Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The dispute arose between two neighboring homeowners in a Tucson subdivision governed by a homeowners’ association and subject to recorded covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs). The plaintiff alleged that noise and vibrations from the defendants’ newly installed air conditioning unit constituted a nuisance in violation of an anti-nuisance provision within the CC&Rs and sought both injunctive relief and damages. The CC&Rs also included a fee-shifting provision entitling the prevailing party in enforcement proceedings to recover attorney fees and costs.The Superior Court in Pima County held a bench trial and ruled in favor of the defendants, finding that while the noise was annoying, it did not rise to the level of an actionable nuisance or a violation of the CC&Rs. The court also concluded that the plaintiff did not prove any breach of contract or obligation by the defendants. Although the court recognized the CC&Rs as creating contractual relationships, it denied the defendants’ request for attorney fees, reasoning that the plaintiff’s claim was essentially a tort claim for nuisance, not a contract claim. The Court of Appeals, Division Two, affirmed, relying on the view that the anti-nuisance provision in the CC&Rs merely mirrored existing tort duties and did not independently support a contractual fee award.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case and held that an anti-nuisance covenant in recorded CC&Rs constitutes a contractual obligation that can be enforced between homeowners, even if the conduct also constitutes a tort. The Court further held that the fee-shifting provision applies to actions enforcing such covenants. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ opinion, reversed the Superior Court’s denial of attorney fees to the defendants, and remanded for determination of reasonable attorney fees. View "BURKETT v DRYJA" on Justia Law

The parties in this case were involved in a family court proceeding in Mohave County Superior Court that resulted in a Decree of Dissolution entered on January 21, 2025. The Decree dissolved the marriage and addressed the division of property and debts, denied spousal maintenance, and denied requests for attorney fees and costs. Husband subsequently filed a timely motion to alter or amend the Decree under Rule 83, specifically contesting aspects of the property division, including the value and allocation of a business and a retirement account. The court granted a stay regarding the disputed property but ultimately denied Husband’s Rule 83 motion on May 5, 2025, and lifted the stay on June 16, 2025.After the denial of his Rule 83 motion and the lifting of the stay, Husband filed a notice of appeal on June 17, challenging the Decree, the Rule 83 denial, and related orders. Wife moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely, arguing that it was filed more than 30 days after the May 5 order denying the Rule 83 motion. The Arizona Court of Appeals agreed, explaining that the time to appeal was triggered by the entry of the order disposing of the Rule 83 motion, not by subsequent orders or the inclusion of finality language, and dismissed Husband’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed the matter to clarify when the time to appeal begins following a Rule 83 motion in family court. The Court held that, under ARCAP 9(e)(1)(C), the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal started when the superior court clerk entered the signed order denying the Rule 83 motion, regardless of whether that order contained Rule 78(b) or (c) finality language. Because Husband’s notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days after this order, it was untimely. The Court affirmed the order dismissing Husband’s appeal. View "MACDONALD v MACDONALD" on Justia Law

Two defendants were jointly indicted for money laundering, illegal control of an enterprise, and attempts to commit trafficking in stolen property. During their trial, the State introduced evidence referencing financial records that had previously been excluded as untimely. One defendant’s counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, additionally requesting dismissal with prejudice, arguing the jury had been irreparably exposed to precluded evidence. The co-defendant’s counsel joined in these motions. The trial court excused the jury, heard arguments, and granted a mistrial, but denied dismissal with prejudice, finding the State’s conduct was not intentional nor in bad faith. After the mistrial was granted, both defendants attempted to withdraw their mistrial requests, expressing preference to continue the trial if dismissal with prejudice was unavailable, but the court declined to revisit its decision.The defendants sought special action review from the Arizona Court of Appeals, arguing that a retrial would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court of appeals accepted jurisdiction, granted relief, and vacated the trial court’s order of mistrial, concluding that retrial would violate double jeopardy because the defendants had not consented to a mistrial without prejudice. The appellate court found the trial court abused its discretion in declaring a mistrial without manifest necessity and instructed that the charges be dismissed with prejudice, reasoning the defendants’ requests were ambiguous and their later attempts to clarify indicated they sought only a mistrial with prejudice.The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed the case to address whether a defendant can withdraw or clarify a mistrial motion after the court’s ruling and what framework governs appellate review of a manifest necessity finding. The Court held that defendants cannot withdraw or condition a mistrial motion after the trial court has ruled; consent to a mistrial must be withdrawn or clarified before the ruling. The Court also held that either consent or manifest necessity is independently sufficient to permit retrial under double jeopardy principles, and affirmed the trial court’s finding of manifest necessity. The relief granted by the court of appeals was vacated, and the case was remanded. View "ROBBINS v STATE OF ARIZONA" on Justia Law

