Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mother conceived M.N. with Father in summer 2020. Before M.N. was born, Mother and her boyfriend initiated adoption proceedings without informing the adoption agency about Father. M.N. was born on March 23, 2021, and Father requested a DNA test at the hospital. In April 2021, Mother and her boyfriend signed adoption consent forms, and the adoption agency petitioned for termination of parental rights. After being identified as a potential father, Father was served notice of the adoption and filed a paternity action within the required timeframe. Genetic testing confirmed Father as the biological father.The juvenile court terminated Father’s parental rights, finding he failed to file with the putative fathers registry. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, concluding the juvenile court improperly terminated Father’s rights under § 8-533(B)(6) without considering his rights as a potential father under § 8-106. The court of appeals held that genetic testing established Father as a presumed legal father, exempting him from filing with the putative fathers registry.The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed the case to determine if a potential father served with a § 8-106 notice must file a notice of a claim of paternity with the putative fathers registry under § 8-106.01. The court held that a potential father identified and served notice under § 8-106(G) is not required to file with the putative fathers registry. The court emphasized that the potential fathers statute and the putative fathers statute address separate classifications of fathers, each with distinct rights and obligations. The court vacated parts of the court of appeals’ opinion, reversed the juvenile court’s termination order, and remanded for further proceedings. View "IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.N." on Justia Law

San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E) owns an interstate electric transmission line running from Arizona to California. The Arizona Department of Revenue (ADOR) is responsible for valuing SDG&E's property in Arizona for tax purposes. In 2020, SDG&E reported a net "original plant in service" valuation of $48,817,396 and a net "related accumulated provision for depreciation" amount of $51,446,397, resulting in a negative valuation of $2,629,001. ADOR disagreed with this calculation and determined a different accumulated depreciation amount, resulting in a positive valuation.The Arizona Tax Court granted summary judgment in favor of SDG&E, finding that their valuation correctly followed the statutory requirements. ADOR appealed, and the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Court's decision, holding that the statute did not permit a negative valuation for a plant in service and that accumulated depreciation could not reduce the full cash value to a negative number. The Court of Appeals remanded the case for further proceedings.The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the calculation prescribed by the statute for determining a reduced plant in service cost does not preclude a negative valuation. The Court found that the statutory language did not limit the reduction of the original plant in service cost by accumulated depreciation to a non-negative number. Additionally, the Court clarified that a negative valuation for one component, when summed with other component valuations, reduces the overall full cash value but does not "offset" the valuation of other components. The Supreme Court vacated the relevant portions of the Court of Appeals' opinion and affirmed the Tax Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of SDG&E. View "San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Arizona Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

The case involves the State of Arizona and the Foothills Reserve Master Owners Association (HOA) regarding the condemnation of easements in a master-planned community. The community, consisting of 590 homes, had easements in common areas owned by the HOA. These easements allowed homeowners to use the common areas and restricted their development. The State condemned these easements to construct the Loop 202 South Mountain Freeway, compensating the HOA $6.5 million for the common areas. The HOA, representing the homeowners, sought additional compensation for the reduction in home values due to the freeway's proximity.The Superior Court in Maricopa County ruled in favor of the HOA, allowing them to pursue proximity damages. The court awarded the HOA $18 million, including $6 million for the easements' value and $12 million for proximity damages, pending the State's appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, stating that proximity damages under A.R.S. § 12-1122(A)(2) are only available when the condemned property is a physical parcel of land, not easements.The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed the case to determine if A.R.S. § 12-1122(A)(2) allows for proximity damages when appurtenant easements are condemned. The court concluded that the statute does authorize such damages. The court reasoned that appurtenant easements are part of the dominant estate and that the homeowners' properties, including the easements, constitute a "larger parcel." Therefore, the homeowners are entitled to severance damages for the reduction in property values due to the freeway's proximity. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' opinion and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment, allowing the HOA to receive the $12 million in proximity damages. View "STATE v FOOTHILLS RESERVE MASTERS ASSOCIATION, INC." on Justia Law

