Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2009, the Arizona Legislature amended Ariz. Rev. Stat. 9-821.01, which, as amended, barred a city from electing its city council in partisan elections or in ward-based primaries combined with at-large general elections. The City of Tuscon filed this case against the State, claiming that the amendments to section 9-821.01 did not apply to it as a charter city. The superior court entered judgment for the State. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court's judgment, holding that because Arizona's Constitution includes a provision authorizing eligible cities to adopt charters, and because a charter city has the power to frame its own organic law, including the power to determine who its governing officers shall be and how they shall be selected, section 9-821.01, as amended, did not displace the method that voters of the City of Tuscon chose under its 1929 charter for electing council members. Remanded to the superior court for entry of summary judgment in favor of the City of Tuscon. View "City of Tuscon v. State" on Justia Law

Granvil Wallace pleaded guilty and was sentenced to death by the trial judge for three murders. The Supreme Court subsequently reduced the death sentence for one murder count to life in prison because the evidence was insufficient to prove an aggravating circumstance as to that murder. In this appeal the Supreme Court vacated Wallace's remaining two death sentences and sentenced him to consecutive life terms of imprisonment, holding that the State had no established beyond a reasonable doubt that Wallace inflicted gratuitous violence on the two victims, and thus, the murders were not heinous or depraved under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-751(F)(6), the sole aggravating factor alleged in this case. View "State v. Wallace" on Justia Law

A jury found Benjamin Cota guilty of two counts of first degree murer, two counts of armed robbery, one count of possession of narcotics, and one count of unlawful flight. Cota was sentenced to death on one first degree murder count and to prison terms for the other counts. The trial judge stated that he believed Arizona law "required" him to make the sentences on the "non-capital" counts consecutive, and he did so on all but the flight count. The Supreme Court affirmed Cota's convictions and death sentence but remanded for resentencing on the non-capital counts, holding that although the judge here imposed one concurrent sentence, the Court was not convinced the judge was aware of his discretion to do the same with all other sentences under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-708. View "State v. Cota" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Jahmari Manuel was convicted of first degree murder and other offenses related to the death of Darrell Willeford. The jury determined that Manuel should be sentenced to death for the murder. The Supreme Court affirmed Manuel's convictions and sentences, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Manuel's notice of change of judge because the notice was untimely under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 10.2(a); (2) the trial court did not err in denying Manuel's motion to suppress a pistol found in his hotel room when he was arrested because the officer discovered the gun in plain view; (3) Manuel did not show that certain remarks that the prosecutor made at trial caused prejudice sufficient to constitute fundamental error, and the instances of alleged misconduct did not warrant reversal when considered cumulatively; (4) the trial judge correctly answered a juror's question in the penalty phase; (5) the judge did not abuse her discretion in denying Manuel's motion for new trial; and (6) the jury did not abuse its discretion by determining that Manuel should be sentenced to death. View "State v. Manuel " on Justia Law

Clifford Ochser brought a civil rights action against two deputy sheriffs for arresting him on a warrant that had been quashed some thirteen months earlier. The trial court granted the deputies' motion for summary judgment, ruling that an arresting officer is entitled to qualified immunity when the arrest is made on a facially valid warrant. A divided court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was the scope of qualified immunity in the context of arrests made pursuant to a facially valid but quashed warrant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although Ochser's arrest was an unreasonable seizure prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, the deputies were entitled to qualified immunity because then-existing law did not clearly establish the constitutionality of their actions. View "Ochser v. Funk" on Justia Law

Douglas Eddington was charged as an accomplice in the murder of the son of a Tucson police officer. During voir dire, one potential juror stated he was employed as a deputy sheriff with the law enforcement agency that had investigated the crime. The trial court denied Eddington's motion to strike the deputy for cause, and the jury ultimately found Eddington guilty of second degree murder. The court of appeals held that the trial court erred in refusing to strike the deputy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a peace officer currently employed by the law enforcement agency that investigated the case is an "interested person," who is disqualified from sitting as a juror by Ariz. Rev. Stat. 21-211(2). View "State v. Eddington" on Justia Law

Michael Hummons agreed to speak with a police officer on the sidewalk. During the encounter the officer discovered an outstanding warrant for Hummons' arrest. The officer arrested Hummons, and in a search incident to that arrest discovered drugs and drug paraphernalia in Hummons' backpack. At trial Hummons moved to suppress the evidence, arguing it was obtained as the result of an illegal detention. The trial court denied the motion, finding the officer's encounter with Hummons consensual. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the appellate court, holding that the court overemphasized the importance the warrant as an intervening circumstance in dissipating the taint of any prior illegality and that the court should have applied the third Brown v. Illinois factor, i.e., the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. The Court held the totality of the circumstances militated against suppressing the evidence and upheld the judgment of the trial court.View "State v. Hummons" on Justia Law

Jacob Braden, an adult with developmental disabilities, died as a result of injuries suffered while residing at an Arizona Integrated Residential and Educational Services (AIRES) facility. AIRES is a licensed private corporation that contracts with the Arizona Department of Economic Security's Division of Developmental Disabilities. Jacob's estate sued the State, alleging a statutory claim under the Adult Protective Services Act (APSA) for abuse and neglect. The trial court granted summary judgment for the State, finding it was not a proper defendant under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 46-455, which permits an action under APSA against a "person" or an "enterprise." The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the State was not exempt from liability under section 46-455. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed the superior court after applying the rules of statutory construction to section 46-455, concluding that the State was not liable under APSA because the legislature did not intend to include the State in its expressly enumerated list of potential APSA defendants. View "Estate of Braden v. State" on Justia Law

After Petitioner was indicted on child abuse, the State extended a plea offer in May 2009 without imposing a deadline for its acceptance. A new prosecutor was assigned to the case in August 2009 and notified Petitioner that the offer was no longer available. Petitioner moved under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.8, which authorizes sanctions if a prosecutor imposes a plea deadline and fails to disclose certain information to the defense at least thirty days before the offer lapses, to preclude any evidence disclosed after July 29, 2009. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals granted relief to Petitioner, holding that rule 15.8 applied because the State effectively imposed a deadline on the offer by withdrawing it. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals, holding (1) rule 15.8 does not apply when a prosecutor withdraws an open-ended plea offer; and (2) in such a situation, Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.7 governs the imposition of sanctions for any failure to make required disclosures. Remanded. View "Rivera-Longoria v. Superior Court (Slayton)" on Justia Law

In May 2006, Mesa police responded to an aggravated assault call. Officers went to the apartment complex where Appellant Laquinn Fisher lived. Officers knocked and announced their presence. Appellant and two others came to the door. None had weapons, and all there were cooperative. Appellant matched a description given by the alleged assault victim. Despite having this information, officers thought further investigation was necessary because a gun used in the assault was still "unaccounted for. Without asking whether anyone else was inside, police entered the apartment to see if anyone else was there. Inside, officers smelled marijuana and observed open duffle bags containing drugs. After the sweep, officers obtained written consent from Appellant's roommate to search the apartment, and then seized the drugs. Appellant was charged with various crimes, including possession of marijuana. Appellant moved to suppress evidence of the marijuana that was seized. The trial court denied the motion, and a jury subsequently found Appellant guilty on the possession charge. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court centered on whether the police lawfully conducted a protective sweep of a suspect's home when the suspect and the only other occupants were detained outside. The Court held that the protective sweep in Appellant's case violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court vacated Appellant's possession conviction, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.View "Arizona v. Fisher" on Justia Law