Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On July 18, 2012, Robinson beat, bound, and immolated his nine-months-pregnant girlfriend, S.H., in their apartment, killing her and their unborn child, B.H. He then placed a 9-1-1 call to report a fire. Upon extinguishing the fire, responders discovered S.H.’s partially burned body lying face down on the bedroom floor with her feet and hands bound, wrists handcuffed, mouth and eyes covered with duct tape, and mouth stuffed with cloth. A search of Robinson’s backpack revealed rolls of duct tape, pieces of crumpled duct tape, a matchbook with at least one match missing, and a receipt reflecting purchases of duct tape and a bottle of lighter fluid that day. Police found a handcuff key in Robinson’s pocket.Robinson was sentenced to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed, first rejecting “Batson” challenges to the dismissal of potential minority jurors. The court upheld the jury’s “especial cruelty” and its “heinous or depraved conduct” findings. The legislature’s decision to equate feticide with infanticide also makes B.H.’s murder senseless as a matter of law. Robinson’s double-counting argument failed. Although the jury was prohibited from weighing B.H.’s age twice as it “assesse[d] aggravation and mitigation” at the penalty phase, it was permitted to “use one fact to find multiple aggravators” at the aggravation phase. The court also rejected challenges to jury instructions and statements made by the prosecutor. View "State of Arizona v Robinson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the identity of an alleged narcotic drug is an element of Arizona's drug possession statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-3408, and therefore, jury unanimity is required as to which drug or drugs listed in Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-3401(6), (19), (20), or (23) was involved in an offense under section 34-3408.Petitioners in this case were Mexican natives lawfully residing in the United States who were convicted of drug-related counts. Based on their convictions, the immigration court ordered them removed from the country. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified for the Supreme Court questions regarding whether Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-3415 and section 13-3408 were divisible as to drug type. The Supreme Court declined to answer the first two certified questions but did hold that jury unanimity regarding the identity of a specific drug is required for a conviction under section 13-3408. View "Romero-Millan v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that because the alleged conduct of a victim of the collision in this case occurred simultaneously with Max Fontes's alleged criminal conduct, Fontes was not entitled to a superseding cause jury instruction.Max Fontes was speeding when he struck Angel Shelby's vehicle. Shelby and his son were not restrained, and the child died. Shelby later pled guilty to driving under the influence and endangerment. Fontes was charged with, inter alia, manslaughter. Before trial, the State filed a motion in limine to preclude Fontes from raising a superseding cause defense. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Shelby's acts could constitute a superseding cause. The court of appeals vacated the trial court's order, concluding that a superseding cause instruction was precluded under the circumstances. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts, holding (1) Fontes was not entitled to a superseding cause jury instruction because Shelby's alleged acts and omissions were not intervening events; but (2) the court of appeals failed to analyze the predicate issue of whether Shelby's alleged acts and omissions were intervening events. View "State v. Honorable Aragon" on Justia Law

In this criminal case concerning a defendant who asserted the attorney-client privilege the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the trial court ruling that all of the defendant's communications with his mitigation specialist, Anna Nelson, and the defense team's paralegal, Nicole Erich, were confidential, privileged, and non-discoverable, holding that there was no error.Defendant was in jail awaiting trial on charges of, among other things, first degree murder. Defendant used the jail's electronic tablets, including its text messaging capabilities, to communicate with members of the defense team. The State issued and served a criminal subpoena duces tecum on the jail requesting Defendant's texts to dispute his claimed intellectual disability. The State filed a motion to determine non-privileged status of communications with the trial court, arguing that Defendant's texts with the defense team were not privileged. The court ruled in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's ruling, holding the remand was required pursuant to Clements v. Bernini ex rel. County of Pima, 249 Ariz. 434 (2020), and the reasoning in this opinion. View "State ex rel. Adel v. Honorable Adleman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the restitution order of the trial court to the extent that it ordered payment of C.C.'s attorney fees, holding that most of C.C.'s fees were not recoverable as criminal restitution.Defendant was convicted of one count of voyeurism for using a mirror to look beneath the door of a bathroom being occupied by C.C. The trial court awarded C.C. restitution that included attorney fees she had incurred in retaining an attorney to represent her in the proceedings. The Supreme Court held (1) a victim's attorney fees are recoverable as criminal restitution but only when an attorney is reasonably necessary to remedy the harm caused by the criminal conduct; and (2) because the vast majority of the attorney fees sought by C.C. did not flow directly from Defendant's criminal conduct, those fees were indirect, consequential damages, and therefore, the court erred by awarding those fees as restitution. View "State v. Reed" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for multiple counts of first degree murder and sentence of death, holding that no prejudicial error occurred in the proceedings below.After a ten-day trial, a jury found Defendant guilty of the 2012 first degree murders of Penelope Edwards and Troy Dunn under both premeditated and felony murder theories. After the penalty phase of trial, the jury returned death verdicts for both murders. