Justia Arizona Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Supreme Court of Arizona was asked to clarify whether Proposition 209, a voter initiative, repealed or affected the validity of a particular portion of the Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S. § 33-1126(A)(11)). The Court held that Proposition 209 neither expressly nor implicitly repealed A.R.S. § 33-1126(A)(11), which was enacted by the Arizona legislature after the drafting of Proposition 209 but before it was voted on.The case arose when Erica Riggins filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and claimed an exemption under A.R.S. § 33-1126(A)(11), which was an exemption for certain types of federal and state tax credits. The Chapter 7 Trustee objected, arguing that Proposition 209, which amended a number of debt collection statutes and was passed by voters after the enactment of A.R.S. § 33-1126(A)(11), repealed the tax credit exemption.Upon review, the Court found that the voters did not expressly repeal A.R.S. § 33-1126(A)(11) by passing Proposition 209, as the proposition did not contain any language suggesting such a repeal. The Court also found that Proposition 209 did not implicitly repeal A.R.S. § 33-1126(A)(11) because the two did not conflict with each other. Both sought to enhance debtor protections, with Proposition 209 increasing the value of certain exemptions while A.R.S. § 33-1126(A)(11) added a new exemption for tax credits. As such, the Court declared A.R.S. § 33-1126(A)(11) to be still operative. View "In re: RIGGINS" on Justia Law

In this case, Steven and Mary Drummond, who resided in their 2017 Tiffin Allegro motor home, filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and claimed that their motor home was subject to the homestead exemption as a "mobile home" under Arizona law. The trustee objected, arguing that the Drummonds' motor home was not a mobile home under Arizona law. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona certified the question to the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona: “Whether a motor home in which a person over 18 years of age resides qualifies as a mobile home for the purpose of claiming an Arizona homestead exemption pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1101(A)(3).” The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona held that a motor home does not qualify for an exemption under A.R.S. § 33-1101(A)(3). The court reasoned that the statutory context of A.R.S. § 33-1101(A)(3) suggests that a "mobile home" under the statute describes a dwelling that is not intended to be moved once placed and physically attached to property. Thus, a "motor home" is not a "mobile home" under the homestead statute because it is readily movable and not anchored to land. View "In re: DRUMMOND" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a recorded judgment lien attaches to homestead property where the judgment debtor has equity in excess of the amount exempt under Arizona law.Pacific Western Bank (PWB) obtained a California judgment against Todd McLauchlan that was domesticated and recorded in Arizona. McLauchlan later filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition identifying an ownership interest in a residence and claiming the statutory homestead exemption in the residence. PWB filed a proof of claim, $552,497 of which was secured by the recorded judgment lien. The remaining $115,985 was unsecured. After McLauchlan received his discharge he sold the residence and realized $56,852 in excess of the $150,000 homestead exemption. PWB filed a motion seeking a determination that McLauchlan's bankruptcy discharge did not affect its interest secured by its recorded judgment. At issue was whether, under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 33-964(B), judgment liens attach to homestead property. The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative. View "In re McLauchlan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff refinanced her home by executing a promissory note in favor of Saxon Mortgage and a deed of trust (DOT) naming Saxon as beneficiary and a title company as trustee. Saxon assigned the note to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as trustee for Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2005-3 by endorsing the note in blank. The assignment was not recorded. Plaintiff defaulted under the note. Deutsche Bank then executed a substitution of trustee, removing the title company as trustee and appointing Tiffany and Bosco as the substituting trustee. Tiffany and Bosco recorded a notice of trustee's sale, naming "Deutsche Bank/2005-3" as the current beneficiary in care of Saxon Mortgage Services. An agent of Saxon then executed an assignment of the DOT, assigning all its beneficial interest to Deutsche Bank. The Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction of questions certified by the United State Bankruptcy Court, answering that the recording of an assignment of deed of trust is not required prior to the filing of a notice of trustee's sale under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 33-808 when the assignee holds a promissory note payable to bearer. View "Vasquez v. Saxon Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law