Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case concerns an incident in which a man, living in a two-bedroom condominium with his long-term partner and their children, was charged with aggravated assault after striking a visitor, M.H., with a microphone stand. The defendant and his partner, J.A., had a history of conflict regarding M.H., who had previously assaulted the defendant and had a felony conviction. On the day in question, after returning home to find M.H. present, the defendant locked himself in his bedroom. J.A. and M.H. forcibly entered the bedroom despite the defendant’s objections, leading to the altercation.The Superior Court in Pima County denied the defendant’s request for jury instructions on the defense of residential structure, defense of premises, and the statutory presumption that force is justified when defending against unlawful entry into a residential structure. The jury convicted the defendant on one count of aggravated assault, and he was sentenced to five years in prison. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that M.H. was lawfully present as J.A.’s invitee.The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed the case and held that a separately securable bedroom within a shared residence qualifies as a “residential structure” under Arizona law. The Court further held that the statutory presumption of justified force applies when an uninvited person forcefully enters such a space, even if another resident invited them into the common areas. The Court found that the trial court erred in refusing the requested jury instructions and that this error was not harmless. The Supreme Court of Arizona reversed the conviction, vacated the sentence, and remanded the case for a new trial. View "STATE OF ARIZONA v BROWN" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was indicted on multiple counts of sexual conduct with a minor and one count of public sexual indecency to a minor. The State made a plea offer that would have capped his sentence at 27 years, but his trial counsel failed to adequately communicate the offer or explain the sentencing consequences if he went to trial. The defendant only learned the full extent of his potential sentence immediately before trial and attempted to accept the plea, but the offer had expired. He was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 79.5 years in prison.After his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal by the Arizona Court of Appeals, the defendant filed a timely first petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) in the Maricopa County Superior Court, raising ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims but not specifically focusing on the plea offer issue. His PCR counsel chose not to pursue that claim, and the petition was denied. Subsequent federal habeas proceedings were also unsuccessful. Years later, the defendant filed a successive PCR petition, this time specifically alleging IAC related to the plea offer. The Superior Court found the claim was not precluded and excused the untimeliness, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding the claim was precluded under prior Arizona Supreme Court precedent.The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed whether the successive IAC claim was precluded and whether the untimely filing was excusable. The court held that a claim based on counsel’s failure to adequately communicate a plea offer implicates a constitutional right of such magnitude—the right to decide whether to plead guilty and waive a jury trial—that it can only be waived knowingly, voluntarily, and personally by the defendant. Therefore, the claim was not precluded. The court also held that the defendant adequately explained the delay, so the untimely filing was excused. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s rulings on preclusion and timeliness, vacated part of the Court of Appeals’ opinion, and remanded for further proceedings. View "STATE OF ARIZONA v TRAVERSO" on Justia Law

A defendant diagnosed with schizophrenia was charged with first-degree murder and related felonies. After being found incompetent to stand trial and not restorable (“NCNR”), the trial court dismissed the charges without prejudice and ordered a civil commitment evaluation. The defendant was discharged from the treatment facility, and the State refiled the same charges, adding a new weapons charge. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that under a recent appellate decision, the State needed judicial approval before refiling charges against someone previously found NCNR.The Superior Court in Maricopa County initially allowed the State to refile charges, finding there was a reasonable belief the defendant’s competency might have changed. However, a different trial judge later dismissed the refiled case, concluding the State lacked sufficient basis to believe the defendant had regained competency. The Arizona Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s orders permitting refiling, holding that the State must present sufficient information to support a reasonable belief of regained competency before refiling, as required by Johnson v. Hartsell. The appellate court also addressed whether a dangerousness trial could proceed without pending charges and whether the State could rely on a prior NCNR finding.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case and vacated the appellate court’s decision. The Court held that due process does not require the State to obtain judicial approval before refiling charges against an NCNR defendant. It overruled the judicial preapproval requirement established in Johnson v. Hartsell and reaffirmed the standard from Rider v. Garcia, allowing the State to refile charges based on a reasonable belief that competency may have been restored. The Court also held that a dangerousness trial under A.R.S. § 13-4517(A)(4) requires pending charges, may rely on a prior NCNR finding for the same conduct, and that the statute applies retroactively. The trial court’s order authorizing the State to proceed was affirmed. View "CARSON v GENTRY" on Justia Law

