Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Ariz. Rev. Stat 8-238 requires juveniles charged with certain offenses and summoned to appear at an advisory hearing to submit to the investigating law enforcement agency a sample of buccal cells or other bodily substances for DNA testing and extraction. The penalty for failure to comply is revocation of release pending adjudication. In this case seven juveniles were separately charged with violations of offenses specified in section 8-238(A). Each was summoned to an advisory hearing, released, and ordered to submit a buccal sample to law enforcement within five days. In each case, the superior court rejected Fourth Amendment objections to the sampling order. The Juveniles jointly filed a special action in the court of appeals, which held that requiring the submission of DNA samples from juveniles for whom a probable cause determination has been made does not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals, holding that the statutory scheme violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. View "Mario W. v. Superior Court (Kaipio)" on Justia Law

This automatic appeal arose from Defendant's 2009 death sentences for the 1996 murders of Thomas Hardman and Carol Lynn Noel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, that (1) the trial court did not err by allowing the State to offer evidence during the penalty phase of the felony murders when he did not present any mitigating evidence; (2) the trial court did not violate Defendant's rights under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the federal and state Constitution by refusing to grant a pretrial evidentiary hearing on Defendant's motion to dismiss on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct; (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to introduce photographs of the crime scenes showing the victims' bodies; and (4) Defendant's death sentences were appropriate. View "State v. Nordstrom" on Justia Law

Gary Gipson was indicted for first degree murder, illegal discharge of a firearm, and aggravated assault. At trial, the judge sua sponte instructed the jury on second degree murder over Gipson's objection and on manslaughter over the objections of both Gipson and the State. The jury found Gipson guilty of manslaughter and illegal discharge of a firearm. On appeal, Gipson conceded that the evidence supported the manslaughter instruction, but he argued that the trial court erred by giving it over the objections of both parties. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, although a judge should hesitate to give the instruction over objections from the defense and the prosecution, it was not reversible error in this case to do so. View "State v. Gipson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Brad Nelson was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The jury found proven beyond a reasonable doubt the only aggravator alleged under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-751(F)(9), that Nelson was an adult and the victim was under fifteen years old at the time of the murder. The Supreme Court affirmed Nelson's conviction and sentence, holding (1) Nelson was not deprived of a fair and impartial jury; (2) the jury's finding of premeditation was not legally incorrect; (3) the premeditation instruction given to the jury was not fundamentally erroneous, nor did the prosecutor incorrectly argue premeditation; (4) the section 13-751(F)(9) aggravator was constitutional; (5) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Nelson's motion for mistrial based on an improper argument by the prosecutor; and (6) the jury did not abuse its discretion in determining that Nelson should be sentenced to death. View "State v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Patrick Ferrero was charged with three counts of sexual conduct with a minor. The trial court admitted evidence of "other uncharged acts" with the minor. The judge did not screen the evidence under Ariz. R. Evid. 404(c), which permits "other act" evidence to prove the defendant's propensity to commit the charged offense, but only if the court makes specific findings. The court of appeals reversed Ferrero's convictions on two counts, holding that the trial judge erred in failing to screen the evidence of Ferrero's prior sexual conduct with the minor - State v. Garner evidence - under Rule 404(c). At issue before the Supreme Court was whether evidence of similar sexual contact with the same minor victim is "intrinsic evidence" that is not governed by Rule 404(c). The Court vacated the court of appeals and remanded the case for a new trial on the first two counts, holding (1) Rule 404(c) does not apply to truly intrinsic evidence, but Garner evidence is not inherently intrinsic; and (2) because the evidence in this case was offered to prove Ferrero's propensity to commit the charged act, the trial court erred in admitting evidence of that act without screening it under Rule 404(c). View "State v. Ferraro" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Pete VanWinkle was found guilty of attempted murder and other offenses. VanWinkle appealed, arguing that the trial court violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by admitting evidence of his post-custody, pre-Miranda silence, and the prosecutorial comment on it. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Miranda did not apply because there was no police interrogation. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals but affirmed VanWinkle's convictions and sentences, holding (1) the admission of post-custody, pre-Miranda silence and prosecutorial comment on such silence violates a defendant's constitutional right to remain silent; but (2) the error in this case was harmless. View "State v. VanWinkle" on Justia Law

Granvil Wallace pleaded guilty and was sentenced to death by the trial judge for three murders. The Supreme Court subsequently reduced the death sentence for one murder count to life in prison because the evidence was insufficient to prove an aggravating circumstance as to that murder. In this appeal the Supreme Court vacated Wallace's remaining two death sentences and sentenced him to consecutive life terms of imprisonment, holding that the State had no established beyond a reasonable doubt that Wallace inflicted gratuitous violence on the two victims, and thus, the murders were not heinous or depraved under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-751(F)(6), the sole aggravating factor alleged in this case. View "State v. Wallace" on Justia Law

A jury found Benjamin Cota guilty of two counts of first degree murer, two counts of armed robbery, one count of possession of narcotics, and one count of unlawful flight. Cota was sentenced to death on one first degree murder count and to prison terms for the other counts. The trial judge stated that he believed Arizona law "required" him to make the sentences on the "non-capital" counts consecutive, and he did so on all but the flight count. The Supreme Court affirmed Cota's convictions and death sentence but remanded for resentencing on the non-capital counts, holding that although the judge here imposed one concurrent sentence, the Court was not convinced the judge was aware of his discretion to do the same with all other sentences under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-708. View "State v. Cota" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Jahmari Manuel was convicted of first degree murder and other offenses related to the death of Darrell Willeford. The jury determined that Manuel should be sentenced to death for the murder. The Supreme Court affirmed Manuel's convictions and sentences, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Manuel's notice of change of judge because the notice was untimely under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 10.2(a); (2) the trial court did not err in denying Manuel's motion to suppress a pistol found in his hotel room when he was arrested because the officer discovered the gun in plain view; (3) Manuel did not show that certain remarks that the prosecutor made at trial caused prejudice sufficient to constitute fundamental error, and the instances of alleged misconduct did not warrant reversal when considered cumulatively; (4) the trial judge correctly answered a juror's question in the penalty phase; (5) the judge did not abuse her discretion in denying Manuel's motion for new trial; and (6) the jury did not abuse its discretion by determining that Manuel should be sentenced to death. View "State v. Manuel " on Justia Law

Clifford Ochser brought a civil rights action against two deputy sheriffs for arresting him on a warrant that had been quashed some thirteen months earlier. The trial court granted the deputies' motion for summary judgment, ruling that an arresting officer is entitled to qualified immunity when the arrest is made on a facially valid warrant. A divided court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was the scope of qualified immunity in the context of arrests made pursuant to a facially valid but quashed warrant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although Ochser's arrest was an unreasonable seizure prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, the deputies were entitled to qualified immunity because then-existing law did not clearly establish the constitutionality of their actions. View "Ochser v. Funk" on Justia Law