Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentences of death, holding that the mitigation evidence was not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.Defendant was convicted of three counts of first-degree murder. During sentencing, the trial court found three aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt and only one mitigating factor. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. On review, the Supreme Court found additional mitigating factors but nonetheless upheld Defendant's sentence. Defendant later filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the federal district court denied. The Ninth Circuit reversed and granted relief, concluding that habeas relief was warranted because the Supreme Court erred in its independent review of the death sentences when considering Defendant's mitigation evidence. The Supreme Court granted the State's motion to conduct a new independent review and affirmed, holding that the mitigating evidence was not sufficient to warrant leniency in light of the three aggravators proven by the State. View "State v. Poyson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's conviction on the basis that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to give a Willits instruction under the circumstances of this case, holding that law enforcement's failure to collect putative fingerprint and DNA evidence did not warrant a Willits instruction.Defendant was charged with one count of fleeing from a law enforcement vehicle. Before trial, Defendant requested a Willits instruction, arguing that the State's failure to collect DNA and fingerprint evidence from the vehicle he had allegedly been driving deprived him of a fair trial. The trial court denied the request, and the jury found Defendant guilty. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Defendant was entitled to a Willits instruction. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' opinion and affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that the State's failure to gather every conceivable piece of physical evidence in this case did not require a Willits instruction. View "State v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that consecutive sentences imposed for separate crimes, when the cumulative sentences exceed a juvenile's life expectancy, do not violate the Eighth Amendment, as interpreted in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).Defendants in these cases argued that their sentences violated the Eighth Amendment. At issue was whether Graham, Miller, and Montgomery prohibit aggregated consecutive sentences for separate crimes that exceed a juvenile's life expectancy. The Supreme Court held that Graham, Miller, and Montgomery do not prohibit such de facto life sentences, and therefore, Graham and its progeny do not constitute a significant chance in the law under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(g). View "State v. Soto-Fong" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Respondent, a superior court judge, erred in concluding that Ariz. R. Crim. P. 24.2 did not bar him from vacating the Enmund/Tison verdict in this case.Defendant was found guilty of child abuse and first degree murder. Before a defendant convicted of felony murder can be sentenced to death, the jury must find that the defendant either (1) killed, attempted to kill, or intended that a killing take place or that lethal force be used, Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); or (2) was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987). The jurors found that Defendant's conduct satisfied Enmund/Tison, but the jury could not unanimously reach a verdict as to Defendant's sentence. Relying on State v. Miles, 243 Ariz. 511 (2018) and Rule 24.2, Defendant moved to vacate the Enmund/Tison verdict while her case was pending retrial of the penalty phase. Respondent vacated the jury's aggravation phase verdict, concluding that the Enmund/Tison verdict was faulty as a result of Miles. The Supreme Court vacated the order, holding that a judgment and a sentence must be entered before a Rule 24.2 motion may be filed and considered by a trial court. View "State ex rel. Adel v. Honorable John Hannah" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the trial court appointing a special master to conduct an in camera review of recordings of jail phone calls between Defendant and a criminal defense attorney to determine whether the calls were privileged, holding that a court may not invade the attorney-client privilege to determine its existence, even in camera using a special master.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) a party claiming the attorney-client privilege must make a prima facie showing supporting that claim, and upon such a showing, the court may hold a hearing to determine whether the privilege applies; (2) once the privilege has been established, a party attempting to set it aside under the crime-fraud exception must demonstrate a factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person that in camera review of the materials may reveal evidence to establish the claim that the crime-fraud exception applies, and only then may a special master review the privileged communications; and (3) because the State conceded that it cannot meet its burden, if the court determines that the privilege applies, the State may not review the recordings between Defendant and his attorney. View "Clements v. Honorable Deborah Bernini" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-1202(B)(2), which enhances the sentence for threatening or intimidating if the defendant is a criminal street gang member, is unconstitutional because it increases the defendant's sentence based solely upon gang status, in violation of substantive due process.Defendant was arrested and charged with two counts of threatening or intimidating, in violation of section 13-1202(B)(2). The trial court dismissed all threatening or intimidating charges, holding that section 13-1202(B)(2) is unconstitutional because it violates due process by punishing a defendant for mere gang membership or association. