital community's equitable lien on a spouse's separate property, in order to provide for a fair division of the separate property’s increase in value proportionate to the amount the community contributed to the property. The Supreme Court held that the Drahos/Barnett formula is an appropriate starting point for courts to calculate a marital community's equitable lien on a spouse's separate property, thus affirming the trial court's judgment in this case. View "Saba v. Khoury" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that when a debtor defaults on a debt secured by a deed of trust and the trustee chooses to sell the property, the trustee's act of recording and serving a notice of trustee's sale does not accelerate the debt as a matter of law.Plaintiff defaulted on a loan for which he executed a promissory note secured by a deed of trust against his residential property. Thereafter, two notices of trustee's sales were recorded, but neither notice invoked an optional acceleration clause included in the promissory note and deed of trust. When the property was not sold, Nationstar Mortgage LLC began servicing the loan. Plaintiff sought declaratory relief, arguing that Nationstar was not permitted to foreclose on the property the six-year statute of limitations contained in Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-548(A)(1) had expired. The trial court granted summary judgment for Plaintiff, concluding that the notices of trustee's sales accelerated the debt. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the entry of summary judgment in favor of Nationstar, holding that the recording a notice of trustee's sale, by itself, is not an affirmative act that accelerates the debt. View "Bridges v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the trial court that the Senate disclose all communications concerning an audit to American Oversight, holding that communications concerning legislative activities need not relate to proposed or pending legislation nor require an affirmative showing of indirect impairment of legislative deliberations to qualify for legislative privilege.At issue in this case was the scope and application of legislative privilege pursuant to the "Gravel/Fields framework" under the Arizona Constitution and common law. In 2020, Senate members contracted to conduct an audit of ballots cast in Maricopa County. American Oversight, a nonprofit organization, filed a complaint under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 39-121 to compel disclosure of the documents. The trial court rejected the Senate's immunity claim and ordered it to disclose the documents. When the Senate submitted a privilege log listing several withheld and redacted communications along with the requested documents American Oversight moved to compel the Senate to produce the withheld records. The trial court rejected the Senate's legislative privilege claim and granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Gravel/Fields framework requires that the Senate only disclose communications concerning administrative, political, or other non-legislative matters. View "Fann v. Honorable Kemp" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that because Defendant's conduct did not establish a prima facie case for punitive damages in this negligence case, the trial court erred in granting Plaintiffs' motion to obtain Defendant's financial records.Plaintiffs sued Defendant, alleging negligence under a theory of respondent superior. Plaintiffs filed a "Motion on Prima Facie Case for Punitive Damages" seeking to obtain Defendant's financial records, which the superior court granted. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the superior court erred in granting Plaintiffs' motion without establishing that Defendant's conduct, if proven, was aggravated or outrageous. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) to establish a prima facie case for punitive damages necessary to justify the discovery of a defendant's financial information a plaintiff must establish that there is a reasonable likelihood that the punitive damages claim will be submitted to the jury; and (2) a punitive damages claim will be submitted to the jury only where there is proof that the defendant’s conduct was either intended to cause harm, motivated by spite or ill will, or outrageous, in which the defendant consciously pursued a course of conduct knowing that it created a substantial risk of significant injury to others. View "Swift Transportation v. Honorable Carman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the exemption from the referendum power for law "for the support and maintenance of the departments of the state government and state institutions," see Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, 1(3), apples to tax measures and that a revenue measure is exempt from referendum provided that it is for the support and maintenance of existing departments of the state government and state institutions.SB 1828 was signed by the Governor as a tax bill for the 2022 fiscal year and imposes a "flat" tax of 2.5 percent on taxable revenues but becomes effective only if the state General Fund revenues reach specific targets. Invest in Arizona (IIA) sought to prevent implementation of the flat tax by referring SB 1828 to the ballot in the November 2022 general election. Appellants filed a motion for preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the Secretary of State from accepting or certifying any petition filed in support of a referendum of SB 1828, including IIA's petition. The trial court ruled that SB 1828 is referable and denied the preliminary injunction request. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the exemption from the referendum power for laws "for the support and maintenance of the departments of the state government and state institutions" applies to tax measures. View "Arizona Free Enterprise Club v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant's motion seeking remand to the grand jury for a redetermination of probable cause pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 12.9, holding that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's Rule 12.9 motion.A grand jury indicted Defendant for attempted second degree murder and other crimes. Defendant subsequently filed the motion at issue, arguing that the State withheld clearly exculpatory evidence of a justification defense that it was obligated to present despite the evidence not being requested by the defense. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Arizona Constitution guarantees a person under grand jury investigation a due process right to a fair and impartial presentation of clearly exculpatory evidence, and a prosecutor has a duty to present such evidence to a grand jury even in the absence of a specific request; (2) where there is evidence relevant to a justification defense that would deter a grand jury from finding probable cause the prosecutor has an obligation to present such evidence; and (3) the State failed to present clearly exculpatory evidence in this case, denying Defendant a substantial procedural right. View "Willis v. Honorable Bernini" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the superior court dismissing this complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, holding that, for the most part, the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies, ripeness, and standing did not prohibit Plaintiff from proceeding with his lawsuit.Plaintiff was an engineer who designed, tested, and built electronic circuits from consumer products through his consulting firm. At issue in this dispute with the Arizona Board of Technical Registration was whether Plaintiff's work required registration with the Board. Plaintiff brought this action under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-1831 to -1846, challenging the constitutionality of statutes prohibiting people and firms from engaging in "engineering practices unless registered with the Board." The superior court dismissed the complaint on two bases. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) three causes of action in Plaintiff's complaint were justiciable, and the superior court erred by dismissing them s nonjusticiable; and (2) the court correctly dismissed the fourth cause of action as unripe. View "Mills v. Arizona Bd. of Technical Registration" on Justia Law

In this case arising from five separate tax lien foreclosure actions the Supreme Court held that reasonable fees and costs incurred after a redemption certificate has issued that were a direct and necessary result of completing that redemption are recoverable even though those expenses were incurred after the redemption.After TFLTC, LLC purchased five liens on five properties it filed an action to foreclosure each property owner's redemption rights. The owners eventually redeemed their tax liens, and certificates of redemption issued. Thereafter, TFLTC sought to recover attorney fees and costs in each separate case pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 42-18206. Relying on Leveraged Land Co. v. Hodges, 226 Ariz. 382 (2011), the trial courts awarded only fees and costs incurred before redemption. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that reasonable fees and costs arising from the redemption itself are recoverable even though the expenses were incurred following the redemption. View "TFLTC, LLC v. Ford" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of two counts of sexual conduct with a minor under age fifteen and other charges, holding that contributing to the delinquency of a minor, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-3613, is not a lesser-included offense of sexual conduct with a minor, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-1405.The court of appeals vacated Defendant's conviction of committing sexual conduct with a minor under age fifteen, holding that contributing to the delinquency of a minor is a lesser-included offense of sexual conduct with a minor under age fifteen. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' opinion and remanded to the court of appeals for further proceedings, holding that contributing to the delinquency of a minor is not a lesser-included offense of sexual conduct with a minor. View "State v. Agueda" on Justia Law