Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Douglas Eddington was charged as an accomplice in the murder of the son of a Tucson police officer. During voir dire, one potential juror stated he was employed as a deputy sheriff with the law enforcement agency that had investigated the crime. The trial court denied Eddington's motion to strike the deputy for cause, and the jury ultimately found Eddington guilty of second degree murder. The court of appeals held that the trial court erred in refusing to strike the deputy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a peace officer currently employed by the law enforcement agency that investigated the case is an "interested person," who is disqualified from sitting as a juror by Ariz. Rev. Stat. 21-211(2). View "State v. Eddington" on Justia Law

Michael Hummons agreed to speak with a police officer on the sidewalk. During the encounter the officer discovered an outstanding warrant for Hummons' arrest. The officer arrested Hummons, and in a search incident to that arrest discovered drugs and drug paraphernalia in Hummons' backpack. At trial Hummons moved to suppress the evidence, arguing it was obtained as the result of an illegal detention. The trial court denied the motion, finding the officer's encounter with Hummons consensual. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the appellate court, holding that the court overemphasized the importance the warrant as an intervening circumstance in dissipating the taint of any prior illegality and that the court should have applied the third Brown v. Illinois factor, i.e., the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. The Court held the totality of the circumstances militated against suppressing the evidence and upheld the judgment of the trial court.View "State v. Hummons" on Justia Law

Jacob Braden, an adult with developmental disabilities, died as a result of injuries suffered while residing at an Arizona Integrated Residential and Educational Services (AIRES) facility. AIRES is a licensed private corporation that contracts with the Arizona Department of Economic Security's Division of Developmental Disabilities. Jacob's estate sued the State, alleging a statutory claim under the Adult Protective Services Act (APSA) for abuse and neglect. The trial court granted summary judgment for the State, finding it was not a proper defendant under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 46-455, which permits an action under APSA against a "person" or an "enterprise." The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the State was not exempt from liability under section 46-455. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed the superior court after applying the rules of statutory construction to section 46-455, concluding that the State was not liable under APSA because the legislature did not intend to include the State in its expressly enumerated list of potential APSA defendants. View "Estate of Braden v. State" on Justia Law

After Petitioner was indicted on child abuse, the State extended a plea offer in May 2009 without imposing a deadline for its acceptance. A new prosecutor was assigned to the case in August 2009 and notified Petitioner that the offer was no longer available. Petitioner moved under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.8, which authorizes sanctions if a prosecutor imposes a plea deadline and fails to disclose certain information to the defense at least thirty days before the offer lapses, to preclude any evidence disclosed after July 29, 2009. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals granted relief to Petitioner, holding that rule 15.8 applied because the State effectively imposed a deadline on the offer by withdrawing it. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals, holding (1) rule 15.8 does not apply when a prosecutor withdraws an open-ended plea offer; and (2) in such a situation, Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.7 governs the imposition of sanctions for any failure to make required disclosures. Remanded. View "Rivera-Longoria v. Superior Court (Slayton)" on Justia Law

In May 2006, Mesa police responded to an aggravated assault call. Officers went to the apartment complex where Appellant Laquinn Fisher lived. Officers knocked and announced their presence. Appellant and two others came to the door. None had weapons, and all there were cooperative. Appellant matched a description given by the alleged assault victim. Despite having this information, officers thought further investigation was necessary because a gun used in the assault was still "unaccounted for. Without asking whether anyone else was inside, police entered the apartment to see if anyone else was there. Inside, officers smelled marijuana and observed open duffle bags containing drugs. After the sweep, officers obtained written consent from Appellant's roommate to search the apartment, and then seized the drugs. Appellant was charged with various crimes, including possession of marijuana. Appellant moved to suppress evidence of the marijuana that was seized. The trial court denied the motion, and a jury subsequently found Appellant guilty on the possession charge. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court centered on whether the police lawfully conducted a protective sweep of a suspect's home when the suspect and the only other occupants were detained outside. The Court held that the protective sweep in Appellant's case violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court vacated Appellant's possession conviction, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.View "Arizona v. Fisher" on Justia Law