In 1994, Christopher Spreitz was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, sexual assault, and kidnapping of Ruby Reid. Reid was last seen leaving a bar in Tucson, and her body was found days later in a desert area. Spreitz admitted to hitting Reid with a rock to stop her from yelling. The medical examiner identified multiple injuries on Reid's body, including broken ribs, internal bleeding, and a skull fracture.The trial court found one aggravating circumstance: that Spreitz murdered Reid in an especially cruel manner. The court also considered several non-statutory mitigating factors, such as Spreitz's sub-normal home environment, emotional immaturity, lack of prior felonies, and potential for rehabilitation. The court determined that the aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating factors and sentenced Spreitz to death. This sentence was affirmed by the Arizona Supreme Court on direct appeal.Spreitz's petition for habeas corpus was denied by the federal district court, but a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part, concluding that the Arizona Supreme Court had applied an unconstitutional "causal nexus" test and did not properly consider evidence of Spreitz's longstanding alcohol and substance abuse as non-statutory mitigation. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court with instructions to correct the constitutional error or impose a lesser sentence.The Arizona Supreme Court conducted a new independent review of the entire record, including the mitigation evidence presented at the original sentencing. The court considered the mitigating factors without requiring a causal nexus to the murder and reweighed them against the established especially cruel aggravating circumstance. The court concluded that the mitigation evidence was insufficient to warrant leniency and affirmed the sentence of death. View "State v. Spreitz" on Justia Law

In January 2015, Ian Mitcham was arrested for DUI in Scottsdale, Arizona. He consented to a blood test to determine alcohol concentration or drug content, and two vials of blood were drawn. Mitcham was informed that the second vial would be destroyed if not claimed within ninety days, but it was not destroyed. Mitcham was later convicted of a misdemeanor DUI. In February 2015, Allison Feldman was found murdered, and DNA evidence was collected from the crime scene. In 2017, a familial DNA search linked Mitcham’s brother to the crime scene DNA, leading police to Mitcham. Without a warrant, police used the second vial of blood to create a DNA profile, which matched the crime scene DNA.The Maricopa County Superior Court suppressed the DNA evidence obtained from the second vial and the subsequent buccal swabs collected under a search warrant, ruling that the warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment and no exceptions to the exclusionary rule applied. The court of appeals reversed, with the majority finding that the inevitable discovery and independent source exceptions applied, while a concurring judge found no Fourth Amendment violation.The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the police violated Mitcham’s Fourth Amendment rights by conducting a warrantless search of the second vial of blood. However, the court found that the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule applied. The court reasoned that Mitcham’s DNA profile would have inevitably been discovered through lawful means due to his subsequent felony convictions, which required DNA profiling under Arizona law. Therefore, the trial court erred in suppressing the DNA evidence. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "STATE OF ARIZONA v MITCHAM" on Justia Law

A police officer from the City of Mesa, while driving his patrol car, was involved in a multi-vehicle accident that injured a bicyclist, Philip Rogers. Rogers claimed the officer's negligent driving caused the accident and served notices of claim to the City of Mesa and the officer, offering to settle for "$1,000,000 or the applicable [insurance] policy limits, whichever are greater." Later, Rogers amended his notices to specify a settlement amount of $1,000,000.The Superior Court of Maricopa County denied the City’s motion to dismiss Rogers' complaint, which argued that the initial notices did not comply with Arizona Revised Statutes § 12-821.01(A) because they did not state a specific settlement amount. The City then petitioned for special action review. The Court of Appeals reversed the Superior Court’s decision, directing it to dismiss the complaint, concluding that the notices of claim did not provide a specific amount for settlement as required by the statute.The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed the case to determine if Rogers' notices of claim complied with § 12-821.01(A). The Court held that the settlement offer of "$1,000,000 or the applicable policy limits, whichever are greater" was insufficiently specific to meet the statutory requirements. The Court emphasized that the statute requires a clear and precise settlement amount, which was not provided in Rogers' notices. Consequently, Rogers was barred from maintaining his lawsuit due to non-compliance with the statutory notice requirements.The Supreme Court of Arizona reversed the Superior Court’s order and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss Rogers' claims. The Court also affirmed in part and vacated in part the opinion of the Court of Appeals. View "CITY OF MESA v. RYAN" on Justia Law

Preston Strong was convicted of six counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Strong had a history of financial troubles and was friends with one of the victims, Luis Rios, who often loaned him money. An argument between Strong and Luis occurred about a month before the murders, with Luis refusing to loan Strong more money. On the day of the murders, Luis and Adrienne Heredia, along with her four children, were found dead in their home. Evidence included Strong’s fingerprints on plastic bags found at the scene and his DNA on the steering wheel of Luis’s vehicle.The Superior Court in Yuma County denied Strong’s motions to change the venue, suppress evidence, and dismiss the case due to preindictment delay. The jury found Strong guilty and determined that the State had proved the alleged aggravating circumstances. The trial court later instructed the jury to disregard one of the aggravating factors during the penalty phase. Strong’s motions for a new trial and to vacate the judgment, based on alleged juror misconduct and other grounds, were denied.The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed Strong’s convictions and sentences. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s rulings on preindictment delay, change of venue, and the admission of evidence. The court also concluded that the trial court did not err in its handling of juror misconduct allegations, the admission of DNA evidence, and the consideration of victim impact statements. The court held that the erroneous instruction regarding the cold-and-calculating aggravating factor did not constitute fundamental error, as the jury was instructed to disregard it. The court also found that the jury’s findings of aggravating circumstances and the imposition of the death penalty were supported by reasonable evidence and did not violate constitutional standards. View "STATE OF ARIZONA v STRONG" on Justia Law