In 2010, an inmate killed his cellmate in an Arizona state prison, inflicting fatal blunt and sharp force injuries. The defendant was convicted by a jury of premeditated first degree murder. The jury found three statutory aggravating factors: a prior conviction for a serious offense, the especially heinous or depraved manner of the crime, and that the offense was committed while in the custody of the state department of corrections. The jury determined that death was the appropriate sentence.The Arizona Supreme Court previously reviewed the case in 2017, affirming the conviction and the findings in the aggravation phase, but vacating the death sentence and remanding for a new penalty phase to comply with United States Supreme Court precedent regarding jury instructions on parole ineligibility. On remand, the defendant waived his right to counsel and to present mitigating evidence, a waiver the trial court found to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The penalty phase was conducted with the defendant representing himself, assisted by advisory counsel, but he did not present any mitigating evidence or argument. The jury again returned a death verdict, and the superior court imposed the sentence.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case on automatic appeal. The court held that the trial court erred by permitting the defendant to be visibly restrained before the jury without making case-specific findings as required by Deck v. Missouri, but found that this error was not fundamental and did not prejudice the outcome, given the overwhelming aggravating evidence and the defendant’s own choices. The court also held that the defendant’s waiver of mitigation was valid and that the trial court was not required to present mitigating evidence over his objection. The court found no abuse of discretion in the jury instructions, no fundamental error in declining to define “moral culpability,” and no prosecutorial error. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence. View "STATE OF ARIZONA v RUSHING" on Justia Law

In this case, the father and mother of B.W. had a contentious relationship, and the father was involved in a criminal incident where he shot and killed a man. Following this incident, the father was advised by his criminal defense attorney not to contact the mother or B.W. to avoid jeopardizing his defense. The father was later charged with first-degree murder and conspiracy but was acquitted in December 2021. In March 2022, the father sought to establish his parental rights, and the mother filed for termination of his parental rights based on abandonment.The Superior Court in Maricopa County found that the father had abandoned B.W. by failing to maintain a normal parental relationship for over six months without just cause. The court rejected the father's argument that he had just cause for his inaction, noting that he did not take any legal steps to assert his parental rights. The court concluded that termination of the father's parental rights was in B.W.'s best interest. The father appealed.The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's decision, agreeing that the father did not demonstrate just cause for his failure to maintain a relationship with B.W. The court held that the father's reliance on his criminal defense attorney's advice did not excuse his inaction.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case to clarify the meaning of "just cause" under A.R.S. § 8-531(1). The court held that "just cause" refers to a reasonable and justifiable reason for a parent's failure to maintain a normal parental relationship, based on good faith. The court reversed the juvenile court's termination order and remanded the case for reconsideration, instructing the lower court to apply the clarified definition of "just cause" in determining whether the father's actions were justified. The Court of Appeals' decision was vacated. View "In re Termination Parental Rights as to B.W." on Justia Law

On Christmas night in 2007, firefighters in Kingman, Arizona, extinguished a fire in a pickup truck. Investigators found evidence of arson, including gasoline fumes and remnants of a gas can. The truck was registered to Anna Hammond, who was found injured in her home nearby, along with her deceased dog. Hammond later died from her injuries. A grand jury indicted Edward Serrato III for second-degree murder, first-degree burglary, arson of an occupied structure (the vehicle), theft of means of transportation, and attempted arson of an occupied structure (the house). Serrato was convicted on all charges and sentenced to 135 years in prison.Serrato appealed his convictions. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions and sentences for second-degree murder, first-degree burglary, theft of means of transportation, and attempted arson of an occupied structure. However, the court also affirmed his conviction for arson of an occupied structure, interpreting the statute to mean that Serrato's presence alone made the truck an occupied structure.The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether an arsonist's presence alone is sufficient to support a conviction for arson of an occupied structure under A.R.S. § 13-1704. The court held that the term "occupied structure" unambiguously excludes the arsonist from being considered a "human being" under the statute. The court reasoned that including the arsonist would render other statutory provisions nearly superfluous and undermine the tiered arson statutory scheme. Therefore, the court vacated Serrato's conviction and sentence for arson of an occupied structure and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court's decision did not affect Serrato's other convictions and sentences. View "STATE OF ARIZONA v SERRATO" on Justia Law

In 2018, Lillian Hester was convicted by a jury of abusing and murdering her six-year-old nephew, Jack. Lenda Hester, Jack’s grandmother, and Jason Conlee, Lillian’s boyfriend, pleaded guilty to charges of child abuse and endangerment. Jack’s half-sister, Elise, sought over $3 million in restitution for Jack’s future lost wages from the defendants.The Superior Court of Coconino County allowed Elise to assert victims' rights on Jack’s behalf but denied her request for restitution for Jack’s future lost wages, ruling that such wages were consequential damages and not recoverable as restitution. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, agreeing that the future lost wages were too speculative and attenuated to be considered direct economic losses.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that future lost wages of a murdered child are recoverable as restitution if they meet the criteria of being economic losses directly caused by the criminal conduct, as outlined in the Wilkinson test. The court emphasized that the loss of Jack’s future wages was a direct result of his murder and not consequential damages. The court remanded the case to the Superior Court to determine the amount of restitution for Jack’s future lost wages, ensuring that the amount is reasonably estimated and not based on speculation. View "E. H. v HON. SLAYTON" on Justia Law

