Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2007, Defendant was convicted for possession of methamphetamine for sale. Defendant filed a notice of post-conviction relief (PCR), but the trial court dismissed the proceeding after Defendant’s new attorney failed to timely file a petition. Defendant then filed a second PCR notice through a different attorney. The trial court again dismissed the matter after Defendant’s new attorney failed to timely file a petition. Defendant initiated a third PCR proceeding, and a third attorney timely filed Defendant’s first PCR petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). The trial court denied the petition. The court of appeals also denied relief, concluding that Defendant waived his claim pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts, holding that because former counsel failed to file any petition in Defendant’s previous PCR proceedings and those failures were not Defendant’s fault, Defendant did not waive his IAC claim. View "State v. Diaz" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree felony murder, attempted first-degree murder, first-degree burglary, and three counts of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death for the murder conviction. The Supreme Court held (1) the trial court erred by permitting a sociologist who specializes on domestic violence to opine about separation violence, lethality factors, and any characteristics common to domestic abusers, as the testimony impermissibly created a “profile” of domestic abusers; and (2) the error was not harmless as to the convictions and sentences for first-degree murder and first-degree burglary, but the error was harmless as to the convictions and sentences on three counts of aggravated assault and one count of attempted first-degree murder. Remanded for a new trial on Defendant’s convictions and sentences for first-degree murder and first-degree burglary. View "State v. Ketchner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted review in this case to resolve the conflict between Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-116, which requires that concurrent sentences be imposed on a defendant whose convictions stem from a single act, and Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-705(M), which requires that sentences imposed on a defendant convicted of certain dangerous crimes against children run consecutively even when the underlying convictions arise from a single act. Defendant was convicted of reckless child abuse (Count 1), child abuse (Count 2), and first degree murder (Count 3). The trial court convicted her to terms of imprisonment on all counts, with Count 2 to be served consecutively to the other sentences. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions but modified the sentence to make Count 2 concurrent, rather than consecutive, to the other sentences. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) under the rule that when statutes conflict and cannot be harmonized, the more recent statute applies, section 13-705(M) should govern in this case because it is more recent; and (2) therefore, the trial court properly ordered Defendant’s sentence on Count 2 to be served consecutively to her other sentences. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

While executing a warrant authorizing the search of a home, police found Defendant, who was not named in the warrant, in the home. Police proceeded to search Defendant’s purse. Defendant was subsequently charged with possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence found in her purse, arguing that the search of her purse was unlawful because she was not named in the warrant. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that police were permitted to search the purse. The Supreme Court affirmed after adopting the possession test, under which officers may search personal items that are not in their owners’ possession when police find them in executing a premises search warrant, holding that because Defendant did not physically possess her purse when the officers found it, they were authorized to search it for the items listed in the warrant. View "State v. Gilstrap" on Justia Law

After a police officers had a consensual encounter with Defendant, they asked Defendant if he had any firearms. Defendant replied that he had a gun. The officers then frisked Defendant, removed the gun, and arrested Defendant as a prohibited possessor of a firearm. Defendant moved to suppress the gun as the fruit of an unconstitutional search. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that once the officers became aware that Defendant had a gun, they were allowed to remove the gun and conduct a pat down for safety purposes. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s conviction and sentence, holding that, during an initially consensual encounter with an individual, an officer must have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot before frisking the individual. View "State v. Serna" on Justia Law

Defendant was tried for three counts of child molestation. At trial, Defendant requested a Willits instruction regarding the destruction of of Tuscon Police Department and Child Protective Services recordings of an earlier interview with the alleged victim, arguing that the recordings would have been useful in impeaching the alleged victim's current testimony. The trial court denied the request on the grounds that the recordings had not been maliciously destroyed and that Defendant had not shown that they contained exculpatory evidence. A jury convicted Defendant on two counts. On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court erred in refusing to give a Willits instruction but reversed only the conviction and sentence on one count of which Defendant was convicted. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals, reversed the convictions and sentences, and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court erred in refusing to give a Willits instruction, and the error was not harmless. View "State v. Glissendorf" on Justia Law

Appellant was placed on probation. Appellant’s appointed counsel filed a notice of appeal. The Office of the Public Defender assigned the case to an attorney. Appellant informed the trial court, as well as her attorney, that she wished to represent herself on appeal, but her requests were ignored. Appellant’s counsel then filed a motion with the court of appeals seeking leave for Appellant to represent herself. The court of appeals denied the motion, concluding that although there was no constitutional right to self-representation on appeal, self-representation was permitted if the request was timely, and Appellant’s request was untimely. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ decision, holding (1) the Arizona Constitution provides a defendant with a right to self-representation on appeal, and (2) the request for self-representation on appeal must be made no later than thirty days after the filing of the notice of appeal. Remanded. View "Coleman v. Hon. Johnsen" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on multiple counts of child molestation and sexual conduct with a minor under age fifteen, and the case proceeded to trial. An expert witness for the State testified during trial, explaining in general how children perceive sexual abuse and describing behaviors involving disclosure of abuse. The jury found Defendant guilty on all but two counts. Defendant appealed the admission of the testimony, arguing that the testimony was barred by Ariz. R. Evid. 702 because it was “cold” in that it educated the jury about general principles but was not tied to the particular facts of the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the expert testimony, as Rule 702(d) does not bar the admission of “cold” expert testimony that educates the trier of fact about general principles without considering the particular facts of the case. View "State v. Salazar-Mercado" on Justia Law

After field sobriety tests revealed that Defendant had Carboxy-Tetrahydrocannobinol (“Carboxy-THC”) in his blood while driving, the State charged Defendant with violating Ariz. Rev. Stat. 28-1381(A)(3), which prohibits driving a vehicle while there is any drug defined in Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-3401 or its metabolite in the person’s body. The justice court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge, reasoning that, although Carboxy-THC is a marijuana metabolite, the legislature did not intend to include all possible byproducts, particularly those that are inactive and cannot impair the driver. The court of appeals disagreed, holding that section 28-1381(A)(3)’s language prohibiting driving with a proscribed drug or its metabolite included the metabolite Carboxy-THC. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the “metabolite” reference in section 28-1381(A)(3) is limited to any of a proscribed substance’s metabolites that are capable of causing impairment; and (2) therefore, drivers cannot be convicted of violating section 28-1381(A)(3) based merely on the presence of a non-impairing metabolite, such as Carboxy-THC. View "State ex rel. Montgomery v. Shilgevorkyan" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was when “entry” occurs under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.3, which requires that a notice of appeal be filed within twenty days after the “entry” of judgment and sentence. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of four counts of aggravated DUI. Defendant filed his notice of appeal twenty-one days after his sentencing but only nineteen days after the clerk of court filed the minute entry memorializing Defendant's sentence. The State challenged the notice as untimely. The court of appeals held that the timeliness of Defendant’s appeal could be measured from the date the minute entry was filed. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals and dismissed the appeal, holding that entry occurs when the sentence is pronounced, and defendants have twenty days from that date to file a notice of appeal. View "State v. Whitman" on Justia Law