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence recovered during a traffic stop and any fruit of that search; (2) the trial court did not err in the way it conducted voir dire; (3) Defendant's evidentiary challenges were without merit; (4) one instance of prosecutorial error occurred, but the error was not prejudicial; (5) any error during the aggravation phase was harmless; and (6) Defendant's challenges to the death penalty were unavailing. View "State v. Thompson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in Plaintiffs' favor on their common law negligence claims and their dram shop liability claim against JAI Dining Services (Phoenix) Inc., holding that the trial court properly submitted to the jury the question of whether JAI was relieved from liability from overserving alcohol.After spending the evening drinking and socializing at a club in Phoenix, Cesar Villanueva, while intoxicated, drove his truck home. Villanueva fell asleep for a short time before he agreed to take a friend home. Villanueva, however, was still intoxicated and struck a vehicle, killing two people. Villanueva was convicted of two counts of manslaughter and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Plaintiffs, the victims' families, sued JAI, which owned the club, alleging negligence-based claims for over serving alcohol to Villanueva. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a jury could reasonably have concluded that Villanueva’s act of driving while intoxicated, even after he reached home, was nevertheless foreseeable by someone in the club’s position and not extraordinary in hindsight. View "Torres v. JAI Dining Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held in this case that a crime victim has a constitutional and statutory right to be heard on the merits of a defendant's motion for a delayed appeal of a restitution order.Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. Beth Fay was a victim of Defendant's crime under Arizona law. Defendant and Fay entered into an agreement regarding restitution, and the trial court entered a restitution award according to the agreement. Eight months later, Defendant filed a limited petition for post-conviction relief to contest the award pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(f). Fay filed a response, arguing that Defendant was not entitled to a delayed appeal. The trial court struck Fay's response on the ground that Fay lacked standing to be heard on Defendant's limited petition. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Fay had a right to be heard on the question of whether Defendant was entitled to file a delayed appeal. View "Fay v. Honorable Fox" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court summarily denying relief as to Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief and affirmed the trial court's ruling dismissing Petitioner's PCR petition, holding that Petitioner's claims did not warrant relief.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) a defendant need not present a standard of care expert affidavit to support his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Petitioner failed to present colorable IAC claims; (2) Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228 (2012), did not cause a significant change in Arizona law; and (3) Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-4234(G) unconstitutionally conflicts with the procedure established by the Supreme Court in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4. View "State v. Bigger" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Ariz. R. Crim. P. 7.2(c), which addresses a defendant's right to release after a conviction but before the defendant is sentenced, applies to a release determination required under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 27.7(c) when a probationer is arrested on a warrant pursuant to a petition to revoke probation.In 2006, Defendant was convicted of transportation of marijuana for sale. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on probation. California then assumed supervision of Defendant. In 2009, Defendant was charged in California for felonies, and Arizona filed a petition to revoke probation. In 2018, a California court convicted Defendant of two counts of armed robbery. The California court sentenced Defendant to time served and granted him parole. In 2019, Defendant returned to Arizona for his probation revocation arraignment and denied the allegations in the petition to revoke. The court ordered that Defendant be held without bail pursuant to Rule 7.2(c) pending the disposition of the petition. Defendant petitioned for special action review, arguing that Rule 7.2(c) does not apply to a release determination under Rule 27.7(c). The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that Rule 7.2(c)(1)(A) applies to determining release conditions for a probationer pending a revocation proceeding under Rule 27.7(c). View "Wilson v. Honorable Higgins" on Justia Law