Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A patient with a history of aortic valve replacement visited an urgent care facility with symptoms including fever, headache, and chills. The urgent care doctor suspected bacterial endocarditis, a potentially fatal infection, and referred the patient to the emergency department at a hospital, providing a note and calling ahead. At the emergency department, the attending physician reviewed the note but dismissed the suspicion of endocarditis, diagnosing the patient with a viral syndrome and discharging him. The patient later saw his primary care provider, who also suspected endocarditis, but he died two days later. An autopsy confirmed death from complications of sepsis due to acute bacterial endocarditis. The patient’s family filed a wrongful death lawsuit, alleging that the hospital and emergency physician’s failure to diagnose and treat endocarditis caused his death.The Superior Court in Maricopa County granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that the plaintiff’s expert testimony did not meet the clear and convincing evidence standard required by Arizona Revised Statutes § 12-572 for emergency department malpractice claims. The court reasoned that the experts did not state causation to a high degree of medical probability. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the expert opinions were insufficient to meet the heightened standard and that summary judgment was appropriate.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reversed and remanded. It held that the clear and convincing evidence standard in § 12-572 is a standard of proof, not a prima facie element of the claim. The Court clarified that a plaintiff’s expert testimony that negligence “likely” caused the injury is sufficient to establish causation for purposes of surviving summary judgment. The factfinder must consider all relevant, admissible evidence—not just expert testimony—when determining whether causation has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The Court vacated the court of appeals’ decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "HENKE v. HOSPITAL" on Justia Law

The case concerns an incident in which a man, living in a two-bedroom condominium with his long-term partner and their children, was charged with aggravated assault after striking a visitor, M.H., with a microphone stand. The defendant and his partner, J.A., had a history of conflict regarding M.H., who had previously assaulted the defendant and had a felony conviction. On the day in question, after returning home to find M.H. present, the defendant locked himself in his bedroom. J.A. and M.H. forcibly entered the bedroom despite the defendant’s objections, leading to the altercation.The Superior Court in Pima County denied the defendant’s request for jury instructions on the defense of residential structure, defense of premises, and the statutory presumption that force is justified when defending against unlawful entry into a residential structure. The jury convicted the defendant on one count of aggravated assault, and he was sentenced to five years in prison. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that M.H. was lawfully present as J.A.’s invitee.The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed the case and held that a separately securable bedroom within a shared residence qualifies as a “residential structure” under Arizona law. The Court further held that the statutory presumption of justified force applies when an uninvited person forcefully enters such a space, even if another resident invited them into the common areas. The Court found that the trial court erred in refusing the requested jury instructions and that this error was not harmless. The Supreme Court of Arizona reversed the conviction, vacated the sentence, and remanded the case for a new trial. View "STATE OF ARIZONA v BROWN" on Justia Law

The case concerns a challenge by the leaders of the Arizona Senate and House of Representatives to the Voters’ Right to Know Act, a voter-approved initiative that imposes new campaign finance disclosure requirements and grants broad enforcement powers to the Citizens Clean Elections Commission. The legislative leaders argue that the Act unconstitutionally delegates legislative authority to the Commission, an executive agency, and that the challenged provisions are so integral to the Act that, despite a severability clause, their invalidity would render the entire measure void.After the Act was approved by voters, the legislative leaders, authorized by their respective chambers, filed a facial constitutional challenge in the Superior Court of Maricopa County against the Secretary of State and the Commission. The Arizona Attorney General and the political action committee that sponsored the Act intervened to defend it. The superior court denied the leaders’ motion for a preliminary injunction, finding no specific injury had occurred, and also denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss, allowing the leaders to amend their pleadings. On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that the leaders lacked standing to challenge the entire Act but had standing to challenge a specific provision (§ 16-974(D)) that prevented the Legislature from limiting the Commission’s rules or enforcement actions. The court of appeals found this provision unconstitutional but severable, and enjoined its enforcement while upholding the rest of the Act.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case and held that the legislative leaders have standing to challenge the Act, as the alleged unconstitutional delegation of legislative power constitutes an institutional injury. However, the Court determined that it is premature to address the severability of the challenged provisions before a ruling on their constitutionality. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s decision, vacated the court of appeals’ decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Montenegro v. Fontes" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was indicted on multiple counts of sexual conduct with a minor and one count of public sexual indecency to a minor. The State made a plea offer that would have capped his sentence at 27 years, but his trial counsel failed to adequately communicate the offer or explain the sentencing consequences if he went to trial. The defendant only learned the full extent of his potential sentence immediately before trial and attempted to accept the plea, but the offer had expired. He was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 79.5 years in prison.After his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal by the Arizona Court of Appeals, the defendant filed a timely first petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) in the Maricopa County Superior Court, raising ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims but not specifically focusing on the plea offer issue. His PCR counsel chose not to pursue that claim, and the petition was denied. Subsequent federal habeas proceedings were also unsuccessful. Years later, the defendant filed a successive PCR petition, this time specifically alleging IAC related to the plea offer. The Superior Court found the claim was not precluded and excused the untimeliness, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding the claim was precluded under prior Arizona Supreme Court precedent.The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed whether the successive IAC claim was precluded and whether the untimely filing was excusable. The court held that a claim based on counsel’s failure to adequately communicate a plea offer implicates a constitutional right of such magnitude—the right to decide whether to plead guilty and waive a jury trial—that it can only be waived knowingly, voluntarily, and personally by the defendant. Therefore, the claim was not precluded. The court also held that the defendant adequately explained the delay, so the untimely filing was excused. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s rulings on preclusion and timeliness, vacated part of the Court of Appeals’ opinion, and remanded for further proceedings. View "STATE OF ARIZONA v TRAVERSO" on Justia Law