Brian Blunt, a long-term employee of the Town of Gilbert, was promoted to Commander in 2021 and signed an at-will employment agreement as a condition of his promotion and pay raise. This agreement allowed either party to terminate the relationship at any time, with or without cause, and was consistent with the then-existing Peace Officers’ Bill of Rights (POBR), which permitted such contractual deviations. In 2023, following employee complaints and an external investigation, Blunt was terminated without a pre-termination hearing or appeal process. He requested these procedural protections but was denied.After his termination, Blunt brought an action in Arizona Superior Court seeking a writ of mandamus compelling the Town to provide him procedural protections under POBR and due process. The Town removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona and moved to dismiss. The District Court granted the motion, holding that Blunt had no constitutionally protected employment interest because his contract was at-will and the 2022 amendment to POBR did not apply retroactively to his agreement. Blunt appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which certified three questions to the Supreme Court of Arizona regarding the retroactive application of the 2022 POBR amendment.The Supreme Court of Arizona held that the presumption against retroactivity, codified in Arizona law, prohibits applying the 2022 amendment to at-will employment agreements executed before its effective date. The court found that the at-will employment term constituted a vested substantive right at the time of contract formation, and absent express legislative intent for retroactivity, the amendment cannot alter those pre-existing rights. The court answered only the first certified question, as its resolution was dispositive, and returned the matter to the Ninth Circuit. View "BLUNT v TOWN OF GILBERT" on Justia Law

A bystander was injured in June 2023 when a police dog owned by a municipality mistakenly attacked him during a pursuit. The injured party, seeking damages for his injuries, timely submitted a statutory notice of claim to the municipality. In the notice, he offered to settle his personal injury claim for “one hundred thousand dollars ($250,000),” creating an internal inconsistency between the written and numerical amounts. The municipality did not accept the offer within the 60-day statutory period.After the offer was not accepted, the injured party filed a complaint in the Superior Court in Gila County. The municipality moved to dismiss, asserting that the notice failed to comply with Arizona Revised Statutes § 12-821.01(A)’s requirement to state a specific amount for which the claim can be settled. The Superior Court treated the motion as one for summary judgment and granted it, finding the notice insufficient. On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, reversed, holding that contract law principles should be used to resolve the inconsistency, and concluding that the written amount controlled, thus satisfying the statute.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case. It held that strict compliance with the statutory requirement is necessary: a notice of claim must state a single, specific settlement amount that leaves no room for doubt. The court rejected the use of contract interpretation principles or extrinsic evidence to resolve conflicting figures in the notice, emphasizing that the municipality has no obligation to investigate or seek clarification. Because the notice contained two different amounts, it did not comply with § 12-821.01(A). The Supreme Court vacated the appellate decision and affirmed summary judgment for the municipality. View "TERBORG v TOWN OF PAYSON" on Justia Law

A tenured professor at the University of Arizona, concerned about adherence to an anti-discrimination constitutional amendment in university hiring, submitted a series of public records requests to the university. These requests sought data and documents related to survey results used in hiring, as well as information about appointment and selection processes for certain positions. The university partially complied, providing some records, redacting or withholding others, and denying access to an audio recording of a committee meeting, citing confidentiality. The university later destroyed the recording after offering the professor a chance to listen without copying, which he declined. Following repeated, unsuccessful requests, the professor’s attorney sent a demand letter, prompting the university to release additional records, though some remained withheld or redacted.The professor filed a Special Action Complaint in the Superior Court in Pima County against the Arizona Board of Regents (ABOR), alleging wrongful denial of records and seeking damages and attorney fees. The Superior Court dismissed some counts as time-barred or for failure to state a claim, held a bench trial, and denied relief on remaining counts. The court found the university had eventually provided nearly all requested records and cured any prior abuse of discretion. It denied the professor’s request for attorney fees, reasoning that such fees could not be awarded if the public entity had complied before litigation commenced. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that destruction of requested records amounted to a denial, but the professor was not entitled to damages or fees absent a timely notice of claim and that the trial court’s review of withheld records should combine de novo and abuse-of-discretion standards.The Supreme Court of Arizona reversed, holding that courts must review de novo an agency’s determination of statutory exemptions and the withholding or redacting of specific documents. The Court also held that destruction of a record after a request constitutes denial of access under the Public Records Law. Finally, the Court determined that “substantially prevailed” for attorney fees includes the requester’s overall success throughout the dispute, not just post-litigation results. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "ABRAHAM v ARIZONA BOARD OF REGENTS" on Justia Law

The case concerns a dispute over the legal paternity of a child born in September 2021, following sexual relations between the mother and two men, Tyler Strang and Christian Hernandez. After the child’s birth, the mother and Hernandez executed an acknowledgment of paternity (AOP), believing Hernandez was the biological father. Hernandez assumed caregiving responsibilities during the mother’s incarceration. Later, genetic testing revealed Hernandez was not the biological father, and subsequent testing in November 2023 and June 2024 established Strang’s biological paternity. Legal proceedings were initiated by the mother and Hernandez regarding decision-making and parenting time, but Strang was not originally included as a party.In Maricopa County Superior Court, Strang sought to intervene and filed his own petition to establish paternity, legal decision-making, and parenting time, arguing the AOP was executed under a mistaken belief. Hernandez moved to dismiss Strang’s petition, citing statutory and rule-based time bars for challenging an AOP. The superior court denied Strang’s requests, concluding the AOP had the force and effect of a judgment and that any challenge was untimely under Arizona Revised Statutes § 25-812(E) and Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure 85(c).The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed whether the superior court properly applied the statutory bar. The Court held that § 25-812(E) does not prevent a biological father who was not party to the AOP from bringing an independent statutory action to establish paternity under § 25-803. If such a father establishes a competing presumption of paternity under § 25-814(A), the superior court must resolve those presumptions according to § 25-814(C). The Supreme Court vacated the superior court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "STRANG v MALAY" on Justia Law