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 13-1202(B)(2) violates due process because it enhances criminal penalties based solely on gang status without a sufficient nexus between gang membership and the underlying crime of threatening or intimidating. View "State v. Arevalo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Arizona's statutory framework for adjudicating intellectual disability complies with the constitutional requirements announced in the recent United States Supreme Court cases, Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017) (Moore I), and Moore v. Texas, 139 S. Ct. 666 (2019) (Moore II).Pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-753(K)(3), a finding that a defendant has an intellectual disability requires a mental deficit "existing concurrently with significant impairment in adaptive behavior" before the defendant is eighteen. At issue in this case was the impact of Moore I and Moore II on section 13-753(K)(1)'s definition of "adaptive behavior." The Supreme Court held that Moore I and Moore II did not eliminate section 13-753(K)(1)'s requirements that the trial court conduct an overall assessment to determine if the defendant has a deficit in any life-skill category and, if a deficit exists, determine whether it affects the defendant's ability to meet "the standards of personal independence and social responsibility expected of defendant's age and cultural group." Because the trial court did not conduct an overall assessment of Defendant's ability to meet society's expectations of him, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded this case for a new intellectual disability determination using the standard set forth in this opinion. View "State v. Honorable Michael W. Kemp" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part Defendant's convictions and sentences for two counts of theft, two counts of vehicle theft, and one count of robbery, holding that theft is a lesser-included offense of both vehicle theft and robbery but that vehicle theft is not a lesser-included offense of robbery.At issue was whether Defendant's convictions and sentences constituted multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court held (1) theft is a lesser-included offense of vehicle theft, and therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited Defendant's convictions for both theft and vehicle theft; (2) theft is a lesser-included offense of robbery; (3) vehicle theft is not a lesser-included offense of robbery, and vehicle theft and robbery may be punished separately; and (4) an offense with a greater penalty can be a lesser-included offense of one with a lesser penalty. View "State v. Carter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's probation revocation and sentence on the basis that Defendant was precluded from challenging her sentence on appeal because she had invited any potential error, holding that an appellate court may not apply the invited error doctrine to preclude review of an illegal, stipulated sentence in a plea agreement.Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter and reckless child abuse. Consistent with the agreement, the trial court sentenced Defendant to ten years' imprisonment for the manslaughter and a consecutive term of lifetime probation for child abuse. After Defendant violated her probation, Defendant argued that her convictions for manslaughter and child abuse comprised a single criminal act against a single victim, and therefore, the stipulated consecutive sentences in her plea agreement resulted in an illegal double punishment. The trial court disagreed and revoked Defendant's probation. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that Defendant was precluded from challenging her sentence on appeal because she had invited any potential error by stipulating to consecutive sentences in her plea agreement. The Supreme Court vacated the court's opinion, holding that the court of appeals erred in applying the invited error doctrine to preclude Defendant from challenging the error on appeal. View "State v. Robertson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the practice of placing a cap on the amount of restitution a defendant may be liable for in a plea agreement, without the victim's consent, violates the right to restitution.In State v. Lukens, 151 Ariz. 502 (1986), State v. Phillips, 152 Airz. 533 (1987), and State v. Crowder, 155 Ariz. 477 (1987), the Supreme Court held that a specific amount of restitution or a cap is necessary for a defendant to make a voluntary and intelligent plea. Here, the Supreme Court overruled these former decisions, holding (1) there is no constitutional requirement to inform a defendant of a specific amount of restitution or to cap the amount of restitution that a court may order; and (2) the change will apply prospectively. Further, the Court held that a lawyer representing a victim has a presumptive right to sit in the well of the courtroom during a hearing involving a victim's constitutional or statutory right, subject to the physical limitations of a courtroom or other trial exigencies.In the instant case, the Supreme Court vacated the cap on restitution available to the victim. View "E.H. v. Honorable Dan Slayton" on Justia Law