Robin Roebuck, who had previously undergone a heart transplant, was hospitalized at the Mayo Clinic in Arizona in April 2020 for COVID-19. During his stay, an arterial blood gas test was performed as part of his treatment, which led to complications requiring surgery and resulting in significant scarring and reduced function in his right arm and hand. In January 2021, Roebuck filed a medical negligence lawsuit against the Mayo Clinic and two of its medical professionals, alleging that the test was negligently performed. He did not claim gross negligence.The Superior Court of Maricopa County initially denied Mayo Clinic’s motion to dismiss, finding that Roebuck had sufficiently alleged the test was part of his heart treatment rather than COVID-19 care. After discovery, the court determined the test was related to COVID-19 treatment and granted summary judgment for Mayo Clinic, holding that Arizona Revised Statutes § 12-516 provided immunity from ordinary negligence claims during the pandemic, requiring proof of gross negligence or willful misconduct instead. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that § 12-516’s bar on ordinary negligence claims for pandemic-related medical care violated the Arizona Constitution’s anti-abrogation clause.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case and held that § 12-516(A) unconstitutionally abrogates the right to recover damages for injuries caused by ordinary negligence by health care providers during a public health emergency. The Court found that gross negligence is not a reasonable alternative to ordinary negligence and that the statute’s limitation impermissibly abolishes a protected right of action. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings, while vacating part of the court of appeals’ reasoning and replacing it with its own. View "ROEBUCK v MAYO CLINIC" on Justia Law

A residential community consisting of sixty-seven homes was developed and sold by a developer, with a separate contractor responsible for construction. Each homebuyer entered into a purchase agreement with the developer, which included an anti-assignment clause stating that the agreement and the buyer’s rights under it could not be assigned without the developer’s written consent. The developer later created a homeowners’ association (HOA) to manage the community’s common areas and certain aspects of the homes’ exteriors. After construction, the HOA alleged that the community suffered from construction defects and filed suit against both the developer and the contractor, asserting claims under Arizona’s dwelling action statutes and for breach of the implied warranty of workmanship and habitability.The Superior Court in Maricopa County granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding that the HOA had no legal right to assert a claim for breach of the implied warranty and that the purchase agreement’s anti-assignment clause barred homeowners from assigning such claims to the HOA. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that the implied warranty claim was part of the contract and that the anti-assignment clause validly precluded assignment of those claims to the HOA.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case to determine whether the anti-assignment clause prevented homeowners from assigning their accrued claims for breach of the implied warranty to the HOA. The court held that the anti-assignment clause, which prohibited assignment of the agreement and the buyer’s rights under it, did not prohibit the assignment of accrued claims for damages arising from breach of the implied warranty. The court distinguished between assignment of contract rights and assignment of claims for damages, concluding that the latter was not barred by the agreement’s language. The Supreme Court vacated the relevant portions of the Court of Appeals’ decision, reversed the trial court’s summary judgment on the implied warranty claim, and remanded for further proceedings. View "POINTE 16 v GTIS-HOV" on Justia Law

Roger Contreras and Nancy Bourke were involved in a marriage dissolution proceeding in Cochise County, Arizona, with a decree entered in 2011. The case saw extensive post-decree litigation. In February 2020, all Cochise County Superior Court judges, including Judge Timothy Dickerson, recused themselves from the matter without providing reasons on the record, and the case was reassigned to a Pima County judge. In 2021, Judge Dickerson became the presiding judge of Cochise County Superior Court and subsequently appointed Contreras as a justice of the peace pro tempore. In December 2022, Contreras moved to have Bourke declared a vexatious litigant, and Judge Dickerson, despite his prior recusal, ruled on the motion without explaining his re-entry or giving the parties an opportunity to object.Judge Dickerson designated Bourke a vexatious litigant. Bourke appealed, and the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that Bourke had waived any challenge to Judge Dickerson’s participation by failing to timely seek disqualification under relevant statutes and rules. The appellate majority did not address Bourke’s argument regarding Judge Dickerson’s appointment of Contreras as a justice of the peace pro tempore as a potential conflict, while the dissent argued that waiver should not apply under the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case. It held that once a judge recuses from a case, the judge remains disqualified from further participation unless the judge articulates the reasons why recusal is no longer required and allows the parties an opportunity to object. The court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion, reversed the superior court’s order declaring Bourke a vexatious litigant, and remanded for a different judge to rule on Contreras’ motion. View "CONTRERAS v BOURKE" on Justia Law

