Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

April Sponsel, a prosecutor at the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office (MCAO), was disciplined for her conduct in several cases. She was found to have violated multiple Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct, including competence, diligence, good faith, and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. The violations stemmed from her handling of cases related to an October 2020 protest, as well as other cases involving defendants Charles Walker and Richard Villa. Sponsel was accused of filing charges without sufficient evidence, failing to review available evidence, and making unsupported allegations.The disciplinary panel concluded that Sponsel violated ethical rules by not thoroughly investigating the cases before filing charges and by pursuing charges that were not supported by the evidence. The panel found that her actions caused significant harm to the defendants, including wrongful incarceration and damage to their reputations. The panel also noted that her conduct negatively impacted the integrity and morale of the MCAO.The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the panel’s findings and the two-year suspension from the practice of law. The Court agreed that Sponsel’s conduct violated the ethical rules and caused harm to the defendants and the justice system. The Court emphasized the importance of a prosecutor’s duty to seek justice rather than merely secure convictions. The Court also noted that the suspension was necessary to protect the public, deter similar misconduct, and maintain confidence in the integrity of the legal system. View "In re Sponsel" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the superior court dismissing this complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, holding that, for the most part, the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies, ripeness, and standing did not prohibit Plaintiff from proceeding with his lawsuit.Plaintiff was an engineer who designed, tested, and built electronic circuits from consumer products through his consulting firm. At issue in this dispute with the Arizona Board of Technical Registration was whether Plaintiff's work required registration with the Board. Plaintiff brought this action under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-1831 to -1846, challenging the constitutionality of statutes prohibiting people and firms from engaging in "engineering practices unless registered with the Board." The superior court dismissed the complaint on two bases. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) three causes of action in Plaintiff's complaint were justiciable, and the superior court erred by dismissing them s nonjusticiable; and (2) the court correctly dismissed the fourth cause of action as unripe. View "Mills v. Arizona Bd. of Technical Registration" on Justia Law

Cal-Am, a developer and operator of RV and mobile-home parks leased the Yuma Sundance RV Resort from its owner, intending to construct a new banquet and concert hall on the property. The property owner provided the funding for the construction. Cal-Am managed the project. Cal-Am hired a contractor, Nickle, to design and construct the hall, who then hired Edais Engineering to survey the property and place construction stakes to mark the Hall’s permitted location. No contract existed between Edais and Cal-Am. Edais acknowledges that its placement of the stakes was defective. Cal-Am was forced to adjust its site plan, eliminating eight RV parking spaces. Cal-Am sued Edais for claims including negligence. The trial court granted Edais summary judgment on the negligence claim finding that Cal-Am could not recover its purely economic damages. The court of appeals affirmed.The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed, repudiating its 1984 Donnelly Construction holding that a design professional’s duty to use ordinary skill, care, and diligence in rendering professional services extends both to persons in privity with the professional and to persons foreseeably affected by a breach of that duty. Under Arizona’s current framework, which repudiated foreseeability as a basis for duty, design professionals lacking privity of contract with project owners do not owe a duty to those owners to reimburse purely economic damages. View "Cal-Am Properties, Inc. v. Edais Engineering, Inc." on Justia Law

The Superior Court of Navajo County erred when it denied Defendants’ motion for change of venue in this legal malpractice action filed by a Hospital located in Navajo County against a professional limited liability company (PLLC) organized in Maricopa County and its attorneys, both Maricopa County residents.After the Hospital sued, Defendants moved to transfer venue to Maricopa County, arguing that venue in Navajo County was improper unless a statutory exception applied under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-401. The trial court denied the motion, finding that venue in Navajo was proper under section 12-401(5) because the Hospital “exclusively contracted business in Navajo County,” and under section 12-401(18), reasoning that LLCs should be considered corporations for venue purposes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the PLLC was not required, expressly or by necessary implication, to perform in Navajo County; and (2) the trial court erred when it applied the subsection (18) exception on the basis that LLCs, like corporations, are amenable to veil-piercing, where venue and the alter-ego doctrine reflect different policy considerations. View "Butler Law Firm, PLC v. Honorable Robert J. Higgins" on Justia Law

Ariz. R. Evid. 408 precludes use of a consent judgment to prove substantive facts to establish liability for a subsequent claim. Likewise, a consent judgment cannot be used for impeachment purposes under Ariz. R. Evid. 613.Before disciplinary proceedings were initiated against attorney Brent Phillips, the Arizona Attorney General sued Phillips for violations of the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act (CFA). To resolve the CFA action, Phillips agreed to a consent judgment. During attorney disciplinary proceedings, Phillips’ counsel moved in limine to preclude the State Bar from introducing the consent judgment into evidence for any purpose. The State Bar opposed the motion, arguing that it should be allowed to use the consent judgment to impeach Phillips’ testimony if it differed from the facts contained in the consent judgment. The presiding disciplinary judge (PDJ) concluded that Rule 408 did not render the stipulated facts inadmissible. The Supreme Court vacated the PDJ's order denying Phillips’ motion in limine, holding (1) none of the exceptions to Rule 408 allowed the State Bar to admit the consent judgment or its contents into evidence during the disciplinary proceedings; and (2) Rule 408 did not permit the use of the consent judgment to impeach Phillips. View "Phillips v. Honorable William O’Neil" on Justia Law