Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A constable, Deborah Martinez-Garibay, was fatally shot while attempting to serve a writ of restitution to a tenant who had threatened a resident with a gun. The tenant also killed Angela Fox, who was accompanying Garibay, and another individual before taking his own life. Angela's surviving spouse, William Fox, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Garibay's spouse, Pima County, and the Arizona Constable Ethics, Standards and Training Board, alleging negligence and gross negligence on Garibay's part.The Superior Court of Pima County denied Garibay's spouse's motion for judgment on the pleadings, which argued that Garibay was entitled to judicial immunity and owed no duty to Angela. The Court of Appeals accepted special action jurisdiction and reversed the Superior Court's decision, holding that Garibay was judicially immune from liability as her actions did not constitute "misconduct" under A.R.S. § 11-449.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case to determine whether the common law doctrine of judicial immunity shields constables from liability under A.R.S. § 11-449. The court held that § 11-449 limits, rather than abrogates, judicial immunity. It concluded that a constable who engages in "misconduct" in the service or execution of a writ is subject to liability. The court defined "misconduct" as an intentional violation of an applicable rule, standard, or norm, rather than mere negligence or gross negligence.The court found that Fox's complaint did not allege that Garibay engaged in "misconduct" as defined by the statute, but rather that she was negligent or grossly negligent. Therefore, the court concluded that Garibay was entitled to judicial immunity and reversed the lower court's decision, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "GARIBAY v FOX" on Justia Law

Roxanne Perez was shopping at a Circle K convenience store when she tripped over a store display of bottled water and injured herself. She sued Circle K for negligence and premises liability, claiming that the store had notice of the dangerous condition and failed to remedy it or warn her. Perez argued that Circle K owed her a duty of care as a business invitee to keep the store in a reasonably safe condition.The Superior Court in Maricopa County granted summary judgment in favor of Circle K, finding that the store did not owe Perez a duty because the water display was an open and obvious condition. The court reasoned that Perez would have seen the display had she looked down, and therefore, it did not pose an unreasonable risk of harm. The Court of Appeals, Division One, affirmed the Superior Court's decision in a divided opinion.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case and concluded that whether the store display was an unreasonably dangerous condition is not relevant to the issue of duty. The court held that Circle K owed Perez a duty of care as a business invitee to keep the store in a reasonably safe condition. The determination of whether the display was unreasonably dangerous pertains to whether Circle K breached its duty, not whether a duty existed. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' opinion in part, reversed the Superior Court's summary judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Perez v. Circle K" on Justia Law

A police officer from the City of Mesa, while driving his patrol car, was involved in a multi-vehicle accident that injured a bicyclist, Philip Rogers. Rogers claimed the officer's negligent driving caused the accident and served notices of claim to the City of Mesa and the officer, offering to settle for "$1,000,000 or the applicable [insurance] policy limits, whichever are greater." Later, Rogers amended his notices to specify a settlement amount of $1,000,000.The Superior Court of Maricopa County denied the City’s motion to dismiss Rogers' complaint, which argued that the initial notices did not comply with Arizona Revised Statutes § 12-821.01(A) because they did not state a specific settlement amount. The City then petitioned for special action review. The Court of Appeals reversed the Superior Court’s decision, directing it to dismiss the complaint, concluding that the notices of claim did not provide a specific amount for settlement as required by the statute.The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed the case to determine if Rogers' notices of claim complied with § 12-821.01(A). The Court held that the settlement offer of "$1,000,000 or the applicable policy limits, whichever are greater" was insufficiently specific to meet the statutory requirements. The Court emphasized that the statute requires a clear and precise settlement amount, which was not provided in Rogers' notices. Consequently, Rogers was barred from maintaining his lawsuit due to non-compliance with the statutory notice requirements.The Supreme Court of Arizona reversed the Superior Court’s order and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss Rogers' claims. The Court also affirmed in part and vacated in part the opinion of the Court of Appeals. View "CITY OF MESA v. RYAN" on Justia Law

