Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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Roy McAlister invented and patented technologies related to clean fuels and incorporated McAlister Technologies, L.L.C. (MT) to hold and license these patents. In 2009, MT entered into a licensing agreement with Advanced Green Technologies, L.L.C. (AGT), which later retained Loeb & Loeb, L.L.P. for patent matters. Conflicts arose, leading McAlister to terminate the agreement, alleging AGT's breach. McAlister and MT claimed that Loeb & Loeb's actions clouded their patents, causing prospective licensees to back out, resulting in lost profits.The Superior Court in Maricopa County granted summary judgment in favor of Loeb & Loeb on the lost profit damages, finding the plaintiffs' evidence speculative and lacking reasonable certainty. The court excluded the plaintiffs' expert testimony on damages and ruled against them on claims for trespass to chattel, slander of title, and aiding and abetting, but allowed claims for breach of fiduciary duty and negligent supervision to proceed. Plaintiffs conceded no triable damages remained and stipulated to final judgment against them.The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the exclusion of the expert testimony and the summary judgment on most lost profit claims but reversed on a $5 million initial payment claim, remanding for further proceedings. It also reversed the summary judgment on trespass to chattel and slander of title claims.The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on the lost profit damages and trespass to chattel claim. It concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove the lost profit damages with reasonable certainty, as material terms of the prospective licensing agreement were unresolved. Consequently, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Loeb & Loeb on the lost profit damages and trespass to chattel claim, vacating the relevant parts of the Court of Appeals' decision. The case was remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings on the slander of title claim. View "McAlister v. Loeb" on Justia Law

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In this case, the father and mother of B.W. had a contentious relationship, and the father was involved in a criminal incident where he shot and killed a man. Following this incident, the father was advised by his criminal defense attorney not to contact the mother or B.W. to avoid jeopardizing his defense. The father was later charged with first-degree murder and conspiracy but was acquitted in December 2021. In March 2022, the father sought to establish his parental rights, and the mother filed for termination of his parental rights based on abandonment.The Superior Court in Maricopa County found that the father had abandoned B.W. by failing to maintain a normal parental relationship for over six months without just cause. The court rejected the father's argument that he had just cause for his inaction, noting that he did not take any legal steps to assert his parental rights. The court concluded that termination of the father's parental rights was in B.W.'s best interest. The father appealed.The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's decision, agreeing that the father did not demonstrate just cause for his failure to maintain a relationship with B.W. The court held that the father's reliance on his criminal defense attorney's advice did not excuse his inaction.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case to clarify the meaning of "just cause" under A.R.S. § 8-531(1). The court held that "just cause" refers to a reasonable and justifiable reason for a parent's failure to maintain a normal parental relationship, based on good faith. The court reversed the juvenile court's termination order and remanded the case for reconsideration, instructing the lower court to apply the clarified definition of "just cause" in determining whether the father's actions were justified. The Court of Appeals' decision was vacated. View "In re Termination Parental Rights as to B.W." on Justia Law

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Fourteen-year-old Christopher "CJ" Lucero was hit by a car and severely injured while jaywalking across a city-owned street to enter his high school campus. The accident occurred near Betty H. Fairfax High School (BFHS) in Phoenix, which is part of the Phoenix Union High School District No. 210. On the day of the accident, there were no crosswalks, school zone speed limit or warning signs, or traffic lights near the school. CJ attempted to cross the street from a vacant dirt lot opposite the school, which was commonly used by parents to drop off students, although the school did not endorse this practice.CJ, through his father, sued the District for negligence, gross negligence, and premises liability. The Superior Court of Maricopa County denied the District's motion for summary judgment, reasoning that the District was aware of the jaywalking and the associated risks but did nothing to mitigate them. The court of appeals also denied the District's petition for special action relief.The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed the case and held that the school did not owe CJ a duty of care as he crossed the street. The court reasoned that the risk of harm did not arise within the school-student relationship because CJ was not under the school's custody and control at the time of the accident. The court emphasized that the school did not own or control the street or the dirt lot and had no authority to install safety features. The court concluded that the general rule is that a school has no duty to protect students from hazards encountered while traveling to or from school. Consequently, the court vacated the court of appeals' decision and reversed the trial court's order, instructing the trial court to enter summary judgment in favor of the District. View "Phoenix Union High School District No. 210. v. Sinclair" on Justia Law

