Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Martha and Mario Madrigal sued the City of Mesa. After the case was settled by the Madrigals’ second attorney, Raymond Slomski, the Madrigals’ first attorney, Edward Fitzhugh, assigned his rights under the parties’ contingent fee agreement to Al Carranza. Carranza later sued the Madrigals (“the fee-collection action”). The Madrigals subsequently divorced pursuant to a decree that allocated the remaining funds from the as-yet-unresolved fee-collection action. Mario and Carranza then entered into a settlement agreement that called for a portion of the disputed funds to be released to Mario and Carranza. The superior court approved the agreement. Slomski filed an interpleader action contesting the settlement. Thereafter, Martha successfully moved to set aside the order approving the settlement. Carranza then moved to substitute Fitzhugh as the real party in interest in both the fee-collection action and the interpleader action. The superior court denied the substitution request and court granted summary judgment in favor of Martha in the fee-collection action. The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment but reversed the denial of Carranza’s motion to substitute in the fee-collection action. The Supreme Court vacated in part, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions to substitute. View "Carranza v. Madrigal" on Justia Law

The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of Father to his two children. Father appealed. While the appeal was pending, the juvenile court ordered the children’s adoption. Thereafter, the court of appeals reversed the termination of Father’s parental rights. Father then filed a motion asking the juvenile court to set aside the adoption pursuant to Arizona Rule of Procedure for Juvenile Court 85(A). The juvenile court denied the motion. The court of appeals vacated the adoption order as void, concluding that Arizona Rule of Procedure for Juvenile Court 103(F) divests the juvenile court of authority to enter an adoption order pending a biological parent’s appeal of a termination-of-rights order. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion, holding that the court of appeals misinterpreted Rule 103(F) and that the juvenile court had authority to enter the adoption order. Remanded to the court of appeals to decide whether the juvenile court properly denied Father’s motion to set aside the adoption pursuant to Rule 85(A). View "Roberto F. v. Dep’t of Child Safety" on Justia Law

Daughter accused Stepfather of sexual abuse. Because Daughter was a minor at the time of the accusation, Mother asserted victims’ rights on her behalf. Before trial, Daughter turned eighteen. Stepfather then filed a motion to compel Mother to submit to a defense interview, which the superior court granted. Mother and Daughter sought special action relief in the court of appeals. The court held that the right of a parent who exercises victims’ rights on behalf of a minor to refuse a defense interview expires when the victim reaches the age of eighteen. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals and the order of the superior court, holding that a parent who exercises victims’ rights on behalf of a minor child is statutorily entitled to refuse a defense interview through the final disposition of the charges, even if the child earlier turns eighteen. View "J.D. v. Hon. Hugh Hegyi" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a juvenile court can delegate discretion to the Arizona Department of Economic Security (ADES) to return a dependent child to his or her parents without first determining that return is in the child’s best interests. The juvenile court concluded that ADES has the discretion to determine when it serves a dependent child’s best interests to be returned to the child’s parent or guardian. The Supreme Court vacated the juvenile court’s order, holding (1) a juvenile court must specifically determine that return of a dependent child to his or her parents is in the child’s best interests before ordering the return; and (2) the juvenile court in this case erred by granting discretion to ADES to place dependent children with their parents without a prior judicial determination that reunification was in the children’s best interests. View "Alexander M. v. Hon. Lisa Abrams" on Justia Law

In 2006, Wife and Husband divorced. In 2011, the superior court conducted a hearing on the parties’ post-decree petitions. Prior to the hearing, Wife filed a petition seeking reimbursement for certain 2010-11 expenses under the terms of the decree of dissolution. The court, however, did not consider the expenses at the hearing. On November 1, 2011, the court entered an order resolving all of the issues listed in the pretrial statement and denied Wife’s request for attorneys’ fees. Shortly thereafter, the court vacated this fee ruling. On September 12, 2012, the court awarded Wife a judgment on the 2010-11 expenses and again denied her request for attorneys’ fees. On October 11, 2012, Wife appealed from both the November 1, 2011 and September 12, 2012 orders. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal from the November 1, 2011 order as untimely. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ order and remanded, holding a family court order that neither resolves a pending request for attorneys’ fees nor includes language making the order appealable is not final for purposes of appeal. View "Bollermann v. Nowlis" on Justia Law

Relatives of Bradford Lund (collectively, Miller) sought the appointment of a guardian and conservator to manage Bradford's assets. Bradford, his father, and his stepfather (collectively, the Lunds) opposed the appointment. Miller's counsel subsequently served a law firm that previously represented Bradford (JS&S) with a subpoena requesting all non-privileged information relating to Bradford. JS&S mistakenly delivered the entire client file to counsel without reviewing it for privileged information. Eventually, the trial court decided to review the documents in camera before ruling on whether each document was privileged. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's order, holding (1) before reviewing a particular document, a trial court must first determine that an in camera review is necessary to resolve the privilege claim; and (2) the trial court in this case erred by ruling that it would review all the documents to determine whether they were privileged without considering the parties' arguments regarding privilege and waiver to determine whether in camera review was warranted for particular documents before reviewing them. Remanded. View "Lund v. Myers" on Justia Law

After the superior court issued a decree dissolving the marriage of Sue Craig and Roger Craig, Roger timely filed a motion for a new trial or to amend the decree. Before the court ruled on Roger's motion, Sue filed a notice of appeal. Roger then cross-appealed. The superior court denied Roger's motion, and neither party filed a new or amended notice of appeal. A divided court of appeals dismissed both appeals for lack of jurisdiction, finding the rule stated in Barassi v. Matison that appellate courts should dismiss for lack of jurisdiction the case where a litigant attempts to appeal where a motion is still pending in the trial court applied. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding the Barassi rule applies even when the notice of appeal is filed by a non-moving party. View "Craig v. Craig" on Justia Law