David Francisco, a retired endodontist, sought treatment from Dr. Kevin Art of Affiliated Urologists, Ltd. in 2018. Dr. Art performed a urological procedure and prescribed the antibiotic Ciproflaxin (Cipro) without discussing its use with Francisco. The FDA's black box warning for Cipro indicated serious risks, especially for elderly patients with a history of corticosteroid use, which applied to Francisco. After taking Cipro, Francisco experienced severe adverse reactions, including tendon ruptures and peripheral neuropathy.The Superior Court in Maricopa County dismissed the Franciscos' case for failing to provide a preliminary expert opinion affidavit as required by A.R.S. § 12-2603. The Franciscos argued that the FDA warning itself should establish the standard of care, negating the need for expert testimony. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal, holding that the FDA warning could be sufficient to establish the standard of care without expert testimony.The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that FDA warnings cannot substitute for expert testimony to establish the standard of care in medical malpractice cases. The Court emphasized that medical judgment is required to determine the appropriate standard of care, which must be established by expert testimony. The Court also rejected the Franciscos' argument that the statutory requirements for expert testimony violated the anti-abrogation clause of the Arizona Constitution, finding that the statutes permissibly regulate medical negligence actions.The Arizona Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the Superior Court's dismissal of the case. View "FRANCISCO v AFFILIATED UROLOGISTS" on Justia Law

The case involves Sherold D. Roaf, who was rear-ended by Francisco Ortiz, an employee of Medstar. Roaf sued Ortiz for negligence and Medstar for both vicarious liability for Ortiz's negligent driving and direct liability for Medstar's negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of Ortiz. Roaf sought compensatory and economic damages but did not seek punitive damages. Medstar admitted liability for the incident but did not move to dismiss the negligent hiring claim. Instead, it sought to prevent Roaf from introducing Ortiz’s personnel record and driving history, arguing that such evidence would be irrelevant and could improperly influence the jury. The trial court denied the motion, allowing Roaf to pursue both theories of liability.The Superior Court in Maricopa County allowed the case to proceed to trial, where Roaf's counsel introduced evidence of Ortiz's driving record and Medstar's hiring policy. The jury found Roaf's full damages to be $4.625 million, allocating 40% fault to Ortiz and 60% to Medstar. Medstar moved for a new trial, arguing that the negligent hiring claim was superfluous and had allowed Roaf to put prejudicial evidence before the jury. The court denied the motion, finding that the evidence of Ortiz’s driving history had no unfair influence and that the damage award was supported by other evidence.The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision, agreeing that the jury’s award was appropriate based on the evidence and that Medstar failed to show that the trial court committed prejudicial error by allowing the separate claims of negligent hiring and vicarious liability to go to the jury.However, the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reversed the lower courts' decisions. The Supreme Court held that because Medstar admitted liability, it was wholly responsible for Roaf’s damages. Therefore, evidence of liability relating to the negligent hiring claim should have been precluded. The court also found that Medstar suffered prejudice because of the erroneous admission of Ortiz’s personnel record and driving history. The case was remanded to the trial court for a new trial. View "ROAF v REBUCK CONSULTING" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the "anti-abrogation clause" set forth in Ariz. Const. art. XVIII, 6 guaranteeing that the "right of action to recover damages for injuries shall never be abrogated" does not extend to dram-shop actions because they were recognized after statehood.At issue was whether the anti-abrogation clause extends to rights of action created after the Arizona Constitution was ratified, such as the common law dram-shop action recognized in Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500 (1983). Plaintiffs sued Defendant, the owner of Jaguars Club in Phoenix, under theories of statutory and common law dram-shop liability. The jury found Defendant was liable under the common law dram-shop action recognized in Ontiveros but not liable under the dram-shop cause of action codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. 4-311(A). The jury apportioned forty percent of the fault to Defendant. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for entry of judgment in favor of Defendant, holding that the legislature's limitation of dram-shop liability to actions brought under section 4-311 did not run afoul of the anti-abrogation clause by abrogating the common law dram-shop action recognized in Ontiveros. View "Torres v. JAI Dining Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In this wrongful death action, the Supreme Court held that the statutory duty to report child abuse or neglect or under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-3620(A) does not encompass reporting a risk of future harm and that mental health professionals owe a duty to third parties based on their special relationship and public duty and not on foreseeability of harm.A licensed professional counselor initiated the process for involuntary court-ordered evaluation and treatment pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 36-523 alleging that Mother was a danger to herself and others and persistently disabled. The superior court granted the petition. After court-ordered treatment Mother was discharged, and the petition was dismissed. Five days later, Mother drowned her twin boys. Father brought this action against, among others, Crisis Preparation and Recovery Inc. The superior court granted summary judgment for Crisis Prep, finding that it had no duty to report Mother's condition given that she was undergoing court-ordered treatment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 13-3620(A) did not impose a duty on Crisis Prep under the circumstances; and (2) Hamman v. County of Maricopa, 161 Ariz. 58 (1989), and Little v. All Phoenix South Community Mental Health Center, 186 Ariz. 97 (App. 1996), are overruled to the extent they found a duty in such circumstances based on foreseeability. View "Avitia v. Crisis Preparation & Recovery, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of Corizon Healthcare Inc. in this medical malpractice action, holding that the requirements of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-2604 do not apply to claims against medical institutions not based on vicarious liability.David Windhurst, an inmate, was provided with health care through the Arizona Department of Corrections' contractor Corizon Healthcare Inc. David later died due the infections complications of diabetes mellitus. Plaintiff, David's widow, filed a wrongful death action against Corizon and other defendants, alleging, inter alia, institutional negligence by Corizon and vicarious liability based on the negligence of its medical personnel. The trial court granted summary judgment for Corizon on the medical negligence claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when it is unclear which provider breached the standard of care, an expert on institutional standards of care may address an alleged breach by establishing that a class of providers failed to exercise appropriate care; (2) the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment for Corizon; and (3) a registered nurse may testify regarding gate cause of death in a medical malpractice case. View "Windhurst v. Ariz. Dep't of Corrections" on Justia Law