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William Chalmers filed for legal separation from his wife, which was later converted to a dissolution proceeding. During the proceedings, Chalmers' attorney requested the appointment of a guardian ad litem due to concerns about Chalmers' capacity. The court appointed Brian Theut as guardian ad litem, who then requested the appointment of East Valley Fiduciary Services, Inc. (EVFS) as temporary guardian and conservator. EVFS retained Ryan Scharber and John McKindles to represent them and Chalmers, respectively. The professionals did not file the required statement under A.R.S. § 14-5109(A) explaining their compensation arrangement.The professionals filed numerous applications for fees and costs, which were initially approved by the court. However, when a new judge took over, Chalmers objected to the fee applications, including those already approved. The court denied the outstanding fee applications, citing the professionals' failure to comply with § 14-5109(A) and noting that they had already received substantial compensation. The court of appeals held that the prior fee approvals were not final and remanded the case to determine if the approvals were manifestly erroneous or unjust due to non-compliance with § 14-5109(A).The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that failure to comply with § 14-5109(A) does not automatically preclude recovery of fees. The court found that the statute is directory, not mandatory, and that the trial court has discretion to rectify non-compliance. The court vacated the court of appeals' opinion, affirmed the denial of fees to which Chalmers timely objected, but reversed the ruling requiring the professionals to disgorge previously awarded fees. The case was remanded to reinstate the initial fee awards. View "In the matter of CHALMERS" on Justia Law

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In this case, a construction financer, Mortgages Ltd. (ML), collapsed, leading to numerous mechanics' liens on unfinished projects. ML had loaned $165 million to Tempe Land Company (TLC) for a condominium project, securing the loan with a deed of trust and purchasing a title insurance policy from Fidelity National Title Insurance Company. Contractors began recording mechanics' liens against the property, and ML entered involuntary bankruptcy. The Loan LLCs, created to hold ML's assets, foreclosed on the property but did not extinguish the liens. Universal and VRCP provided loans to ML Manager and the Loan LLCs, securing their loans with deeds of trust and obtaining title insurance policies from Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co.The trial court granted summary judgment to Commonwealth on CMLC's breach of contract claim, finding that the loans were fully repaid, thus precluding coverage under the policy. The case proceeded to trial on CMLC's bad faith claim, where the jury awarded $5 million in damages. Both parties appealed. The court of appeals vacated the trial court's summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, directing the trial court to enter summary judgment for CMLC, and affirmed the denial of Commonwealth's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the bad faith claim.The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed the case and held that Commonwealth could contest coverage based on policy provisions limiting liability to the unpaid indebtedness. The court found that the loans were fully repaid, thus no covered loss occurred. The court also held that the diminution in lien value did not constitute actual pecuniary damage to support a bad faith claim. Additionally, the court ruled that the collateral source rule did not preclude evidence of loan repayments. The court vacated the court of appeals' opinion, affirmed the trial court's summary judgment for Commonwealth on the breach of contract claim, and remanded to enter summary judgment for Commonwealth on the bad faith claim. View "CENTERPOINT v COMMONWEALTH" on Justia Law

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Jacey Lee Orlando was a passenger in an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) that overturned in California’s Imperial Sand Dunes, causing serious injury to her leg. The driver’s insurer paid Orlando the liability policy limit, which was insufficient to cover her injuries. Orlando then filed a claim with her insurer, State Farm, under her underinsured motorist (UIM) policy. State Farm denied coverage, stating that the ATV was not an “underinsured motor vehicle” under the policy because it was designed for use primarily off public roads and the accident did not occur on a public road. State Farm subsequently filed for a declaratory judgment to confirm that the policy did not provide UIM coverage for the ATV accident. Orlando counterclaimed for breach of contract.The Superior Court in Maricopa County granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm, concluding that the ATV was not an “underinsured motor vehicle” under the policy and that the policy’s exclusion was valid. Orlando appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, holding that the UIM provision of the Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Act (UMA) did not permit excluding coverage for the ATV accident.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case to determine whether the UMA requires insurers to provide UIM coverage for accidents involving vehicles designed primarily for off-road use and that do not occur on public roads. The court held that the UMA does not require coverage for ATVs not operated on public roads and that an insurer may preclude such coverage in a UIM policy. The court vacated the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the Superior Court’s summary judgment in favor of State Farm. View "STATE FARM AUTOMOBILE v ORLANDO" on Justia Law