A mother gave birth to a child, M.P., in February 2023. In September of that year, the mother sought emergency care for M.P., who was found to be severely malnourished and developmentally delayed. Medical professionals determined the child’s condition was the result of neglect, not an underlying medical disorder. The Department of Child Safety (DCS) took custody of M.P., ultimately placing her in a medically fragile foster home. The mother was arrested, pleaded guilty to attempted child abuse, and received probation. DCS filed a dependency petition alleging that M.P. was neglected due to the mother’s failure to provide adequate nourishment and to protect the child from domestic violence. The mother participated in reunification services, but DCS remained concerned about her ability to safely care for M.P.The Superior Court in Pima County adjudicated M.P. dependent and later held a hearing on DCS’s petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2), which authorizes termination for neglect. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that the mother’s neglect placed M.P. at substantial risk of harm and concluded that termination was in M.P.’s best interests, noting the mother’s lack of behavioral change despite engaging in services. The Arizona Court of Appeals vacated the termination, holding that the juvenile court was required to consider the mother’s participation in, and benefit from, services at the unfitness stage, and that consideration of rehabilitative efforts was not required in the best-interests analysis.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona vacated the court of appeals’ decision and affirmed the termination. The Court held that, under § 8-533(B)(2), the juvenile court is not required to consider subsequent participation in services when determining parental unfitness, but must consider rehabilitation efforts in the best-interests analysis. The Court found that the juvenile court properly applied the law and that due process was satisfied. View "IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.P." on Justia Law

The dispute concerns damage to a commercial property owned by a company and insured under an all-risk property insurance policy. The tenant, Star Fisheries, Inc., had leased part of the property for over thirty years, during which its operations—particularly the use of water and salt—caused structural deterioration to concrete stairs, walls, and flooring. After initial damage was discovered in 2010, an engineering report recommended several repairs, some of which were completed, while others were not. The tenant was made responsible for remediation costs. No insurance claim was filed at that time. In 2021 and 2022, similar damage was again discovered, confirmed as structural, and the owner filed a claim with the insurer.The insurer investigated and denied coverage, citing policy exclusions for inherent vice, faulty workmanship, settling, and wear-and-tear. The owner requested reconsideration, but coverage was denied again. The owner then sued in Maricopa County Superior Court; the insurer removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. That court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer, applying a test from Ingenco Holdings, LLC v. Ace American Insurance Co., which included whether the loss was reasonably foreseeable and almost certain to occur, concluding the loss was not fortuitous.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified a question to the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona regarding the legal definition of a “fortuitous loss.” The Supreme Court of Arizona held that under Arizona law, a fortuitous loss is one that, so far as the parties to the contract are aware, is dependent on chance. A loss is non-fortuitous only if the insured knew, at the time coverage attached, that the loss-causing event had already occurred, was in progress, or was certain to occur because no material contingency remained. The court adopted a subjective standard focused on the insured’s knowledge at the time of contract formation. View "INDUSTRIAL PARK CENTER v GREAT NORTHERN INSURANCE" on Justia Law

The petitioner, who served as president of a company selected by a school district to develop and manage two middle schools, was indicted by a state grand jury on felony counts related to alleged violations of procurement rules during the project. The indictment was initially remanded because the wrong version of the procurement code was presented to the grand jury. After a second presentation, a new indictment was issued. The State later dismissed the charges with prejudice, citing the passage of time and evidentiary concerns. The petitioner, who lawfully possessed the grand jury transcripts, sought permission from the Superior Court in Maricopa County to use those transcripts in a civil lawsuit against the State and its agents for malicious prosecution, alleging fabricated evidence led to his indictment.The Superior Court denied the motion, reasoning that the petitioner could rely on the publicly available Auditor General Report to prove his claims in the civil action, and thus had no "particularized need" for the grand jury transcripts. The court also found no possible injustice because relevant information was accessible from public records. The Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, accepted special action jurisdiction and upheld the Superior Court’s ruling, agreeing that the petitioner failed to establish prejudice or a need for the transcripts outweighing grand jury secrecy.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reversed the lower courts' decisions. It held that the "particularized need" framework, as established in State ex rel. Ronan v. Superior Court, applies to requests by former defendants who lawfully possess grand jury transcripts and seek to use them in subsequent civil actions. The Court found error in the Superior Court’s conclusion that public records were a functional equivalent to grand jury transcripts and remanded for an in camera review to balance the petitioner’s need against societal interests in grand jury secrecy, and to determine appropriate conditions for transcript use. View "ALLER v. STATE" on Justia Law