David Francisco, a retired endodontist, sought treatment from Dr. Kevin Art of Affiliated Urologists, Ltd. in 2018. Dr. Art performed a urological procedure and prescribed the antibiotic Ciproflaxin (Cipro) without discussing its use with Francisco. The FDA's black box warning for Cipro indicated serious risks, especially for elderly patients with a history of corticosteroid use, which applied to Francisco. After taking Cipro, Francisco experienced severe adverse reactions, including tendon ruptures and peripheral neuropathy.The Superior Court in Maricopa County dismissed the Franciscos' case for failing to provide a preliminary expert opinion affidavit as required by A.R.S. § 12-2603. The Franciscos argued that the FDA warning itself should establish the standard of care, negating the need for expert testimony. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal, holding that the FDA warning could be sufficient to establish the standard of care without expert testimony.The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that FDA warnings cannot substitute for expert testimony to establish the standard of care in medical malpractice cases. The Court emphasized that medical judgment is required to determine the appropriate standard of care, which must be established by expert testimony. The Court also rejected the Franciscos' argument that the statutory requirements for expert testimony violated the anti-abrogation clause of the Arizona Constitution, finding that the statutes permissibly regulate medical negligence actions.The Arizona Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the Superior Court's dismissal of the case. View "FRANCISCO v AFFILIATED UROLOGISTS" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant, Christopher Montoya, was convicted of first-degree murder, second-degree burglary, kidnapping, aggravated identity theft, unlawful use of means of transportation, theft, and two counts of animal cruelty. Montoya was sentenced to death for the murder charge. The crimes occurred after Montoya's relationship with the victim, A.R., ended, leading him to break into her house, attack, and ultimately kill her. Montoya also used A.R.'s personal information and belongings for his benefit after her death.The Superior Court in Maricopa County handled the initial trial, where Montoya pleaded guilty to all charges and admitted to two capital aggravators: committing previous serious offenses and murdering A.R. in an especially cruel and heinous manner. Despite his guilty plea, Montoya waived the presentation of most mitigation evidence, allowing only the records of his guilty pleas and mitigation waiver hearings to be submitted as evidence of his acceptance of responsibility. The jury returned a death verdict, and the court sentenced Montoya to death for the murder and to a combined 103 years in prison for the other charges.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case. The court affirmed Montoya’s convictions and sentences, including the death penalty. The court found no fundamental errors in the trial process, including the handling of voir dire, the admission of autopsy photographs, and the acceptance of Montoya’s waiver of mitigation evidence. The court also determined that the jury instructions were adequate and that the victim impact statements did not fundamentally prejudice Montoya’s right to a fair trial. The court conducted an independent review of the death sentence and concluded that a reasonable jury could have found the mitigating circumstances insufficient to warrant leniency. View "STATE OF ARIZONA v MONTOYA" on Justia Law

Marcos Martinez killed his grandmother and subsequently pleaded guilty except insane (GEI) to first-degree murder. Under his plea agreement, he was committed to the Arizona State Hospital and will remain under the jurisdiction of the superior court for life. However, unlike a standard guilty plea, Martinez’s GEI plea did not include restitution for the victims of his crime. Lisa Gilpin, claiming to be a victim, sought approximately $18,300 in restitution from Martinez under Arizona’s Victims’ Bill of Rights (VBR). The superior court denied her request, citing the precedent set in State v. Heartfield, which held that GEI defendants are not responsible for restitution.The superior court ruled that a GEI judgment is not a “conviction” for restitution purposes, thus making restitution unavailable. Gilpin sought special action review from the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, but the court declined jurisdiction. The Arizona Supreme Court granted review due to the recurring statewide importance of whether crime victims are entitled to restitution from GEI defendants.The Arizona Supreme Court overruled Heartfield, concluding that the legislature intended to assign criminal responsibility to GEI defendants. The court held that a GEI verdict results in criminal responsibility, and therefore, victims are entitled to restitution from GEI defendants who cause or threaten to cause death or serious bodily injury. The court remanded the case to the superior court to determine Gilpin’s eligibility for restitution, the amount owed, and whether Martinez is liable for restitution payments while suffering from a mental disease or defect. View "GILPIN v MARTINEZ" on Justia Law