Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Roger Contreras and Nancy Bourke were involved in a marriage dissolution proceeding in Cochise County, Arizona, with a decree entered in 2011. The case saw extensive post-decree litigation. In February 2020, all Cochise County Superior Court judges, including Judge Timothy Dickerson, recused themselves from the matter without providing reasons on the record, and the case was reassigned to a Pima County judge. In 2021, Judge Dickerson became the presiding judge of Cochise County Superior Court and subsequently appointed Contreras as a justice of the peace pro tempore. In December 2022, Contreras moved to have Bourke declared a vexatious litigant, and Judge Dickerson, despite his prior recusal, ruled on the motion without explaining his re-entry or giving the parties an opportunity to object.Judge Dickerson designated Bourke a vexatious litigant. Bourke appealed, and the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that Bourke had waived any challenge to Judge Dickerson’s participation by failing to timely seek disqualification under relevant statutes and rules. The appellate majority did not address Bourke’s argument regarding Judge Dickerson’s appointment of Contreras as a justice of the peace pro tempore as a potential conflict, while the dissent argued that waiver should not apply under the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case. It held that once a judge recuses from a case, the judge remains disqualified from further participation unless the judge articulates the reasons why recusal is no longer required and allows the parties an opportunity to object. The court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion, reversed the superior court’s order declaring Bourke a vexatious litigant, and remanded for a different judge to rule on Contreras’ motion. View "CONTRERAS v BOURKE" on Justia Law

In this case, the father and mother of B.W. had a contentious relationship, and the father was involved in a criminal incident where he shot and killed a man. Following this incident, the father was advised by his criminal defense attorney not to contact the mother or B.W. to avoid jeopardizing his defense. The father was later charged with first-degree murder and conspiracy but was acquitted in December 2021. In March 2022, the father sought to establish his parental rights, and the mother filed for termination of his parental rights based on abandonment.The Superior Court in Maricopa County found that the father had abandoned B.W. by failing to maintain a normal parental relationship for over six months without just cause. The court rejected the father's argument that he had just cause for his inaction, noting that he did not take any legal steps to assert his parental rights. The court concluded that termination of the father's parental rights was in B.W.'s best interest. The father appealed.The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's decision, agreeing that the father did not demonstrate just cause for his failure to maintain a relationship with B.W. The court held that the father's reliance on his criminal defense attorney's advice did not excuse his inaction.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case to clarify the meaning of "just cause" under A.R.S. § 8-531(1). The court held that "just cause" refers to a reasonable and justifiable reason for a parent's failure to maintain a normal parental relationship, based on good faith. The court reversed the juvenile court's termination order and remanded the case for reconsideration, instructing the lower court to apply the clarified definition of "just cause" in determining whether the father's actions were justified. The Court of Appeals' decision was vacated. View "In re Termination Parental Rights as to B.W." on Justia Law

William Chalmers filed for legal separation from his wife, which was later converted to a dissolution proceeding. During the proceedings, Chalmers' attorney requested the appointment of a guardian ad litem due to concerns about Chalmers' capacity. The court appointed Brian Theut as guardian ad litem, who then requested the appointment of East Valley Fiduciary Services, Inc. (EVFS) as temporary guardian and conservator. EVFS retained Ryan Scharber and John McKindles to represent them and Chalmers, respectively. The professionals did not file the required statement under A.R.S. § 14-5109(A) explaining their compensation arrangement.The professionals filed numerous applications for fees and costs, which were initially approved by the court. However, when a new judge took over, Chalmers objected to the fee applications, including those already approved. The court denied the outstanding fee applications, citing the professionals' failure to comply with § 14-5109(A) and noting that they had already received substantial compensation. The court of appeals held that the prior fee approvals were not final and remanded the case to determine if the approvals were manifestly erroneous or unjust due to non-compliance with § 14-5109(A).The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that failure to comply with § 14-5109(A) does not automatically preclude recovery of fees. The court found that the statute is directory, not mandatory, and that the trial court has discretion to rectify non-compliance. The court vacated the court of appeals' opinion, affirmed the denial of fees to which Chalmers timely objected, but reversed the ruling requiring the professionals to disgorge previously awarded fees. The case was remanded to reinstate the initial fee awards. View "In the matter of CHALMERS" on Justia Law