Appellant Wayne Prince, Jr. was convicted of first degree murder for the death of his step-daughter and for the attempted murder of his wife. The jury found Appellant guilty, and the trial judge sentenced Appellant to death. The sentence was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court. Under the law in effect when Appellant killed his step-daughter, the trial judge decided whether to impose the death penalty, but a jury needed to determine whether there were mitigating circumstances from the case that might warrant life imprisonment. A penalty-phase was impaneled, and it found no mitigating factors to spare Appellant from the death sentence. The second jury sentenced Appellant to death. Appellant appealed, citing among other issues that the second jury’s sentence gave the State a second chance to seek a death sentence thus violating the ex post facto clauses of the U.S. and Arizona Constitutions. Upon re-review, the Supreme Court was not persuaded by Appellant’s ex post facto argument, and affirmed the trial court’s death sentence.View "Arizona v. Prince" on Justia Law

Appellant Clarence Dixon was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. At trial, he represented himself. A jury found him guilty on all counts. When Appellant elected before trial to represent himself, the judge warned him that he would have sole responsibility for his defense, including examining and cross-examining witnesses. Appellant requested that an advisory counsel handle the examination of witnesses. The trial court rejected this proposal. On appeal, Appellant claimed multiple errors by the trial court entitled him to a new trial, including the trial court’s denial of his proposed “hybrid representation.” The Supreme Court noted that “there is no constitutional right to hybrid representation.” The Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion. Finding no other errors from trial, the Court affirmed the lower court’s decision and Appellant’s death sentence.View "Arizona v. Dixon" on Justia Law

The Arizona Constitution entitles victims of crimes to be present and informed of all criminal proceedings where the defendant has the right to be present. In this case, Petitioners Morehart and Duffy challenged a court decision that denied them the opportunity to attend an ex parte hearing on the return of summonses issues as part of defense counsel’s pretrial investigation and mitigation of evidence in a capital case. The Defendant was charged with five counts of fist-degree murder. The State sought the death penalty. In 2006, the trial court found the defendant indigent, and approved an ex parte motion for the appointment of a mitigation specialist and an expert. Defense counsel filed a motion for a hearing on the matter. The court granted the ex parte request, and the Victims objected to it. The Victims sought special action relief from the appellate court, arguing that state law “does not displace a victim’s right to be present at all criminal proceedings." The Supreme Court held that because the defendant had no right to attend such a purely procedural hearing, the victims had no right to attend it too. The Court vacated the appellate court’s decision and remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings.View "Morehart v. Arizona" on Justia Law

Defendant Scott Lehr was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death for the murder of two women. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed Lehr's convictions and sentences, holding (1) Lehr's waiver of his right to attend trial was knowing and voluntary; (2) the trial court did not err in its use of other acts evidence and in its jury instructions; (3) the trial court did not violate Lehr's rights under the Confrontation Clause in admitting prior testimony by a witness; (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lehr's motion to preclude DNA evidence; (5) the trial court did not deny Lehr's right to a fair and impartial jury by refusing to grant a mistrial after several jurors applauded upon the completion of certain testimony; (6) the trial court's jury instruction defining premeditation and the State's closing argument did not violate Lehr's right to due process; (7) the trial court did not violate the state rules of criminal procedure by allowing the State to amend its notice of aggravating factors; and (8) the trial court did not violate the Eighth Amendment by precluding Lehr from offering testimony from one of his victims. View "State v. Lehr" on Justia Law

The Arizona Constitution requires that a five-member Independent Redistricting Commission (IRC) draw boundaries for congressional and state legislative districts after every decennial census. According to Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, section 1(3), during the three years preceding appointment, members of the IRC shall not have been appointed to, elected to, or a candidate for any other public office. In 2010, the Appointment Commission selected twenty-five nominees for the IRC, including a chief judge for two state tribal courts and directors of irrigation districts. Petitioners Kirk Adams, speaker of the House of Representatives, and Russell Pearce, president of the Senate, asked the Commission to reconsider, arguing that the three contested nominees were ineligible because they held public office. The Commission declined to change its selections, and Petitioners filed a petition for special action with the Supreme Court. The Court (1) denied relief as to the tribal judge because a tribal judge is not a public office for purposes of section 1(3); (2) granted relief as to the irrigation district board members because an irrigation district director holds a public office for purposes of section 1(3); and (3) ordered the Commission to identify two alternative nominees. View "Adams v. Comm'n on Appellate Court Appointments" on Justia Law