Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1985, the Arizona Legislature established the Elected Officials’ Retirement Plan (“Plan”), which provides pension benefits for elected officials, including judges. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 38-818 establishes a formula for calculating pension benefit increased for retired members of the Plan. In 2011, the Legislature enacted S.B. 1609, which modified the formula set forth in section 38-818. Two retired judges, on behalf of themselves and as representatives of a class of retired Plan members and beneficiaries, sued the Plan and its board members, alleging that S.B. 1609 violated Ariz. Const. art. 29, 1(C). The trial court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs, concluding that S.B. 1609 violated Article 29, 1(C)’s prohibition against the diminishment or impairment of public retirement system benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the statute diminished and impaired the Plan’s retired members’ benefits, it violated the Pension Clause of Article 29, 1(C). View "Fields v. Elected Officials’ Ret. Plan" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree felony murder and six other felonies for offenses committed during a home invasion. The trial court imposed death sentences for the murders and prison sentences totaling seventy-five years for the non-capital counts. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences but ordered that her sentences for armed robbery and aggravated robbery run concurrently, holding, among other things, that (1) the trial court did not commit reversible error in granting Defendant’s motion for a change of venue based on extensive media coverage of the crimes, deciding its rulings regarding jury selection, and instructing the jury; (2) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct; and (3) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences for robbery and aggravated robbery because these crimes were based on a single act by Defendant. View "State v. Forde" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of five counts of first degree murder, among other charges, and sentenced to death for each murder. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences, holding (1) Defendant was not deprived of his right to a speedy trial; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by consolidating the murder and solicitation of first degree murder charges; (3) the trial court did not err in admitting into evidence certain victims’ recorded statements; (4) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for mistrial; (5) the trial court did not err in admitting a forensic firearms expert’s testimony; (6) substantial evidence supported the solicitation convictions; (7) the trial court did not err in its jury instructions; (8) and substantial evidence supported the jury’s findings of aggravating circumstances and the imposition of the death sentences. View "State v. Miller" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and thirty counts of attempted first degree murder following a shooting spree at a homeowners' association meeting in 2000. Appellant was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences on appeal. In 2010, Appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The petition was pending when Appellant died in 2013. The superior court subsequently dismissed Appellant's post-conviction relief proceeding as well as his indictment and conviction under State v. Griffin, in which the Supreme Court held that when a convicted defendant dies before his direct appeal is decided, the prosecution is abated from the outset, and the conviction is set aside. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's judgment, holding that the doctrine of abatement ab initio set forth in Griffin does not apply when a defendant dies after his conviction is affirmed but while post-conviction relief proceedings are pending. View "State v. Glassel" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with four felonies relating to an assault. After Defendant agreed to plead guilty to a lesser charge, he admitted at a change-of-plea hearing that he was an accomplice. Later Defendant denied any involvement. The trial court subsequently rejected the plea agreement. During the trial proceedings, Defendant moved to prevent the State from using statements he made during the change-of-plea hearing. The trial court ruled that the State could impeach Defendant with his statements if he testified inconsistently with them at trial. Defendant did not testify at trial, and the jury found him guilty on all counts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court erred in ruling the State could use Defendant's change-of-plea statements to impeach him; but (2) Defendant could not raise the trial court's error on appeal because a defendant must testify to preserve a challenge to a ruling permitting the use of evidence for impeachment. View "State v. Duran" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, armed robbery, first degree burglary, kidnapping, and theft of a means of transportation. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death for the murder conviction and to prison sentences totaling forty-two years for the other convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declaring a mistrial and later denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the State's allegation that Defendant should be sentenced to death; (2) the statutes governing the death penalty are not unconstitutionally vague; (3) there is not an unconstitutional presumption of death in Arizona's death penalty statutes; and (4) the jury did not abuse its discretion in imposing the death sentence in this case. View "State v. Reeves" on Justia Law

In 2000, Arizona voters approved a referendum that statutorily directed the Legislature to annually increase the base level of the revenue control limit for K-12 public school funding. The measure was codified as Ariz. Rev. Stat. 15-901.01. For several years, the Legislature adjusted the base level and transportation support level annually for inflation, but the 2010-11 budget (HB 2008) included an adjusted to the transportation support level only. Subsequent budgets likewise did not include base level adjustments. Several school districts and other parties sued the State Treasurer and State, alleging that HB 2008 amended or repealed a voter-approved law in violation of the Voter Protection Act (VPA). The superior court dismissed the complaint for failing to state a claim, ruling that section 15-901.01 was not mandatory and that voters "cannot require the legislature to enact a law that provides for the appropriation" prescribed in the statute. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no constitutional impediment existed to the electorate's directive, and legislative adjustments to section 15-901.01's funding scheme are limited by the VPA. View "Cave Creek Unified Sch. Dist. v. Ducey" on Justia Law

Four members of the Commission on Appellate Court Appointments filed this special action asking the court to declare H.B. 2600 unconstitutional and to enjoin the Commission from applying the statute. The Arizona Constitution established the Commission and required it to submit "not less than three" nominees to the governor for her appointment to fill an appellate judicial vacancy. H.B. 2600 directed the Commission to submit "the names of at least five persons" to the governor, unless an applicant was rejected by a two-thirds vote of the Commission, in which case it could submit fewer than five names. The court held that H.B. 2600 was unconstitutional because it directly conflicted with Arizona's Constitution. Accordingly, the court enjoined the Commission from applying the statute and awarded reasonable attorney's fees to petitioners upon compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21. View "Dobson v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, third degree robbery, and aggravated robbery. Defendant was sentenced to death for the murder. A few years later, the trial court vacated the sentence, finding that Defendant's defense counsel was inefficient. Because the jury could not agree on a sentence at the resentencing trial, the judge declared a mistrial. After a second penalty phase trial, the jury determined Defendant should be sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's death sentence, holding, inter alia, that (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's second petition for post-conviction relief and his motion to suppress; (2) the statutory provision for retrial after a hung penalty-phase jury does not result in cruel and unusual punishment; (3) the trial court did not err in its decisions regarding the jury or the jury instructions; (4) the application of the 2009 version of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-752(G) in Defendant's case did not violate the ex post facto clause; (5) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct; and (6) based on the aggravating and mitigating circumstances present in this case, the mitigation was not sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency. View "State v. Medina" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of child abuse, two counts of concealing a dead body, and two counts of first degree murder. The jury also found three aggravating factors, including the young age of the victims, ages three and four. Defendant was sentenced to death for the two murders. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences, holding, inter alia, that (1) the trial court did not err by dismissing some jurors improperly and failing to dismiss others; (2) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant's request for a change of venue based on presumed and actual prejudice; (3) the trial court did not err by refusing to suppress Defendant's post-arrest statements; (4) the prosecution did not commit prejudicial misconduct; (5) the evidence was sufficient to convict Defendant of the child abuse charges; (6) the trial court did not fundamentally err in its aggravation phase jury instructions; and (7) the jury did not abuse its discretion by finding the mitigating factors presented by Defendant insufficient to warrant leniency. View "State v. Payne" on Justia Law