Mother conceived M.N. with Father in summer 2020. Before M.N. was born, Mother and her boyfriend initiated adoption proceedings without informing the adoption agency about Father. M.N. was born on March 23, 2021, and Father requested a DNA test at the hospital. In April 2021, Mother and her boyfriend signed adoption consent forms, and the adoption agency petitioned for termination of parental rights. After being identified as a potential father, Father was served notice of the adoption and filed a paternity action within the required timeframe. Genetic testing confirmed Father as the biological father.The juvenile court terminated Father’s parental rights, finding he failed to file with the putative fathers registry. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, concluding the juvenile court improperly terminated Father’s rights under § 8-533(B)(6) without considering his rights as a potential father under § 8-106. The court of appeals held that genetic testing established Father as a presumed legal father, exempting him from filing with the putative fathers registry.The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed the case to determine if a potential father served with a § 8-106 notice must file a notice of a claim of paternity with the putative fathers registry under § 8-106.01. The court held that a potential father identified and served notice under § 8-106(G) is not required to file with the putative fathers registry. The court emphasized that the potential fathers statute and the putative fathers statute address separate classifications of fathers, each with distinct rights and obligations. The court vacated parts of the court of appeals’ opinion, reversed the juvenile court’s termination order, and remanded for further proceedings. View "IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.N." on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over jurisdiction in a divorce proceeding between Maria Del Carmen Rendon Quijada and Julian Javier Pimienta Dominguez. The couple, originally from Mexico, moved to the U.S. in 2007. Pimienta held a TN visa, allowing him to work temporarily in the U.S., while Rendon held a TD visa, reserved for spouses and minor children of TN visa holders. Rendon's TD visa expired in March 2020, and she began seeking lawful permanent resident status in December 2020. In May 2022, Rendon filed for divorce in Arizona. Pimienta argued that Rendon could not establish domicile in Arizona due to her expired TD visa, which precludes her from intending to remain in the state indefinitely. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case.The court of appeals reversed the decision, holding that Rendon's TD visa did not prevent her from establishing a U.S. domicile, as she had begun seeking lawful permanent resident status. The court concluded that federal immigration law did not preempt Arizona jurisdiction over the dissolution proceeding.The Supreme Court of Arizona disagreed with the lower courts' focus on federal immigration law. It held that the question was not whether federal immigration law divested Arizona courts of jurisdiction over a divorce sought by an expired TD visa holder, but whether the visa holder could meet the domicile requirements under Arizona law. The court concluded that federal immigration law did not prevent Rendon from establishing domicile in Arizona, and thus, the state courts had jurisdiction over the divorce proceeding. The court vacated the court of appeals' opinion, reversed the trial court's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF QUIJADA/DOMINGUEZ" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that an injury settlement agreement between the married couple in this case and a third party did constitute a valid and binding property settlement or postnuptial agreement, thus reversing the trial court's judgment and remanding the case for further proceedings.Husband and Wife sued the manufacturer of Husband's pacemaker, among other parties, claiming medical malpractice. The couple were awarded $2 million in compensatory damages and $5.4 million in punitive damages. Thereafter, the couple entered into a written settlement agreement with the pacemaker manufacturer requiring, for purposes of this appeal, Husband and Wife to use $5.4 million of the settlement to fund a series of annuity payments. Later, the parties separated, and the trial court entered a dissolution decree finding that the parties had agreed to the allocation of the settlement funds. Wife appealed, arguing that the punitive damages portion of the agreement was a community asset that should have been equitably divided. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's determination that the annuity payments were not community property based on the settlement, holding that the agreement was not a valid postnuptial agreement. View "Sowards v. Sowards" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals vacating the order of the juvenile court terminating Mother's parental rights under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 8-533(B)(8)(c), holding that the court of appeals exceeded the proper scope of review and erroneously implied that it could dismiss the dependency finding in an appeal challenging a termination order.In vacating the juvenile court's judgment terminating parental rights, the court of appeals concluded that "even accepting all of the juvenile court's findings of fact...the state failed to meet its burden to justify severance" and that the juvenile court clearly erred. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals opinion and affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court, holding (1) the court of appeals' failure to examine each element contained in the statutory ground for termination was error; (2) the court of appeals exceeded the proper scope of review by reweighing the evidence presented to the juvenile court; and (3) the juvenile court did not clearly err in determining that the statutory ground for termination was proven by clear and convincing evidence. View "Brionna J. v. Dep't of Child Safety, A.V." on Justia Law

In this marriage dissolution case, the Supreme Court held that the appropriate method of establishing the marital community's interest in separate property should begin with trial judges using the "Drahos/Barnett formula" and then adjust the calculation to account for the community's overall contribution of labor and funds to the separate property along with the market appreciation of the property.At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the formula laid out in Drahos v. Rent, 149 Ariz. 248 (App. 1985) and refined in Branett v. Jedymak, 219 Ariz. 550 (App. 2009) (the Drahos/Barnett formula) was the appropriate method of establishing the marital community's equitable lien on a spouse's separate property, in order to provide for a fair division of the separate property’s increase in value proportionate to the amount the community contributed to the property. The Supreme Court held that the Drahos/Barnett formula is an appropriate starting point for courts to calculate a marital community's equitable lien on a spouse's separate property, thus affirming the trial court's judgment in this case. View "Saba v. Khoury" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court in this parental rights termination case, holding that the juvenile court applied the incorrect definition of "normal home" in Ariz. Rev. Stat. 8-533(B) in terminating the parental interest of Father to his child.The juvenile court found H.B. and her half-siblings dependent as to Mother and their respective fathers. As to Father, the court found that DCS had proved termination pursuant to the length-of-sentence ground listed 8-533(B)(4) and that termination was in H.B.'s best interests. Specifically, the court concluded that Father's incarceration had and would continue to deprive H.B. of a normal home for a period of years, thus demonstrating the legnth-of-sentence ground for termination. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the juvenile court erred by not considering whether a permanent guardianship could provide H.B. with a "normal home" while Father maintained his parental rights; and (2) remand was necessary for consideration of Father's past and ongoing efforts to parent H.B. from prison and their impact on H.B.'s interest in a stable home life in the court's best interests analysis. View "Timothy B. v. Department of Child Safety" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the juvenile court terminating the parent-child relationship of Father to his four children, holding that while the juvenile court misapplied two factors set forth in Michael J. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security, 196 Ariz. 246 (2000), substantial evidence existed to support the termination.After a hearing, the juvenile court found that Father's incarcerative sentence was of sufficient length to deprive the children of a normal home for a period of years and that termination of Father's parental rights was in the children's best interests. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in evaluating the Michael J. factors. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the juvenile court misapplied the first two Michael J. factors; (2) the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Father's sentence was of sufficient length to deprive the children of a normal home for a period of years; and (3) reasonable evidence supported the juvenile court's best-interests finding. View "Jessie D. v. Department of Child Safety" on Justia Law