Posted in: Insurance Law
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In April 2021, David Browne visited Billy Jack’s Saloon and Grill in Dewey-Humboldt, Arizona. After leaving the bar, Browne, with a blood alcohol content nearly four times the legal limit, caused a multi-vehicle collision on State Route 69. Victor Sanchez-Ravuelta, Janette Dodge, and their two minor children, Elijah and Amelia, were injured in the crash. The plaintiffs alleged that the Arizona Department of Liquor Licenses and Control (the Department) was negligent in failing to prevent Billy Jack’s from overserving its patrons.The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the State of Arizona, the Town of Dewey-Humboldt, and Yavapai County. The Superior Court in Maricopa County dismissed the claims against all defendants. The court found that the plaintiffs’ notice of claim to the County and Town was insufficient and that the Department did not have a legal duty to protect the plaintiffs from the harm caused by Browne’s actions. The court dismissed the minor plaintiffs’ claims without prejudice and the adult plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice.The Arizona Court of Appeals held that the Department owed a statute-based duty of care to the plaintiffs. However, the Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the Department did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiffs. The court found that the statutes cited by the plaintiffs did not impose a mandatory duty on the Department to prevent the overserving of patrons. The Supreme Court vacated parts of the Court of Appeals' opinion and affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal of the adult plaintiffs’ claims against the State with prejudice. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to consider the Town’s cross-appeal. View "SANCHEZ-RAVUELTA v YAVAPAI" on Justia Law

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On Christmas night in 2007, firefighters in Kingman, Arizona, extinguished a fire in a pickup truck. Investigators found evidence of arson, including gasoline fumes and remnants of a gas can. The truck was registered to Anna Hammond, who was found injured in her home nearby, along with her deceased dog. Hammond later died from her injuries. A grand jury indicted Edward Serrato III for second-degree murder, first-degree burglary, arson of an occupied structure (the vehicle), theft of means of transportation, and attempted arson of an occupied structure (the house). Serrato was convicted on all charges and sentenced to 135 years in prison.Serrato appealed his convictions. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions and sentences for second-degree murder, first-degree burglary, theft of means of transportation, and attempted arson of an occupied structure. However, the court also affirmed his conviction for arson of an occupied structure, interpreting the statute to mean that Serrato's presence alone made the truck an occupied structure.The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether an arsonist's presence alone is sufficient to support a conviction for arson of an occupied structure under A.R.S. § 13-1704. The court held that the term "occupied structure" unambiguously excludes the arsonist from being considered a "human being" under the statute. The court reasoned that including the arsonist would render other statutory provisions nearly superfluous and undermine the tiered arson statutory scheme. Therefore, the court vacated Serrato's conviction and sentence for arson of an occupied structure and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court's decision did not affect Serrato's other convictions and sentences. View "STATE OF ARIZONA v SERRATO" on Justia Law

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In 2018, Lillian Hester was convicted by a jury of abusing and murdering her six-year-old nephew, Jack. Lenda Hester, Jack’s grandmother, and Jason Conlee, Lillian’s boyfriend, pleaded guilty to charges of child abuse and endangerment. Jack’s half-sister, Elise, sought over $3 million in restitution for Jack’s future lost wages from the defendants.The Superior Court of Coconino County allowed Elise to assert victims' rights on Jack’s behalf but denied her request for restitution for Jack’s future lost wages, ruling that such wages were consequential damages and not recoverable as restitution. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, agreeing that the future lost wages were too speculative and attenuated to be considered direct economic losses.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that future lost wages of a murdered child are recoverable as restitution if they meet the criteria of being economic losses directly caused by the criminal conduct, as outlined in the Wilkinson test. The court emphasized that the loss of Jack’s future wages was a direct result of his murder and not consequential damages. The court remanded the case to the Superior Court to determine the amount of restitution for Jack’s future lost wages, ensuring that the amount is reasonably estimated and not based on speculation. View "E. H. v HON. SLAYTON" on Justia Law

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Martin Montano Jr., an employee of Casas Custom Floor Care, LLC, was involved in a fatal car accident while driving his mother's truck to correct his timesheet at the company's main yard. Michael Cravens, the surviving spouse of the deceased, sued Montano and Casas, alleging negligence and vicarious liability. Cincinnati Indemnity Company, which insured Casas, issued a reservation of rights letter to Montano, disputing its obligation to defend or insure him under the policy.The Superior Court in Pima County granted summary judgment in favor of Cravens, ruling that Montano was using the vehicle "in connection with" Casas's business at the time of the accident, thus obligating Cincinnati to indemnify Montano. The court also upheld the enforceability of a Morris Agreement between Montano and Cravens, which stipulated Montano's liability and assigned his rights under the policy to Cravens. The court of appeals affirmed the superior court's rulings on both coverage and the agreement.The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed the case and held that an employee operates a non-owned auto "in connection with your business" when using the vehicle while engaged in the employer's business. This does not include a routine commute. The court also held that a contingent Morris agreement is enforceable if it meets the substantive requirements to ensure against fraud, collusion, unfairness, or unreasonableness. The court vacated the court of appeals' coverage ruling, affirmed the ruling on the Morris Agreement, reversed the superior court's judgment, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "CRAVENS v MONTANO" on Justia Law