Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
by
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the post-conviction relief (PCR) court determining that Appellant raised a colorable claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel and ordering him to disclose certain materials, holding that the PCR court did not err in ordering the disclosure of the records.Appellant was found guilty of two counts of first degree murder and sentenced to death. In these PCR proceedings, the PCR court determined that Appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim in III(A)-III(E) of the PCR petition was colorable. The court then ordered Appellant to disclose materials associated with trial counsel's interviews of three of Appellant's family members who did not testify during the penalty phase of trial. Appellant filed a petition for special action, claiming that he should not have to disclose the records at issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was good cause for the disclosure of materials associated with the interviews under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.6(b)(2). View "Naranjo v. Honorable Sukenic" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court held that the justification defense provided in Arizona's self-defense statute, Arizona. Rev. Stat. 13-404(A), does not extend to both the defendant and the victim but only applies to a defendant's conduct. Section 13-404(A) states that "a person is justified in threatening or using physical force against another when and to the extent a reasonable person would believe that physical force is immediately necessary to protect [one]self against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful physical force." However, Rev. Ariz. Jury Instr. (Crim.) Justification for Self-Defense 4.04, at 63-65 (4th ed. 2016), states that the justification defense applies not to a "person" but to a "defendant." The court of appeals vacated Defendant's convictions and remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the justification presumptions were not intended to apply to the victim's conduct. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) the term "person" in section 13-404(A) applies to a defendant in a criminal prosecution; and (2) therefore, the trial court erred when it modified the standard Revised Arizona Jury Instruction to incorporate a victim's use of force. View "State v. Ewer" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order granting preliminary injunctive relief in this case, holding that courts lack authority to enter a nunc pro tunc order absent clerical error or mistake in the record rendering such an order void and subject to collateral attack.In 1994, Nevada Freeman was convicted of first-degree murder. In 2020, after disagreement about whether Freeman was parole eligible, Freeman and the State entered into a stipulation regarding Freeman's sentence. The stipulation stated that, at the time of Freeman's sentencing, the parties intended that after twenty-five years' imprisonment Freeman would be eligible for parole. The parties thus requested that Freeman's sentencing order be corrected to include the word "parole" as a form of release. The judge entered a nunc pro tunc order making the requested amendment. Freeman then filed claim for injunctive relief arguing that his sentence, as amended, clearly conferred parole eligibility. The trial judge granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court exceeded its authority under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 24.4 because it did not remedy a clerical error, omission, or oversight in the record. View "Shinn v. Ariz. Bd. Of Executive Clemency" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions on two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, two counts of aggravated assault causing temporary but substantial disfigurement, and one count of attempted second degree murder, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.At issue on appeal was whether the trial court committed fundamental error by instructing the jury that a conviction for attempted second degree murder may be based not only on intent to kill but on recklessness or the defendant's knowledge that serious injury would result. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) the trial court's instruction on second degree murder was erroneous, and a new instruction is necessary, which the Court adopts in this opinion; and (2) based on the evidence, the nature of the charged offense, and other factors, Defendant fell short of meeting his burden of persuading the Court that he suffered prejudice. View "State v. Fierro" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant's motion seeking remand to the grand jury for a redetermination of probable cause pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 12.9, holding that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's Rule 12.9 motion.A grand jury indicted Defendant for attempted second degree murder and other crimes. Defendant subsequently filed the motion at issue, arguing that the State withheld clearly exculpatory evidence of a justification defense that it was obligated to present despite the evidence not being requested by the defense. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Arizona Constitution guarantees a person under grand jury investigation a due process right to a fair and impartial presentation of clearly exculpatory evidence, and a prosecutor has a duty to present such evidence to a grand jury even in the absence of a specific request; (2) where there is evidence relevant to a justification defense that would deter a grand jury from finding probable cause the prosecutor has an obligation to present such evidence; and (3) the State failed to present clearly exculpatory evidence in this case, denying Defendant a substantial procedural right. View "Willis v. Honorable Bernini" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of two counts of sexual conduct with a minor under age fifteen and other charges, holding that contributing to the delinquency of a minor, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-3613, is not a lesser-included offense of sexual conduct with a minor, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-1405.The court of appeals vacated Defendant's conviction of committing sexual conduct with a minor under age fifteen, holding that contributing to the delinquency of a minor is a lesser-included offense of sexual conduct with a minor under age fifteen. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' opinion and remanded to the court of appeals for further proceedings, holding that contributing to the delinquency of a minor is not a lesser-included offense of sexual conduct with a minor. View "State v. Agueda" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant, following a jury trial, of murdering her ten-year-old cousin, but remanded the case for resentencing, holding that the sentence imposed for count four was illegal.A jury convicted Defendant of first-degree felony murder, conspiracy to commit child abuse, and three counts of child abuse (counts three through five). The jury imposed the death sentence on the murder conviction and maximum and aggravated terms of imprisonment on the remaining counts. Defendant appealed both the judgments and the sentences. The Supreme Court largely affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was not entitled to reversal of her convictions based on her allegations of error; and (2) as to count four, because only one aggravating factor was found, the imposition of an aggravated sentence was illegal. View "State v. Allen" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of thirteen felony counts of aggravated harassment, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in accepting Defendant's jury-trial waiver.At issue on appeal was whether, in a case where a criminal defendant's competency has been put at issue, a trial court must make a specific finding of heightened competency before determining that the defendant's waiver of the right to a jury trial is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative, holding (1) Arizona law does not require a finding of heightened competency for a jury-trial waiver where a defendant's competency has been put at issue; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Defendant had knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial. View "State v. Muhammad" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts in this matter arising from two criminal cases, holding that the Cochise County Superior Court's innominate jury system does not violate the First Amendment.This case arose from two criminal cases that used innominate juries without objection by either party. In both cases, Appellant, a journalist, unsuccessfully sought access to prospective and impaneled jurors' names before and after trial. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, Appellant argued that the First Amendment provides a qualified right of public access to jurors' names during voir dire, thus creating a presumption of access that can be overcome only on a case-by-case basis by showing both that a compelling state interest exists in a particular case to shield the names and that denying access is a remedy narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the First Amendment does not provide the press or public with a qualified right to access jurors' names, and the law is facially valid. View "Morgan v. Honorable Dickerson" on Justia Law

by
On July 18, 2012, Robinson beat, bound, and immolated his nine-months-pregnant girlfriend, S.H., in their apartment, killing her and their unborn child, B.H. He then placed a 9-1-1 call to report a fire. Upon extinguishing the fire, responders discovered S.H.’s partially burned body lying face down on the bedroom floor with her feet and hands bound, wrists handcuffed, mouth and eyes covered with duct tape, and mouth stuffed with cloth. A search of Robinson’s backpack revealed rolls of duct tape, pieces of crumpled duct tape, a matchbook with at least one match missing, and a receipt reflecting purchases of duct tape and a bottle of lighter fluid that day. Police found a handcuff key in Robinson’s pocket.Robinson was sentenced to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed, first rejecting “Batson” challenges to the dismissal of potential minority jurors. The court upheld the jury’s “especial cruelty” and its “heinous or depraved conduct” findings. The legislature’s decision to equate feticide with infanticide also makes B.H.’s murder senseless as a matter of law. Robinson’s double-counting argument failed. Although the jury was prohibited from weighing B.H.’s age twice as it “assesse[d] aggravation and mitigation” at the penalty phase, it was permitted to “use one fact to find multiple aggravators” at the aggravation phase. The court also rejected challenges to jury instructions and statements made by the prosecutor. View "State of Arizona v Robinson" on Justia Law