Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of ten counts of sexual exploitation of a minor and one count of conspiracy to commit sexual exploitation of a minor. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences on appeal. Appellant later filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and juror misconduct. The trial court summarily dismissed Appellant’s petition for post-conviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) neither Appellant’s trial counsel nor his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance; and (2) even if Appellant properly raised his juror misconduct claim, he failed to show prejudice. View "State v. Kolmann" on Justia Law

In 1993, Defendant, who was seventeen years old at the time, pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and other charges. Defendant was sentenced to life in prison. Defendant later filed a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32, claiming that recent scientific findings concerning juvenile psychology and neurology were newly discovered material facts that entitled him to post-conviction relief. The trial court dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to present a colorable claim because the advancements in juvenile psychology and neurology offered by Defendant merely supplement then-existing knowledge of juvenile behavior that was considered at the time of Defendant’s sentencing. View "State v. Amaral" on Justia Law

After a second jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder. The State’s evidence supporting the conviction included testimony by a firearms examiner that a certain pistol had fired six shell casings found at the murder scene. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding Defendant from offering expert testimony that firearms examiners use subjective rather than scientifically rigorous methods in drawing conclusions from indentations on shell casings. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the trial court in part and remanded, holding that the trial court erred in excluding the expert testimony where Defendant’s expert witness was qualified and his testimony would have been helpful to the jury in understanding the evidence. View "State v. Romero" on Justia Law

In this capital case, Defendant was indicted on two counts of first degree murder. Defendant indicated that he would accept a plea offer to natural life it were offered to him, but the State did not extend a plea offer. Defendant later filed a motion in limine seeking permission to introduce evidence of his willingness to accept a natural life plea offer at the penalty phase of his trial if he is convicted and becomes eligible for the death penalty. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Defendant’s proposition did not evidence a true acceptance of responsibility for his actions. The Supreme Court vacated the order denying Defendant’s motion to permit introduction of evidence of his pretrial offer to plead guilty, holding that a capital defendant’s pretrial offer to plead guilty in exchange for a natural life sentence is admissible to demonstrate the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility for the murder, a non-statutory circumstance. View "Busso-Estopellan v. Hon. Rosa Morz" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder, assault, and kidnapping. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences, holding (1) the trial court properly admitted evidence of statements by Defendant’s brother recounting the events preceding the victim’s death; (2) the admission of gang expert testimony was proper; (3) the trial judge did not commit fundamental error by allowing the jury to consider the Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-751(F)(6) “especially cruel” aggravator under appropriate limiting instructions; and (4) the jury did not abuse its discretion when it declined to grant Defendant leniency. View "State v. Guarino" on Justia Law

Petitioners were each charged with two counts of driving under the influence (DUI). Count two alleged a violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 28-1381(A)(3), which prohibits driving a vehicle while there is cannabis (marijuana) or its metabolite in the defendant’s body. Both petitioners were medical marijuana cardholders. Petitioners were each convicted. At issue on appeal was whether the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act (AMMA) immunizes a medical marijuana cardholder from DUI prosecution under section 28-1381(A)(3). The Supreme Court affirmed Petitioners’ conviction, holding (1) the AMMA does not shield a medical marijuana cardholder from prosecution under section 28-1381(A)(3); but (2) the AMMA does but does afford an affirmative defense for those patients who can show that the marijuana or its metabolite was in a concentration insufficient to cause impairment. View "Dobson v. Hon. Crane McClennen" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, armed robbery, and burglary. The jury returned a death verdict for the murder. The Supreme Court remanded for a new penalty-phase proceeding on the murder conviction. On resentencing, Defendant was again sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s death sentence, holding (1) while the prosecutor engaged in misconduct in certain instances during trial, the improper remarks did not affect the jury’s verdict; (2) the trial court did not commit reversible error when it denied Defendant’s motion to retry the aggravated phase and prohibited him from offering the guilty verdict as an exhibit during the penalty-phase retrial; (3) the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury that Defendant would never be released if sentenced to prison; (4) the trial court did not violate Batson v. Kentucky when it permitted the State to strike five Hispanic jurors over Defendant’s objection; (5) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike a juror that had previously worked at the same hospital as one of the State’s witnesses; and (6) the death sentence was appropriate in this case. View "State v. Lynch" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of first degree murder for murdering his two young sons. The jury sentenced Defendant to death for each murder. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences, holding (1) the trial court did not err by admitting statements Defendant made to police officers at his home; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting other acts evidence under Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b); (3) the trial court erred in excluding some evidence of Defendant’s mental health and prescription drug use, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (4) the trial court erred in giving a jury instruction defining the Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-751(F)(6) aggravating factor, but the error was harmless; (5) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by precluding testimony of the former warden in the Department of Corrections; (6) the trial court did not err in admitting testimony of Defendant’s former neighbor about the effect of the murders on the neighbor; and (7) the imposition of the death sentence in this case was not an abuse of discretion. View "State v. Leteve" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. Defendant later filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), asserting that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to timely raise on appeal the issue of an unconstitutional jury instruction. The superior court denied the claim, concluding (1) Defendant was precluded from arguing the issue because it could have been, but was not, raised on appeal; and (2) any prejudice caused by appellate counsel’s failure to timely raise the issue on appeal was cured by the Supreme Court’s independent review of Defendant’s convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the PCR court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief because counsel’s failure to timely raise the issue on appeal did not prejudice Defendant. View "State v. Roseberry" on Justia Law

The defendant in this criminal case moved to suppress the pretrial identification of a police officer that responded to an emergency call. The trial judge denied the motion to suppress without making any findings regarding the procedure’s suggestiveness or the identification’s reliability. On appeal, the State conceded that the one-person show-up identification procedure was inherently suggestive and that the trial court erred in concluding that the officer’s identification was not subject to a due process identification analysis. Relying on the pretrial hearing transcript, the court of appeals concluded that the officer’s identification of Defendant was reliable and therefore admissible. At issue in this case was whether an appellate court may make a reliability determination in the first instance when the trial court has failed to do so. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an appellate court may make a reliability determination if the trial court record permits an informed analysis; and (2) the court of appeals in this case had a sufficient record from which to analyze the reliability of the officer’s identification of Defendant, and therefore, the court of appeals did not err in conducting a reliability analysis of Defendant’s identification in the first instance on appeal. View "State v. Rojo-Valenzuela" on Justia Law