In this insurance dispute, the Supreme Court held that Ariz. Rev. Stat. 20-259.01 mandates that a single policy insuring multiple vehicles provides different underinsured motorist (UIM) coverages for each vehicle rather than a single UIM coverage that applies to multiple vehicles.Plaintiff's mother died in a car crash caused by a neglectful driver. Plaintiff submitted a UIM to CSAA General Insurance Company, her mother's insurer. At the time of the accident, Plaintiff's mother's CSAA policy covered the mother's two vehicles and provided UIM coverage of $50,000 per person. When CSAA paid only $50,000 Plaintiff sought an additional $50,000 under an "intra-policy stacking" theory. After CSAA rejected the claim, Plaintiff sued for declaratory judgment, alleging breach of contract, bad faith, and a class action. CSAA moved to certify two questions. The Supreme Court answered (1) insurers seeking to prevent insureds from stacking UIM coverages under a single, multi-vehicle policy must employ section 20-259.01(H)'s sole prescribed method for limiting stacking; and (2) section 20-259.01(B) does not bar an insured from receiving UIM coverage from the policy in an amount greater than the bodily injury or death liability limits of the policy. View "Franklin v. CSAA General Insurance" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court overruled in substantial part DeGraff v. Smith, 62 Ariz. 261 (1945), which concluded that dismissing a claim against an employee with prejudice serves to exonerate that employee from negligence and thus simultaneously adjudicates a respondent superior claim against the employer, holding that if a tort claim against the employee was dismissed for reasons unrelated to its merits, the respondent superior claim remains viable.Jacob Laurence and his son were injured when a truck owned by Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District (SRP) and driven by John Gabrielson, SRP's employee, collided with Laurence's vehicle. Laurence brought this action claiming that SRP was vicariously liable for Gabrielson's negligence. The superior court granted Gabrielson's motion for summary judgment as it pertained to Laurence's claim due to untimeliness but denied the motion as it pertained to the minor son's claim. The court then granted SRP's motion for summary judgment on Laurence's respondeat superior claim because the court had granted summary judgment for Gabrielson on that claim. The court ultimately dismissed all claims, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated and reversed, holding (1) DeGraff was based on incorrect reasoning; and (2) therefore, the superior court erred in entering summary judgment for SRP. View "Laurence v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District" on Justia Law