A defendant diagnosed with schizophrenia was charged with first-degree murder and related felonies. After being found incompetent to stand trial and not restorable (“NCNR”), the trial court dismissed the charges without prejudice and ordered a civil commitment evaluation. The defendant was discharged from the treatment facility, and the State refiled the same charges, adding a new weapons charge. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that under a recent appellate decision, the State needed judicial approval before refiling charges against someone previously found NCNR.The Superior Court in Maricopa County initially allowed the State to refile charges, finding there was a reasonable belief the defendant’s competency might have changed. However, a different trial judge later dismissed the refiled case, concluding the State lacked sufficient basis to believe the defendant had regained competency. The Arizona Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s orders permitting refiling, holding that the State must present sufficient information to support a reasonable belief of regained competency before refiling, as required by Johnson v. Hartsell. The appellate court also addressed whether a dangerousness trial could proceed without pending charges and whether the State could rely on a prior NCNR finding.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case and vacated the appellate court’s decision. The Court held that due process does not require the State to obtain judicial approval before refiling charges against an NCNR defendant. It overruled the judicial preapproval requirement established in Johnson v. Hartsell and reaffirmed the standard from Rider v. Garcia, allowing the State to refile charges based on a reasonable belief that competency may have been restored. The Court also held that a dangerousness trial under A.R.S. § 13-4517(A)(4) requires pending charges, may rely on a prior NCNR finding for the same conduct, and that the statute applies retroactively. The trial court’s order authorizing the State to proceed was affirmed. View "CARSON v GENTRY" on Justia Law

A political committee sought to place a constitutional initiative on the Arizona general election ballot that would have replaced partisan primaries with an open primary system. To qualify, the committee needed to submit signatures from at least 15% of qualified electors, as required by the Arizona Constitution. The committee submitted more than the required number of signatures, but opponents challenged the initiative, alleging violations of the separate amendment rule, misleading petition summaries, and various deficiencies in the signature collection process, including claims of duplicate signatures.The Superior Court in Maricopa County consolidated the challenges and set an expedited schedule due to the impending ballot printing deadline. The court first rejected the legal challenges regarding the separate amendment rule and petition summary, a decision affirmed on appeal. After a hearing on the signature challenges, the trial court initially overruled the objections to alleged duplicate signatures, finding the evidence inadmissible, and determined the initiative had enough valid signatures. On further review, the Arizona Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration of the duplicate signature evidence. After further proceedings, including review by a special master, the trial court ultimately dismissed the challenge, finding the statutory method for signature validation unconstitutional as applied, and holding it lacked authority to grant the requested injunction.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case and held that the statutory formula in A.R.S. § 19-121.04(A), which required double counting of some invalid signatures, was unconstitutional as applied to this initiative. The court found that this method effectively raised the constitutionally mandated 15% signature threshold for constitutional initiatives, contrary to the framers’ intent. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment dismissing the challenge, holding that the initiative would have qualified for the ballot absent the unconstitutional double counting. View "SMITH v FONTES" on Justia Law

In 2010, an inmate killed his cellmate in an Arizona state prison, inflicting fatal blunt and sharp force injuries. The defendant was convicted by a jury of premeditated first degree murder. The jury found three statutory aggravating factors: a prior conviction for a serious offense, the especially heinous or depraved manner of the crime, and that the offense was committed while in the custody of the state department of corrections. The jury determined that death was the appropriate sentence.The Arizona Supreme Court previously reviewed the case in 2017, affirming the conviction and the findings in the aggravation phase, but vacating the death sentence and remanding for a new penalty phase to comply with United States Supreme Court precedent regarding jury instructions on parole ineligibility. On remand, the defendant waived his right to counsel and to present mitigating evidence, a waiver the trial court found to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The penalty phase was conducted with the defendant representing himself, assisted by advisory counsel, but he did not present any mitigating evidence or argument. The jury again returned a death verdict, and the superior court imposed the sentence.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case on automatic appeal. The court held that the trial court erred by permitting the defendant to be visibly restrained before the jury without making case-specific findings as required by Deck v. Missouri, but found that this error was not fundamental and did not prejudice the outcome, given the overwhelming aggravating evidence and the defendant’s own choices. The court also held that the defendant’s waiver of mitigation was valid and that the trial court was not required to present mitigating evidence over his objection. The court found no abuse of discretion in the jury instructions, no fundamental error in declining to define “moral culpability,” and no prosecutorial error. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence. View "STATE OF ARIZONA v RUSHING" on Justia Law