Giovani Fuster Melendez moved from Puerto Rico to Arizona in 2017 and became acquainted with the victim, A.G., through a church connection. In 2019, Melendez returned to his former apartment complex, encountered A.G., and fired multiple shots at him, missing each time. Melendez was taken into custody shortly after the incident. During his police interview, he was read his Miranda rights twice and initially chose not to speak. However, in a subsequent interview, he deferred answering some questions but eventually confessed to the shooting, claiming self-defense.The Superior Court in Maricopa County convicted Melendez of aggravated assault and five counts of endangerment, sentencing him to concurrent prison terms. On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals found that the State's references to Melendez's selective silence during his police interview violated his constitutional rights, constituting fundamental prejudicial error.The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine if the State violated Melendez's due process rights by commenting on his post-Miranda statements and temporary deferrals during the trial. The Court held that the State could use a defendant’s post-Miranda statements and temporary deferrals for impeachment purposes if the defendant did not unambiguously invoke his Miranda rights and ultimately spoke on the substantive matters. The Court concluded that Melendez did not unequivocally invoke his right to remain silent and that his deferrals were tactical rather than an invocation of his rights. Therefore, the prosecutor's comments did not violate Melendez's due process rights. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Melendez's convictions and sentences and vacated the Court of Appeals' opinion. View "STATE OF ARIZONA v MELENDEZ" on Justia Law

In 1994, Christopher Spreitz was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, sexual assault, and kidnapping of Ruby Reid. Reid was last seen leaving a bar in Tucson, and her body was found days later in a desert area. Spreitz admitted to hitting Reid with a rock to stop her from yelling. The medical examiner identified multiple injuries on Reid's body, including broken ribs, internal bleeding, and a skull fracture.The trial court found one aggravating circumstance: that Spreitz murdered Reid in an especially cruel manner. The court also considered several non-statutory mitigating factors, such as Spreitz's sub-normal home environment, emotional immaturity, lack of prior felonies, and potential for rehabilitation. The court determined that the aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating factors and sentenced Spreitz to death. This sentence was affirmed by the Arizona Supreme Court on direct appeal.Spreitz's petition for habeas corpus was denied by the federal district court, but a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part, concluding that the Arizona Supreme Court had applied an unconstitutional "causal nexus" test and did not properly consider evidence of Spreitz's longstanding alcohol and substance abuse as non-statutory mitigation. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court with instructions to correct the constitutional error or impose a lesser sentence.The Arizona Supreme Court conducted a new independent review of the entire record, including the mitigation evidence presented at the original sentencing. The court considered the mitigating factors without requiring a causal nexus to the murder and reweighed them against the established especially cruel aggravating circumstance. The court concluded that the mitigation evidence was insufficient to warrant leniency and affirmed the sentence of death. View "State v. Spreitz" on Justia Law

Preston Strong was convicted of six counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Strong had a history of financial troubles and was friends with one of the victims, Luis Rios, who often loaned him money. An argument between Strong and Luis occurred about a month before the murders, with Luis refusing to loan Strong more money. On the day of the murders, Luis and Adrienne Heredia, along with her four children, were found dead in their home. Evidence included Strong’s fingerprints on plastic bags found at the scene and his DNA on the steering wheel of Luis’s vehicle.The Superior Court in Yuma County denied Strong’s motions to change the venue, suppress evidence, and dismiss the case due to preindictment delay. The jury found Strong guilty and determined that the State had proved the alleged aggravating circumstances. The trial court later instructed the jury to disregard one of the aggravating factors during the penalty phase. Strong’s motions for a new trial and to vacate the judgment, based on alleged juror misconduct and other grounds, were denied.The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed Strong’s convictions and sentences. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s rulings on preindictment delay, change of venue, and the admission of evidence. The court also concluded that the trial court did not err in its handling of juror misconduct allegations, the admission of DNA evidence, and the consideration of victim impact statements. The court held that the erroneous instruction regarding the cold-and-calculating aggravating factor did not constitute fundamental error, as the jury was instructed to disregard it. The court also found that the jury’s findings of aggravating circumstances and the imposition of the death penalty were supported by reasonable evidence and did not violate constitutional standards. View "STATE OF ARIZONA v STRONG" on Justia Law