Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Police officers stopped Defendant’s vehicle for unlawful window tinting. Upon approaching the vehicle and speaking with Defendant, the officers noticed an odor of burnt marijuana emanating from inside the vehicle. The officers searched the car and found a small amount of unburnt marijuana. Defendant was arrested and charged with possession or use of marijuana. Defendant filed a motion to suppress arguing that, after passage of the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act, the odor of marijuana coming from a vehicle does not alone provide probable cause. The trial court denied the motion and then found Defendant guilty. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in the instant case, the odor of marijuana sufficed to establish probable cause, and therefore, the search was authorized by the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. View "State v. Cheatham" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of nine counts of first degree murder, among other crimes. The trial court imposed nine death sentences for the murders. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of his home; (2) the trial court did not unconstitutionally deny Defendant the opportunity to observe or participate in the State’s DNA testing procedures that consumed certain DNA samples; (3) the trial court did not fundamentally err by ending Defendant’s motion to sever and by permitting joinder of all the counts in the indictment; (4) the trial court did not deprive Defendant of his constitutional right to counsel; (5) the trial court did not prejudicially err in its evidentiary rulings; (6) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and the jury’s findings that Defendant committed the murders in an especially cruel manner; (7) although the State made some improper remarks during the State’s opening arguments, they did not deprive Defendant of a fair trial; (8) Defendant’s waiver of his right to present mitigation was voluntary, knowing, and informed; and (9) the jury did not abuse its discretion in finding death sentences appropriate for the murders. View "Arizona v. Goudeau" on Justia Law

After Defendant resisted, two police officers subdued and handcuffed him. The resistance and arrest formed one uninterrupted course of conduct. Defendant was indicted on two counts of resisting arrest under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13—2508 - one for each officer resisted. The trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent rather than consecutive terms of imprisonment. The court of appeals vacated one of Defendant’s resisting arrest convictions, concluding that the second conviction arose from the same offense and violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals, vacated Defendant’s second conviction for resisting arrest, and affirmed the remaining convictions, holding that the legislature did not intend, and the Double Jeopardy Clause does not allow, multiple convictions under section 13-2508 for a single, continuous act of resisting arrest. View "State v. Jurden" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty on sixty-seven counts, including nine counts of first-degree murder. The jury returned death verdicts on all nine murder charges. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; (2) any error in the denial of Defendant’s request to observe or participate in the State’s DNA testing procedures that consumed certain DNA samples was harmless; (3) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion to sever; (4) Defendant was not deprived of his constitutional right to counsel; (5) Defendant was not deprived of a fundamentally fair trial; (6) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence other-act evidence, pretrial and in-court identifications, firearms expert testimony, and an autopsy photograph; (7) the trial court did not violate Defendant’s right to present a complete defense; (8) although the prosecutor made some improper remarks during trial, they did not deprive Defendant of a fair trial; (9) the trial court did not prejudicially err during the penalty phase; and (10) the jury did not abuse its discretion in finding death sentences appropriate for each of the nine murders. View "State v. Goudeau" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (DUI) and taken to a police station, where he was read an “admin per se” form. The form provided that “Arizona law requires you to submit” to breath, blood, or other bodily substance tests chosen by law enforcement. Defendant subsequently submitted to breath and blood tests and was subsequently charged with five counts of aggravated DUI. Defendant moved to suppress the test results, arguing that the warrantless search violated his Fourth Amendment rights because he did not voluntarily consent to the tests. The trial court denied the motion. Based on the parties’ stipulated facts, the court dismissed three counts and convicted Defendant on the remaining counts. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) Defendant’s consent was not freely and voluntarily given in this case; but (2) because the admonition was given in good faith reliance on precedent, exclusion of the test results was not required. View "State v. Valenzuela" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for operating a motorized watercraft while under the influence of alcohol or drugs (OUI) and transported to an aid station used by the sheriff’s office. Defendant read an “OUI Admonishment” form, which provided that “Arizona law requires you to submit” to breath, blood, or other bodily substance tests chosen by law enforcement. Defendant agreed to submit to a blood draw and was subsequently charged with two counts of OUI and one count of extreme OUI. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the test results, arguing that the warrantless search violated his Fourth Amendment rights because he did not voluntarily consent to the test. The justice court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. A jury subsequently found Defendant guilty. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant did not consent to giving blood samples in this case. Remanded. View "Brown v. Hon. Crane McClennen" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of ten counts of sexual exploitation of a minor and one count of conspiracy to commit sexual exploitation of a minor. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences on appeal. Appellant later filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and juror misconduct. The trial court summarily dismissed Appellant’s petition for post-conviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) neither Appellant’s trial counsel nor his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance; and (2) even if Appellant properly raised his juror misconduct claim, he failed to show prejudice. View "State v. Kolmann" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder, assault, and kidnapping. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences, holding (1) the trial court properly admitted evidence of statements by Defendant’s brother recounting the events preceding the victim’s death; (2) the admission of gang expert testimony was proper; (3) the trial judge did not commit fundamental error by allowing the jury to consider the Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-751(F)(6) “especially cruel” aggravator under appropriate limiting instructions; and (4) the jury did not abuse its discretion when it declined to grant Defendant leniency. View "State v. Guarino" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, armed robbery, and burglary. The jury returned a death verdict for the murder. The Supreme Court remanded for a new penalty-phase proceeding on the murder conviction. On resentencing, Defendant was again sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s death sentence, holding (1) while the prosecutor engaged in misconduct in certain instances during trial, the improper remarks did not affect the jury’s verdict; (2) the trial court did not commit reversible error when it denied Defendant’s motion to retry the aggravated phase and prohibited him from offering the guilty verdict as an exhibit during the penalty-phase retrial; (3) the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury that Defendant would never be released if sentenced to prison; (4) the trial court did not violate Batson v. Kentucky when it permitted the State to strike five Hispanic jurors over Defendant’s objection; (5) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike a juror that had previously worked at the same hospital as one of the State’s witnesses; and (6) the death sentence was appropriate in this case. View "State v. Lynch" on Justia Law

The defendant in this criminal case moved to suppress the pretrial identification of a police officer that responded to an emergency call. The trial judge denied the motion to suppress without making any findings regarding the procedure’s suggestiveness or the identification’s reliability. On appeal, the State conceded that the one-person show-up identification procedure was inherently suggestive and that the trial court erred in concluding that the officer’s identification was not subject to a due process identification analysis. Relying on the pretrial hearing transcript, the court of appeals concluded that the officer’s identification of Defendant was reliable and therefore admissible. At issue in this case was whether an appellate court may make a reliability determination in the first instance when the trial court has failed to do so. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an appellate court may make a reliability determination if the trial court record permits an informed analysis; and (2) the court of appeals in this case had a sufficient record from which to analyze the reliability of the officer’s identification of Defendant, and therefore, the court of appeals did not err in conducting a reliability analysis of Defendant’s identification in the first instance on appeal. View "State v. Rojo-Valenzuela" on Justia Law